摘要
我国为了加快国际化步伐，实现与国际会计准则的协调与趋同，于2006年2月颁布了新企业会计准则体系，其中最显著的变化、最大的亮点就是公允价值计量属性的适度运用。然而，正当我国适度引入公允价值会计的同时，美国次贷危机引发的全球化金融危机席卷而来，公允价值会计运用的适当性引起了理论界、实务界和监管机构的激烈争论。目前，我国处于新会计准则的试水阶段，政府和监管机构需要经验累积，市场和企业需要时间适应，加上次贷危机引发的各界对公允价值会计的质疑，种种形势表明公允价值会计的相关研究十分必要且迫切。
本文的研究主题是公允价值会计信息的契约有用性。企业的相关利益方通过签订和履行各类契约达成和实现交易，而契约的设计很大程度依赖于会计信息，公允价值计量方式的引入又改变了传统历史成本计量方式下会计信息的涵义和列报方式，具有顺周期效应，影响了会计信息的相关性和可靠性；“企业行为异化理论”的引入又将公允价值会计信息与企业内部治理中的异化行为相联系，探求公允价值会计信息导致的企业行为异化对薪酬契约、债务契约和股利契约的影响，具有一定的创新性和现实意义。
全文总共分为九大章节，从基础研究、理论分析、实证检验、政策建议四大板块就研究主题做全方位的探索。
基础研究板块包括第1章和第2章。开篇第1章论述了本文选题的理论价值和现实意义，简要陈述并分析了国内外研究现状，概括了主要研究内容，构建出研究框架，并提出了主要创新点。第2章从公允价值准则体系建设和应用历程的角度，回顾和梳理了公允价值在美国会计准则体系、国际会计准则体系以及我国会计准则体系中的发展过程，并分析了公允价值在我国新会计准则体系中的具体运用情况及应用特征。
理论分析板块包括第3章和第4章。第3章作为本文研究的理论基础，阐述了企业契约理论、会计信息质量理论、委托代理理论、融资理论、股利分配理论、企业行为异化理论的主要观点，为后文的实证研究提供理论依据和理论支撑。第4章是公允价值会计信息的契约有用性机理论述，主要立足于对核心要素和重要关系做理论探讨，是后续几章系统性机理分析和实证研究的理论基础和思路参考。
实证检验板块包括第5章、第6章和第7章，是整篇论文的核心，分别研究公允价值会计信息的薪酬契约、债务契约、股利契约有用性。笔者遵循机理分析，假设提出，实证检验，结论分析的思路，得出了一系列有价值的结论。1）薪酬契约有用性的研究发现：公允价值变动损益与高管薪酬具有显著的相关性，且高管薪酬对公允价值变动损益的敏感系数与对经常性损益的敏感系数几乎等同，甚至在稳定性检验中高于经常性损益的敏感系数；当产生公允价值变动收益时，公允价值变动损益与高管薪酬显著相关，而发生公允价值变动损失时，两者不存在相关性；国有控股企业的公允价值变动损益与高管薪酬不相关，而非国有控股企业里两者显著正相关。企业董事会或薪酬委员会趋向于有限理性，规避了利用公允价值会计信息的盈余管理手段，没有出现薪酬契约异化的行为。2）债务契约有用性的分析得出：就企业的整体负债规模而言，经常性损益与资产负债率的相关性高于公允价值变动损益；短期债务契约注重解决流动性资金问题，其债务要求短期内偿还，公允价值变动损益与短期债务规模呈正相关关系；长期债务契约着眼于长期投资，偿付周期较长，银行风险更大，公允价值变动损益与长期债务规模不存在相关关系。企业认为银行能够识别公允价值会计信息的特殊性，并不具有盈余管理空间，所以在总体债务和长期债务契约中中没有出现债务异化的行为，短期债务契约可能因银行的约束放松而有债务异化的倾向。3）股利契约有用性的研究结论显示：我国现金股利支付水平较低，上市公司的分配意愿普遍较弱；总体上公允价值变动损益与企业现金股利的支付水平显著正相关，且反应系数与经常性损益相似，在稳定性检验中则小于经常性损益与现金股利支付水平的反应系数；国有控股企业的公允价值变动损益与企业现金股利的支付水平不相关，而非国有控股企业里两者显著正相关；对于股权集中度低的企业，公允价值变动损益与企业现金股利的支付水平不相关，而对于股权集中度高的企业两者显著正相关。企业股东比较理性，重视企业的可持续发展，并没有利用公允价值会计信息进行盈余管理，所以没有出现股利契约异化行为。
政策建议板块为第8章。本章在前述实证研究结论的基础上，结合公允价值会计的发展、运用情况以及我国经济特征，从完善企业薪酬契约、债务契约和股利契约三方面提出政策建议。最后，笔者就全文主要观点及研究结论做了总结，并针对文章的不足和缺陷提出了后续研究的计划。
本论文的主要特色和创新如下：1）现有研究成果忽略了企业出售交易性金融资产时，“公允价值变动损益”科目会结转入“投资收益”科目，而这类公允价值变动损益的减少不是真正的利润损失这一事实，或者认为技术上无法规避该噪音干扰，笔者做了数据筛选和相应的稳定性检验，在一定程度上解决了该问题。2）充分考虑到我国转型时期的各种经济体制特征，对国有企业和非国有企业的体制差异，由大股东持股比例多少带来的股权集中度高低程度，以及不同贷款期限的借款合同做分组剖析，得出一系列有价值的相关结论。3）首次引入企业行为异化理论，关注了公允价值会计信息所能提供的盈余管理空间，是否会导致薪酬契约、债务契约和股利契约的异化行为。
China issued in February2006the new accounting standards system in order tospeed up the pace of international coordination and convergence with internationalaccounting standards. While the most significant change is the moderate use of valuemeasurement attributes. However, the globalization of the financial crisis triggered bythe U.S. subprime mortgage crisis occurred when China is introducing the fair valueaccounting. It caused a fierce debate among the theorists, practitioners and regulatoryagencies on the appropriateness of the use of fair value accounting. At present, China isjust beginning to use the new accounting standards and the government and regulatoryagencies need experiences, the market and companies need time to adapt, coupled withquestions on fair value accounting by subprime mortgage crisis triggered from all walksof life. These all show that the research of fair value accounting is necessary and urgent.
The theme of this paper is the contract usefulness of the fair value accountinginformation. Stakeholders reach and achieve transactions by signing and performingvarious types of contract and contract design depends on the accounting information toa large extent. The introduction of the fair value accounting changed the meaning ofaccounting information and the way of displaying under the traditional historical costand it affected the relativity and reliability of the accounting information. Theintroduction of corporate behavior alienation connected the fair value accountinginformation with the alienation behavior of companies' internal management. It isinnovative and practical to explore the impact of the alienation of corporate behavior,resulted from the fair value accounting information, on payment contract, liabilitycontract and dividend contract.
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. With a well-rounded exploration based onresearch topic, it has four parts, including basic research, theoretical analysis, empiricalstudy and policy suggestion.
The first part consists of Chapter One and Chapter Two. In Chapter One, there isan analysis of the theoretical value and practical significance of the selected topic. Itmakes a brief introduction to the research situation at home and abroad, summarizes themain study content, presents the research framework and puts forward innovative points.Moreover, in accordance with the criterion system construction and application processof fair value, Chapter Two reviews the development of fair value in American Accounting Standards System, International Accounting Standards System and ourcountry's Accounting Standards System. Besides, it analyzes the specific applicationand features of fair value in the new Accounting Standards System of our country.
Chapter Three and Chapter Four are included in the second part. As the theoreticalfoundation of this thesis, Chapter Three expounds on the main points of the theoriesrespectively concerning firm contract, accounting information quality, principal–agentissues, financing and dividend distribution and corporate behavior alienation, providingthe following empirical study with theoretical basis and support. Furthermore,according to the theoretical analysis of core elements and crucial relationship, ChapterFour sketches out the usefulness of the contracts for fair value accounting information,working as the theoretical foundation and idea reference for the succeeding systematicalmechanism analysis as well as empirical study.
As the core content of this thesis, the part of empirical study contains Chapter Five,Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, taking a research on the effectiveness of fair valueaccounting information on remuneration contract, debt contract and dividend contract.Following the idea of mechanism analysis, hypothesizing, empirical test and conclusionanalysis, the author reaches a series of significant conclusions.
Firstly, the article found in the research of compensation contract validity thatchanges in fair values is significantly related to the profit and loss of the pay ofexecutives. The sensitivity coefficient of the pay of executives to the changes in the fairvalue loss is almost equivalent to that of the recurring profit and loss, and even higher thanthat of the recurring profit and loss in stability test. When the change of fair valueresults in profit, they are significantly related, but when it is a lost, there is nocorrelation. In the state-owned enterprises, they are not related to each other, while thereare significant and positive correlations in the non-state owned enterprise. Companiestend to limited rationality and avoid the use of fair value accounting information inearning management. Therefore, there is no payment contract alienation behavior.Secondly, the author derives from the analysis of the debt covenant validity that in theaspect of the size of the overall debt the recurring gains and losses is higher than thechanges in fair values related to the asset-liability ratio. The short-term debt covenantsemphasis on the solving of liquidity problems and the debt requires repaid in a shortterm, so they are positively related. The long-term debt covenants focus on permanentinvestment and it can be settled in a longer period, banks are at greater risk, so there isno correlation between the two. Companies think that banks are capable of identifying the particularity of fair value accounting information and they don't have any space forearning management. As a result, there is no debt alienation behavior in overall debt andlong-term debt contract, whereas short-term debt contract is tend to be alienated owingto the relaxation of bank constraints. Thirdly, the research of the usefulness of thedividend contract shows that the level of our cash dividend payment is low and the desireof the allocation of listed companies is generally weak. The changes in fair values lossand corporate cash dividends payment levels is significantly and positively correlatedand the reaction coefficient is almost the same as that of the recurring profit and loss,but lower than that of the recurring profit and loss and corporate cash dividendspayment levels in stability test. Changes in fair value gains and losses of state-ownedholding companies are uncorrelated with payment of companies' cash dividends, whilethose of non state-owned holding companies are in notably positive correlation with thepayment of companies' cash dividends. Changes in fair value gains and losses andpayment of enterprises' cash dividends are uncorrelated in companies with low stockright concentration, while those are in remarkably positive correlation in companieswith high stock right concentration. The demonstration results above almost conform tothe assumption, confirming the contractual usefulness of fair value accountinginformation in some degree, but some actual and irrational conditions lessen its fairnessas well. The shareholders are relatively rational and attach great importance to thesustainable development of the company. They do not make use of fair value accountinginformation to conduct earning management, so there is no sign of alienation behaviorin dividend contract.
Chapter Eight is about policy suggestion. Based on the previous empirical researchconclusions and combined with the development and application of fair valueaccounting and our economic characteristics, this chapter proposes some policysuggestions to consummate companies' payment contract, liability contract anddividend contract. At last, the author summarizes the thesis' main viewpoint andresearch conclusions and put forward follow-up study for the essay's imperfection.
The characteristics and innovation of this paper lie in three aspects. First, theexisting researches have neglected the fact that the kind of changes in the fair valueloss reduction, which happens at the time that "fair value" subjects are transferred to"return on investment" subjects when enterprises sell trading financial assets, is not areal loss of profit, or believed that the noise interference cannot be technologicallyevaded. The author makes data screening and corresponding stability test and solves the problem to some extent. Second, this paper, taking the characteristics of variouseconomic systems of our country during the period of transition into full consideration,makes packet analysis on the system differences between state-owned enterprises andnon-state enterprises, the ownership concentration degree caused by differentshareholding ratio of large shareholders and the loan contracts with different length ofmaturity and obtains a series of valuable conclusions. Third,this paper introducescorporate behavior theory of alienation initiatively and pays attention to whether theearning management space provided by the fair value accounting information will leadto the alienation behavior of payment contract, liability contract and dividend contract.
引文
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