摘要
自1942年Schumpeter发现大企业更有可能进行技术创新以来,中外学者对影响企业技术创新的因素进行了大量的研究。研究大致可分为两个方面：来自企业的微观因素和来自外部的宏观因素。这些研究的前提是企业处于一个市场化的制度环境中,而对于处于从计划经济向市场经济转型期中国的民营企业,其技术创新的驱动因素则有必要进行其他视角的研究。政治关联指的是企业与政府或拥有政治权力的个人形成的非正式、特殊的政企关系。这种企业和政府之间的特殊关系,在世界各国的发展中都是一个普遍现象。在我国向市场经济转型的制度背景下,由于地方政府经常干预企业以及民营经济本身所遭受的所有制歧视等原因,民营企业家更是热衷于政治关联。可见,从政治关联的角度对转型期中国民营企业技术创新的影响因素进行研究,有着重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本文在系统回顾国内外相关研究的基础上,运用新制度经济学理论、寻租理论、公司治理理论和技术创新理论,采用理论分析与实证分析相结合的研究方法,以我国2009-2011年创业板上市公司的经验数据为样本,对政治关联如何影响民营企业的技术创新进行了全面研究。首先,结合转型期中国民营企业的制度环境,分析了民营企业政治关联的起源、发展历程及其现状,并运用两个案例初步分析了政治关联对于技术创新的影响；其次,基于政府视角对政治关联影响技术创新的途径进行了理论研究；接着,基于企业视角对政治关联影响技术创新的途径进行了理论研究；然后,对前文理论研究提出的假设进行了相应的实证检验；最后,在理论和实证研究的基础上,得到全文结论并给出了政策建议。
本文研究在以下几个方面实现了一定的创新：第一,从政治关联这个视角来研究企业的技术创新,选题本身就具有新颖性；第二,使用新制度经济学理论来解释企业的政治关联；第三,从寻租带来的政策优惠和政治负担角度来研究政治关联对于技术创新的影响；第四,从公司治理的角度来研究政治关联对于技术创新的影响。另外,本文使用创业板上市公司的数据作为实证研究的样本,也在一定程度上弥补了该领域研究较少的空白。
本文通过研究得出了以下结论：第一,在制度环境较差或者说市场化进程相对较慢的地区,民营企业政治关联会更加普遍。进一步研究还发现,政府对企业的干预、企业的对外税费负担以及对生产者合法权益的保护是影响企业政治关联的关键因素；第二,总体来说,政治关联的民营企业相对于非政治关联企业来说,技术创新的水平更低,政治关联对于民营企业的技术创新活动起到了阻碍的作用；第三,政治关联的民营企业可以从银行得到更多的贷款,然而这些贷款反而使得技术创新的水平降低。政治关联可以帮助企业获得更多财政补贴,从而促进了企业的技术创新。政治关联造成的政策性负担使得民营企业家不得不雇佣更多的冗余员工和进行过度的固定资产投资,造成了用于技术创新资金的减少。第四,股权集中使得大股东更有动力去投资于技术创新,而在政治关联的的企业中,这种动力会减弱。两职合一使得总经理更有权力来推动企业的技术创新,而政治关联同样使得这种影响减弱。在政治关联的民营企业中,接受过高水平教育的董事人数更少,聘用有技术背景的人才为总经理的可能性也更小,这些都会对企业的技术创新产生负面影响。
本文提出了以下的政策建议：第一,加快市场化建设的进程,减少政府对经济的直接干预,让市场在资源的配置方面发挥基础作用；第二,对政府来说,在制度设计上要创造出一个公平的竞争环境,给予所有企业平等的待遇,从制度上来约束民营企业进行政治关联寻租的动机。对企业来说,对于政治关联要有一个清醒的认识,更应该发挥企业家精神,将企业的主要精力投入到生产活动中来。第三,为了促进企业的技术创新,增强企业的竞争能力,政府要合理利用财政税收等手段进行激励和引导,同时减轻企业身上的负担。企业也应该加强制度建设,不断完善自己的公司治理结构。
Since Schumpeter found large enterprises are more likely to carry out technological innovation in1942, domestic and foreign scholars have conducted a lot of research on the influence factors of technological innovation. Those researches can be divided into two aspects:micro factors from the enterprise and macro factors from the outside. The premise of these studies is that enterprises are in a market environment, and for China's private enterprises during the period of transition from a planned economy to a market economy, research on the driving factors of the technological innovation from other perspective is necessary. Political connection refers to the informal and special relationship between enterprises and government or the individual who has political power. This special relationship between the enterprises and the governments is a common phenomenon all over the world. Under the background of transiting to a market economy in China, private entrepreneurs are keen to political connection because of the intervention from local governments and the ownership discrimination. Therefore, it's meaningful both in theoretical and practical to study the influence factors of technological innovation of China's private enterprises during the period of transition.
After reviewing the domestic and foreign relevant research, this paper has combined the theory of new institutional economics, rent-seeking theory, corporate governance theory and the technological innovation theory, and made use of the research method of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. Based on the private enterprises listed on GEM (Growth Enterprise Market) board, selecting relevant data from2009to2011, this paper has carried out a comprehensive study on how political connection has influenced technological innovation of private enterprises. First of all, base on the institutional environment of China's private enterprises during the period of transition, this paper has introduced the origin and evolution of political connection, and analyzed the impact on technological innovation of political connection with two case studies. Next, this paper has studied how political connection influenced technological innovation from the perspective of government. And then, this paper has studied how political connection influenced technological innovation from the perspective of enterprise. Then, the corresponding empirical test has been made for the hypothesis proposed by former theoretical research. Finally, based on theoretical and empirical research, conclusion and policy recommendation has been made.
This paper has presented some innovations in the following aspects:Firstly, the idea of studying the technological innovation of enterprises from the perspective of political connection is novel. Secondly, it is innovative to explain the political connection with the theory of new institutional economics. Thirdly, it is novel to study the impact on innovation resources of political connection from the perspective of preferential policies and political burden from rent-seeking. Fourthly, it is novel to study the impact on innovation institution of political connection from the perspective of corporate governance. In addition, it also has filled the blank of research to a certain extent by using the data of enterprises listed on GEM board as a sample of empirical studies.
This paper has drawn following conclusions through the research:Firstly, political connection of private enterprises become more common in the region where institutional environment is worse or the process of marketization is slower. Further research shows, government intervention, enterprise's tax burden and the protection of legitimate rights are key factors of political connection for the private enterprises. Secondly, generally speaking, the level of technological innovation is lower in enterprises with political connection which means political connection has hindered the activities of technological innovation for the private enterprises. Thirdly, political connection has brought private enterprises more loans from banks, but these loans have reduced the input of technological innovation. Political connection can help enterprises get more subsidies, so as to promote the technological innovation of enterprises. Private entrepreneurs have to employ redundancy employees and invest in fixed assets excessively because of the policy burden caused by political connection which has reduced the resources of technological innovation. Fourthly, ownership concentration gives big shareholders more motivation to invest in technological innovation and this motivation will be weakened in the enterprises with political connection. Two duties in one bring CEO more power to promote the technological innovation and also this power will be weakened in the enterprises with political connection. In private enterprises with political connection, the ratio of board members who has received high level education is lower, and the possibility of employing a CEO with technical background is lower, which will have a negative impact on technological innovation.
This paper has proposed following policy recommendations:Firstly, to accelerate the construction of marketization and to reduce the direct government intervention in the economy, which make market play a basic role in the allocation of resources. Secondly, for government, to create a fair competition environment in the field of institution design and to give all enterprises equal treatment which will constraint the rent-seeking incentives by political connection for private enterprises. For enterprises, to have a clear understanding of political connection and play more entrepreneurial spirit which means spending more energy on the production activities. Thirdly, In order to promote the technological innovation of enterprises and enhance the competitiveness of the enterprises, the government should make use of fiscal, taxation and other polices to encourage and guide enterprises, while reducing their burden. Enterprises should strengthen the institution construction, and constantly improve the corporate governance structure.
引文
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