摘要
草原退化问题是世界性难题,无论从学理上还是治理实践上都有待于深入分析与研究,同时它也是当前可持续性研究中一个重要主题,对草原退化问题的研究将推进可持续发展理论的进展。目前可持续研究中从“制度”角度取得明显进步,本文认为,从制度角度研究草原退化问题同样适用。本文由研究主题方法及框架,牧业制度的演化与变迁,基于产权的制度分析等三部分内容构成,第一部分是导论与基本概念章节,提出本文所运用到的基本概念与理论框架；第二部分从效率、公平、制度与生态可持续性等方面着重对游牧制度、牧业土改、合作化运动、人民公社、牲畜承包、草原承包等制度形式进行回顾与分析,运用诺奖获得者奥斯特罗姆女士的制度分析与发展框架(IAD),从外部变量、决策域、互动模式、产出及评价等框架上进行把握,综合运用数理概念模型、博弈论、经济原理图解、逻辑证明及计量模型验证等多种工具展开分析；第三部分构建了牧业制度模型,从契约、资产价值与产权角度对草原退化的经济学机理进行研究。本文主要结论包括,(1)游牧制度与草原产权制度并非截然矛盾,草原产权的建立经历了从部落制到盟旗制度逐步明确化的过程；游牧制度的成功有四个主要因素,包括牲畜产权的确立、分旗划界的公共产权边界的确立、5%的牲畜头只税与对王爷特权阶层滥用草原权力的限制,游牧制度的成功对当前草原治理也有借鉴作用；(2)牧业土改初期提出的“牧者有其畜”制度造成了大量牲畜被破坏性宰杀,这是后来的“三不两利”的新苏鲁克制度提出的原因。新苏鲁克制度打破了草原契约均衡,增加了草原放牧的交易费用。互助组的快速增长源于新苏鲁克工资管制制度造成的交易费用。初级社与高级社阶段取消了牲畜产权造成了解放后第二次来自牧民的反抗,这之后进入到以生产队为核心的计划经济时代；(3)很多研究包括林毅夫、周其仁等人都指出人民公社低效的命题,然而何以低效的人民公社得以在经历初期的惨痛挫折后持续存在20多年之久,本文注意到,三年自然灾害过后,从中央到地方都采取一系列措施包括“三级所有,队为基础”的人民公社章程规定,这些转变都促进了“一大二公”公共财产相对有效的监管与激励的建立,更为重要的是,本文发现,基层生产者与组织通过“隐瞒产出”方式确立起来的私下激励方式,一定程度补充人民公社制度自身效率的不足,正是隐瞒产出使得原本低效的人民公社制度得以在长期内运行。1978年以来制度的新发展只是把隐瞒产出逐步加以明确化,因而从牧业土改、新苏鲁克、互助组、初级社、高级社、人民公社到牲畜承包、牲畜私有(赎买)中间存在政治推进的非效率的制度形式,然而长期来看,基于实际参与者内在理性的“对抗”与“隐藏”,使得强制参与的人民公社制度具有了效率；(4)牲畜承包与私有制度期间由于草原公共利用,理论上存在草原公地悲剧,然而同期草原管理局的有力监管避免了草原的过度利用。1986年之后草原管理局并入畜牧局使得草原监管执法权限下降,草原畜牧业生产成为地方主要职能,这是之后草原退化的重要原因；草原承包阶段,由于存在产权交易费用,从启动产权改革迄今为止,真正承包到户草原(实际围栏草原)比例不超过50%,因而理论上存在未明确草原上的公地悲剧问题。本文借助草原资产价值理论指出,即便草原产权明确也解决不了因过度放牧导致的退化问题,因而存在“私地悲剧”,即当牧民个人折现率高于牧草再生率时,牧民理性的选择过度利用草地是符合理性和效率原则的,这里存在一个经济效率与可持续发展的相矛盾的问题。私地悲剧的存在是自2002年之后国家加大对草原管制力度的内在原因,然而高额的管制与补贴成本限制着管制效率,长期有效的治理机制还有待建立；(5)利用草原放牧契约模型,可以得出在草原产权明确情况下,风险中性的牧业契约必定会采取过度放牧策略,甚至即便契约方属于风险厌恶,在草原多种合约存在情况下也蕴藏着过度放牧风险,也就是说,不考虑文化价值观因素,市场经济下,草原退化几乎是不可避免的,这也可视作草原“私地悲剧”的另一种表述；(6)草原产权制度方面存在一些具体问题,包括流转短期化趋势和草原承包权期限较短且成员权规定不明确,这些问题都一定程度上将草原长期投资排除了；(7)草原产权因为产权交易费用的存在导致难以确立100%的草原产权,同时即便建立产权也存在私地悲剧问题,因而可以考虑借鉴游牧制度建立新时期的草原公共治理制度。
Grassland degradation is a worldwide problem no matter from the doctrinal or governance practices that is subject to thorough analysis and research, and which is an important topic in the current sustainability research. Current sustainable study from the perspective of institution has made obvious progress, and I believe that the institution study of the grassland degradation caused by human economic activity is also a right angle. This article is divided into three parts, including the concepts and research topics, the evolution of the institution of animal husbandry and change and the analysis of property rights system and other aspects of research. The first part is an introduction and basic concepts a, put forward basic concepts and theoretical framework used in the paper; The second part review and analyze the nomadic system, animal husbandry, land reform and the cooperative movement, people's communes, livestock contracting and grassland contracting system from the angle of efficiency, fairness, and ecological sustainability, using Institution Analysis and Development framework (IAD) developed by the Nobel Prize winner Mrs Ostrom, from a series of unit framework the external variables, action domain, interactive mode, the output and evaluation, integrated using of mathematical concept model, game theory, economic principle diagram, logical proof and econometric model validation and other tools to analysis; The third part of the animal husbandry institution model is established, in which economics mechanism of grassland degradation from the contract based on risk preference, prairie in the view of asset value and property rights were studied. The main conclusions include:(1)The nomadic system in breeding a variety of heterogeneous animals, be helpful for grassland ecology;Nomadic system and grassland property right system is not very contradictory,the establishment of grassland property right has experienced from tribalism to flag system gradually explicit process; The success of the nomadic system includes four main factors,that is, the establishment of animals'property rights, setting up grassland grazing boundaries and flag demarcation to establish public property rights,5%of the livestock head taxes and power restrictions on sovereign privileged to abuse prairie, the success of the nomadic system can be used as reference for the current grassland management;(2)"shepherd has its livestock" is put forward in the early years of the grazing land reform system that caused a large number of livestock destructively slaughtered, which caught high-level's attention and lead to "No share no fight, herder and owner double win" put forward under the name of the new Sue Luke system; New Sue Luke system has broken the contract balance and increased transaction costs of grassland grazing grassland; Peer support rapid growth comes from high transaction costs caused by the new Sue Luke system; Elementary and senior agricultural producers' cooperative is the product of political movement which both are neither efficient nor fairness.(3) Pushed by a political movement, the establishment of people's commune system was promoted and the degree of public ownership upgrade to an unprecedented height, but because of limitation of information and the technology at the time, however, impossible to establish effective regulatory organization and system, thus formed the common tragedy of ineffective regulation, and three years of natural disasters is painful example of the tragedy of the Commons in the early years of the people's communes; A lot of research including Lin and Zhou have pointed out the proposition of the people's commune inefficiency, but why inefficiency of the people's communes after the early bitter frustrations could persist for more than20years, this paper noticed that after three years of natural disasters, from central to local levels have taken a series of measures including "3level's ownership but on the basis of team" as articles of association of the people's commune, all those transformation pushed relatively effective supervision and motivation to public property to build up. More important, the article found kinds of private incentives were established by way of hiding "output" by primary producers and teams, to a certain extent effective supplement the shortage of incentive of the people's commune system itself. It is hiding output that increased incentives to make the inefficient people's commune system to be subsistent in the long run. Since1978the development of is make the hiding of output gradually to clear and direct incentive until to livestock contracting and private purchasing, thus from Grazing Land Reform, the new Suluke, Peer Support Team, Elementary and Senior agricultural producers' cooperative, People's communes to Livestock Contracting Institution, private purchasing, in between there were the inefficiency of exists which pushed by political motion, but in the long term, the institutions chosen are gradually have some efficiency just for rational "confrontation" and "action hidden" by actual participants;(4) theoretical there is grassland tragedy of the Commons livestock during contracting and private purchasing system due to the prairie public use; Grassland property rights reform or contracting, because of high transaction cost to establish grassland property rights, is a slowly process from start to date, and the real grassland (actual enclosure grassland) that were contracted to family is less than50%, so in theory there is a the Commons tragedy of grasslands due to the non-contracted grasslands; In this paper, based on prairie asset value theory, I points out that degradation as a result of overgrazing can't be solved by definition of the property rights, because of existence of "private tragedy", namely when personal discount rate of herdsmen higher than regeneration rate of grass, herdsmen will rationally choose to excessive use of the grassland which is in conformity with the principle of rationality and efficiency, so there is a paradox of economic efficiency and sustainable development issues; The existence of private tragedy is the root cause of increasing restrictions on grassland since2002, however, high controls and subsidies cost limits the govern and control efficiency, and a long-term effective governance mechanism remains to be established;(5) Under the condition of clear grassland property rights a grassland-livestock contract model was built conclusion is that animal husbandry contract parties of risk neutral bound to take overgrazing strategy; Even if the contract parties of the risk aversion, in condition of exists a variety of grassland contract there also is the risk of the overgrazing, that is to say, no consideration for cultural values factor, under the market economy, grassland degradation is almost inevitable. This can also be seen as another kind of expression of the prairie "private tragedy";(6) of grassland property rights system there lie some specific problems, including the trend of shorter transfer the possession of grassland and grassland contract rights deadline and provisions of member rights of grassland contracting are not clear, all these problems which to a certain extent will rule out the prairie long-term investments;(7) Establishment100%of grassland property right because of the existence of property rights transaction costs is impossible and at the same time problems of private tragedy even establishing property rights,so a public governance system is proposed in the new period according to an experience from the nomadic system.
引文
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