农业保险的农户收入效应、信息不对称风险
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摘要
近年来,农业保险作为一种被WTO“绿箱政策”所允许的可分散风险、弥补损失的非价格农业保护工具,日益得到世界各国政府的重视。中共中央、国务院连续10个“一号文件”均提出要加大对我国农业保险的财政支持力度,逐步建立健全我国的政策性农业保险制度；特别是自2007年起中央财政开始按照WTO协议中有关政府可在财政上参与农业保险以支持本国农业发展的要求提供保费补贴,我国农业保险呈现出蓬勃快速的发展趋势。内蒙古自治区作为保费补贴的首批试点地区之一,农业保险规模持续快速增长,自2007年到2012年,内蒙古农业保险保费收入从4.33亿元增加到19.21亿元,增长3.44倍；各级政府保费补贴从3.37亿元增加到17.38亿元,增长4.16倍,各级政府的财政补贴无疑是内蒙古农业保险蓬勃快速发展的重要推手。然而,大量的财政保费补贴资金是否可以实现农业保险稳定农户收入的政策效应?现行的农业保险在开展中是否存在由信息不对称引起的道德风险问题和逆向选择行为?对这些问题的理论研究与实证检验不仅是对中国特色农业保险理论的补充和完善,也是为进一步促进内蒙古甚至整个中国的农业保险的可持续发展提供决策依据和政策建议。
基于上述背景,本研究综合运用微观经济学、农业经济学、计量经济学等相关经济学理论和方法,以内蒙古六年的政策性农业保险实践为研究对象,对该项支农惠农政策的福利效应和运营风险进行理论分析与实证研究,以试图解答两个研究问题：(1)农业保险是否具有稳定农户收入的政策效应?若有,则其政策效应是否己真正落实到受益主体农户身上?目前,影响农业保险政策效应发挥的主要因素是什么?其形成原因又是什么?(2)在现行的农业保险制度下,农业保险在开展中是否存在运营风险,或者说,行为主体是否存在由信息不对称引起的道德风险问题和逆向选择行为?如果存在,如何规避?研究的主要内容和结论陈述如下：
内容一：农业保险稳定农户收入的政策效应研究。
从理论上看,农业保险可以降低农户收入波动,具有减轻农业风险、弥补因灾损失、稳定农户收入的政策效应。然而,基于微观农户样本数据,本文分别采用倍差模型、匹配模型和匹配倍差模型对农业保险稳定农户收入的政策效应进行实证检验,结果发现,在内蒙古现行“低保障、广覆盖、低保费、低赔偿”的农业保险制度下,该项支农惠农政策尚难以发挥其稳定农户收入的福利效应。
内容二：农业保险中“协议”理赔的成因研究。
研究发现：“协议”理赔是影响农业保险稳定农户收入的政策效应真正落实到受益主体农户身上的直接因素之一。内蒙古农业保险开展中“协议”理赔模式的产生既是政府、农户、保险公司三方行为主体由于地位不对等而导致的各自利益低水平均衡的结果,更是三方利益相关者出于自身利益考虑所做出的现实选择,具体表现在农户的效用最大化与其弱势群体地位的不一致,政府的社会福利最大化让位于保持政策持续和社会稳定,保险公司的利益最大化与其基层组织体系建设的不匹配。
内容三：农业保险中三方行为主体的道德风险问题研究。
研究发现：在内蒙古现行的农业保险制度下,农户、政府、保险公司三方行为主体均存在道德风险问题,其中,农户的道德风险问题可分为农户事前消极防损与事后怠于减损的不积极行为和农户事前骗保与事后骗赔的保险欺诈行为两类。三方利益主体均存在道德风险问题的现实原因是投保农户的认知偏差和侥幸心理,保险公司的利益驱使和机会主义,政府部门的认知误区与监管缺位；同时,道德风险不仅会使保险公司的业务拓展受挫,而且会造成各级政府的财政补贴资金流失。然而,基于农户视角的实证检验却发现,无论是在种植业保险市场还是在养殖业保险市场,在内蒙古现行“低保障、广覆盖、低保费、低赔偿”的农业保险制度下,投保农户均不存在事前消极防损和事后怠于减损即事前与事后的不积极行为的道德风险问题,但存在事前骗保与事后骗赔等属于保险欺诈范畴的道德风险问题。
内容四：农业保险中农户逆向选择行为的理论与实证研究。
农业保险市场中农户逆向选择的产生机理是投保农户在农业生产中风险差异的客观存在和保险公司根据农户在农业生产中的平均损失概率厘定保险费率；深层根源则是农业保险标的的特殊性,保险公司经营管理方面的不足以及部分农户对农业保险的认知存在偏差。如果农户的逆向选择行为非常严重,则会导致农业保险市场的风险累积和供求失衡。另外,基于微观农户视角,采用非参数分析方法和计量经济模型对农户在内蒙古现行“低保障、广覆盖、低保费、低赔偿”的农业保险政策实施中是否存在逆向选择行为进行实证检验,结果显示：农户确实存在逆向选择问题,但其并不严重；原因可能是目前内蒙古农业保险理赔中“协议”赔付的广泛存在和政府对农户的大规模保费补贴。
本文的创新点主要有两个方面：首先,在理论研究方面,本研究对农业保险中“协议”理赔的概念、表现、后果及其成因给予系统论述,同时对农户、政府和保险公司三方行为主体道德风险和农户逆向选择的形成机理及其危害进行了全面深入的研究,研究结论不仅可以为消除“协议理赔”提供理论依据,而且可以完善农业保险的信息不对称理论。其次,在实证研究方面,本研究应用农户层面的调查数据,实证检验农业保险是否具有稳定农户收入的政策效应,识别现行农业保险制度下的道德风险和逆向选择等信息不对称风险,研究结果可以为政策制定者与实施者评价农业保险的政策效应和判断农业保险的运营风险提供更为稳健的、可靠的决策依据。
In recent years, agricultural insurance, as a non-price tool to protect agriculture under "Green Box" framework of WTO in mitigating risk and offsetting loss, has been attracting increasing attention from more and more countries of the world. China Central Government proposed to gradually establish and perfect policy-oriented agricultural insurance system by providing more financial support in ten No.1documents from2004to2013. Chinese agricultural insurance revealed a vigorous development trend since the Ministry of Finance in China began to subsidy the insurance premium according to WTO rules in2007. As one of the first pilot regions, agricultural insurance market in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region rapidly expands. The premium income, increasing by3.44times, has growed from0.433billion Yuan to1.921billion Yuan from2007to2012; the subsidies from governments of all levels, increasing by4.16times, has added up to1.738billion Yuan from0.337billion Yuan. So financial subsidies from governments of all levels obviously are an important promoter to rapid development of agricultural insurance in Inner Mongolia. However, whether the extensive subsidies to agricultural insurance can stabilize farmers'income? Is there moral hazard or adverse selection resulting from information asymmetry during the extension of the current agricultural insurance? The theoretical study and empirical test with regard to the above problems can not only supplement and improve theory of agricultural insurance with Chinese characteristics, but also can provide decision basis and policy recommendations to further prompt sustainable development of agricultural insurance in Inner Mongolia even in the whole of China.
Based on above background, this study, focusing on the agricultural insurance practice from2007to2012in Inner Mongolia, theoretically analyses and empirically explores policy effect and operating risk of agricultural insurance by making good use of theories and methods of microeconomics, agricultural economics, econometrics, etc. in order to rationally expound and prove two propositions:(1) Whether the current crop insurance can stabilize farmers'income? If it's possible, whether the benefits from crop insurance have being enjoyed by the insured farmers? What is the main factor influencing policy effect of crop insurance, and its deep-rooted reasons?(2) Is there some operating risks to current agricultural insurance? i.e., do behavioral agents'moral hazard and adverse selection deriving from information asymmetry exist? If they exist, how to reduce? There are four main parts in this thesis, shown as the following:
Part1:to evaluate the policy effect of crop insurance program to stabilize farmers' income.
Theoretically, crop insurance can reduce fluctuation of farmers' income, in other words, it can mitigate risk, compensate loss, and stabilize farmers' income. However, we adopt a variety of robust treatment effect estimation strategies including difference-in-difference (DID), propensity score matching (PSM), and hybrid propensity score matching difference-in-difference treatment effect estimators (PSM-DID) to empirically investigate the causal impact of crop insurance program participation on farmers'income in Inner Mongolia from China, and the results show that crop insurance can not significantly affect farmers'income under the current system of "low-guarantee, wide-coverage, low-premium and low-indemnity" in Inner Mongolia.
Part2:to explain the cause of settling a claim by negotiation.
The results indicate that the mode of settling a claim by negotiation is one of direct factors influencing policy-oriented crop insurance to guarantee farmers'income stability. Fundamentally speaking, settling a claim by negotiation results from low-level equilibrium of benefits of three behavioral agents (including farmer, government and insurance company) because of being unequal status. Meanwhile, it also is realistic choice of behavioral agents in the mouth of their own interest, specifically manifested in inconsistency between utility maximization of farmers and their position of the vulnerable group, social welfare maximization of governments giving way to maintain the policy sustainability and social stability, mismatch between optimal self-interests of insurance company and construction of grass-roots organization.
Part3:to examine moral hazard of three behavioral agents.
The empirical results and some cases point to the existence of moral hazard of farmer, government, and insurance company under the current policy of agricultural insurance. The moral hazard of farmer can be divided into two types:one is inactive behavior of farmers ex ante to prevent loss and inactive behavior ex post to mitigate loss; the other is intentional fraud ex ante or ex post. The practical reasons leading to the existence of moral hazard of three behavioral agents involve cognitive biases and fluke minds from farmer, interests-driven and opportunistic behavior from company insurance, and cognitive mistakes and absence of supervision from government. Meanwhile, moral hazard can not bring about frustration of business development of insurance company, but also lead to dissipation of financial subsidies from governments at all levels. However, the empirical results show that the insured producer can not adopt inactive behavior to prevent loss ex ante and to mitigate loss ex post, and find that insurance fraud (including fabricating insurance object ex ante, and deceiving claims ex post) really exists in crop insurance market or in livestock insurance market under the current policy of "low-guarantee, wide-coverage, low-premium and low-indemnity" in Inner Mongolia from China.
Part4:to theoretically and empirically explore adverse selection of farmer in crop insurance market.
The generating mechanism of adverse selection is that risk difference of the insured farmer exists objectively, and insurance company makes premium rate according to average loss probability in agricultural production. Its deeper reasons are the specificity of insurance objects, weakness of operating management of insurance company, and cognitive bias of some farmers. Adverse selection may result in risk accumulation and supply-demand imbalance of agricultural insurance. In addition, this paper uses non-parametric analysis and econometric model to empirically test the presence of adverse selection of the insured farmer under the present crop insurance system of "low-guarantee, wide-coverage, low-premium and low-indemnity". The results indicate that adverse selection of farmers does exist, but it is not serious, whose reasons may be the mode of settling a claim by negotiation and considerable premium subsidies from governments at all levels.
The innovations of this paper include two aspects. Firstly, in theoretical analysis, we analyze systematically the concept, manifestation, consequence and cause of the mode of settling a claim by negotiation, and thoroughly and deeply explore the generating mechanism and consequence of moral hazard from three behavioral agents (including farmer, government and insurance company) and of adverse selection from farmer under the current policy of agricultural insurance in Inner Mongolia. The conclusions can not only offer theoretical basis to eliminate the mode of settling a claim by negotiation, but also perfect the theory of information asymmetry of agricultural insurance. Secondly, in empirical study, we evaluate the policy effect of crop insurance program to stabilize farmers'income and identify the information asymmetry risks including moral hazard and adverse selection based on the first-hand data collected by questionnaires under the current system of crop insurance or livestock insurance in Inner Mongolia from China. The empirical results can provide more robust or more reliable decision basis for policy makers and policy implementer to access the effectiveness of agricultural insurance on farmers' income and estimate its operating risks.
基于上述背景,本研究综合运用微观经济学、农业经济学、计量经济学等相关经济学理论和方法,以内蒙古六年的政策性农业保险实践为研究对象,对该项支农惠农政策的福利效应和运营风险进行理论分析与实证研究,以试图解答两个研究问题：(1)农业保险是否具有稳定农户收入的政策效应?若有,则其政策效应是否己真正落实到受益主体农户身上?目前,影响农业保险政策效应发挥的主要因素是什么?其形成原因又是什么?(2)在现行的农业保险制度下,农业保险在开展中是否存在运营风险,或者说,行为主体是否存在由信息不对称引起的道德风险问题和逆向选择行为?如果存在,如何规避?研究的主要内容和结论陈述如下：
内容一：农业保险稳定农户收入的政策效应研究。
从理论上看,农业保险可以降低农户收入波动,具有减轻农业风险、弥补因灾损失、稳定农户收入的政策效应。然而,基于微观农户样本数据,本文分别采用倍差模型、匹配模型和匹配倍差模型对农业保险稳定农户收入的政策效应进行实证检验,结果发现,在内蒙古现行“低保障、广覆盖、低保费、低赔偿”的农业保险制度下,该项支农惠农政策尚难以发挥其稳定农户收入的福利效应。
内容二：农业保险中“协议”理赔的成因研究。
研究发现：“协议”理赔是影响农业保险稳定农户收入的政策效应真正落实到受益主体农户身上的直接因素之一。内蒙古农业保险开展中“协议”理赔模式的产生既是政府、农户、保险公司三方行为主体由于地位不对等而导致的各自利益低水平均衡的结果,更是三方利益相关者出于自身利益考虑所做出的现实选择,具体表现在农户的效用最大化与其弱势群体地位的不一致,政府的社会福利最大化让位于保持政策持续和社会稳定,保险公司的利益最大化与其基层组织体系建设的不匹配。
内容三：农业保险中三方行为主体的道德风险问题研究。
研究发现：在内蒙古现行的农业保险制度下,农户、政府、保险公司三方行为主体均存在道德风险问题,其中,农户的道德风险问题可分为农户事前消极防损与事后怠于减损的不积极行为和农户事前骗保与事后骗赔的保险欺诈行为两类。三方利益主体均存在道德风险问题的现实原因是投保农户的认知偏差和侥幸心理,保险公司的利益驱使和机会主义,政府部门的认知误区与监管缺位；同时,道德风险不仅会使保险公司的业务拓展受挫,而且会造成各级政府的财政补贴资金流失。然而,基于农户视角的实证检验却发现,无论是在种植业保险市场还是在养殖业保险市场,在内蒙古现行“低保障、广覆盖、低保费、低赔偿”的农业保险制度下,投保农户均不存在事前消极防损和事后怠于减损即事前与事后的不积极行为的道德风险问题,但存在事前骗保与事后骗赔等属于保险欺诈范畴的道德风险问题。
内容四：农业保险中农户逆向选择行为的理论与实证研究。
农业保险市场中农户逆向选择的产生机理是投保农户在农业生产中风险差异的客观存在和保险公司根据农户在农业生产中的平均损失概率厘定保险费率；深层根源则是农业保险标的的特殊性,保险公司经营管理方面的不足以及部分农户对农业保险的认知存在偏差。如果农户的逆向选择行为非常严重,则会导致农业保险市场的风险累积和供求失衡。另外,基于微观农户视角,采用非参数分析方法和计量经济模型对农户在内蒙古现行“低保障、广覆盖、低保费、低赔偿”的农业保险政策实施中是否存在逆向选择行为进行实证检验,结果显示：农户确实存在逆向选择问题,但其并不严重；原因可能是目前内蒙古农业保险理赔中“协议”赔付的广泛存在和政府对农户的大规模保费补贴。
本文的创新点主要有两个方面：首先,在理论研究方面,本研究对农业保险中“协议”理赔的概念、表现、后果及其成因给予系统论述,同时对农户、政府和保险公司三方行为主体道德风险和农户逆向选择的形成机理及其危害进行了全面深入的研究,研究结论不仅可以为消除“协议理赔”提供理论依据,而且可以完善农业保险的信息不对称理论。其次,在实证研究方面,本研究应用农户层面的调查数据,实证检验农业保险是否具有稳定农户收入的政策效应,识别现行农业保险制度下的道德风险和逆向选择等信息不对称风险,研究结果可以为政策制定者与实施者评价农业保险的政策效应和判断农业保险的运营风险提供更为稳健的、可靠的决策依据。
In recent years, agricultural insurance, as a non-price tool to protect agriculture under "Green Box" framework of WTO in mitigating risk and offsetting loss, has been attracting increasing attention from more and more countries of the world. China Central Government proposed to gradually establish and perfect policy-oriented agricultural insurance system by providing more financial support in ten No.1documents from2004to2013. Chinese agricultural insurance revealed a vigorous development trend since the Ministry of Finance in China began to subsidy the insurance premium according to WTO rules in2007. As one of the first pilot regions, agricultural insurance market in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region rapidly expands. The premium income, increasing by3.44times, has growed from0.433billion Yuan to1.921billion Yuan from2007to2012; the subsidies from governments of all levels, increasing by4.16times, has added up to1.738billion Yuan from0.337billion Yuan. So financial subsidies from governments of all levels obviously are an important promoter to rapid development of agricultural insurance in Inner Mongolia. However, whether the extensive subsidies to agricultural insurance can stabilize farmers'income? Is there moral hazard or adverse selection resulting from information asymmetry during the extension of the current agricultural insurance? The theoretical study and empirical test with regard to the above problems can not only supplement and improve theory of agricultural insurance with Chinese characteristics, but also can provide decision basis and policy recommendations to further prompt sustainable development of agricultural insurance in Inner Mongolia even in the whole of China.
Based on above background, this study, focusing on the agricultural insurance practice from2007to2012in Inner Mongolia, theoretically analyses and empirically explores policy effect and operating risk of agricultural insurance by making good use of theories and methods of microeconomics, agricultural economics, econometrics, etc. in order to rationally expound and prove two propositions:(1) Whether the current crop insurance can stabilize farmers'income? If it's possible, whether the benefits from crop insurance have being enjoyed by the insured farmers? What is the main factor influencing policy effect of crop insurance, and its deep-rooted reasons?(2) Is there some operating risks to current agricultural insurance? i.e., do behavioral agents'moral hazard and adverse selection deriving from information asymmetry exist? If they exist, how to reduce? There are four main parts in this thesis, shown as the following:
Part1:to evaluate the policy effect of crop insurance program to stabilize farmers' income.
Theoretically, crop insurance can reduce fluctuation of farmers' income, in other words, it can mitigate risk, compensate loss, and stabilize farmers' income. However, we adopt a variety of robust treatment effect estimation strategies including difference-in-difference (DID), propensity score matching (PSM), and hybrid propensity score matching difference-in-difference treatment effect estimators (PSM-DID) to empirically investigate the causal impact of crop insurance program participation on farmers'income in Inner Mongolia from China, and the results show that crop insurance can not significantly affect farmers'income under the current system of "low-guarantee, wide-coverage, low-premium and low-indemnity" in Inner Mongolia.
Part2:to explain the cause of settling a claim by negotiation.
The results indicate that the mode of settling a claim by negotiation is one of direct factors influencing policy-oriented crop insurance to guarantee farmers'income stability. Fundamentally speaking, settling a claim by negotiation results from low-level equilibrium of benefits of three behavioral agents (including farmer, government and insurance company) because of being unequal status. Meanwhile, it also is realistic choice of behavioral agents in the mouth of their own interest, specifically manifested in inconsistency between utility maximization of farmers and their position of the vulnerable group, social welfare maximization of governments giving way to maintain the policy sustainability and social stability, mismatch between optimal self-interests of insurance company and construction of grass-roots organization.
Part3:to examine moral hazard of three behavioral agents.
The empirical results and some cases point to the existence of moral hazard of farmer, government, and insurance company under the current policy of agricultural insurance. The moral hazard of farmer can be divided into two types:one is inactive behavior of farmers ex ante to prevent loss and inactive behavior ex post to mitigate loss; the other is intentional fraud ex ante or ex post. The practical reasons leading to the existence of moral hazard of three behavioral agents involve cognitive biases and fluke minds from farmer, interests-driven and opportunistic behavior from company insurance, and cognitive mistakes and absence of supervision from government. Meanwhile, moral hazard can not bring about frustration of business development of insurance company, but also lead to dissipation of financial subsidies from governments at all levels. However, the empirical results show that the insured producer can not adopt inactive behavior to prevent loss ex ante and to mitigate loss ex post, and find that insurance fraud (including fabricating insurance object ex ante, and deceiving claims ex post) really exists in crop insurance market or in livestock insurance market under the current policy of "low-guarantee, wide-coverage, low-premium and low-indemnity" in Inner Mongolia from China.
Part4:to theoretically and empirically explore adverse selection of farmer in crop insurance market.
The generating mechanism of adverse selection is that risk difference of the insured farmer exists objectively, and insurance company makes premium rate according to average loss probability in agricultural production. Its deeper reasons are the specificity of insurance objects, weakness of operating management of insurance company, and cognitive bias of some farmers. Adverse selection may result in risk accumulation and supply-demand imbalance of agricultural insurance. In addition, this paper uses non-parametric analysis and econometric model to empirically test the presence of adverse selection of the insured farmer under the present crop insurance system of "low-guarantee, wide-coverage, low-premium and low-indemnity". The results indicate that adverse selection of farmers does exist, but it is not serious, whose reasons may be the mode of settling a claim by negotiation and considerable premium subsidies from governments at all levels.
The innovations of this paper include two aspects. Firstly, in theoretical analysis, we analyze systematically the concept, manifestation, consequence and cause of the mode of settling a claim by negotiation, and thoroughly and deeply explore the generating mechanism and consequence of moral hazard from three behavioral agents (including farmer, government and insurance company) and of adverse selection from farmer under the current policy of agricultural insurance in Inner Mongolia. The conclusions can not only offer theoretical basis to eliminate the mode of settling a claim by negotiation, but also perfect the theory of information asymmetry of agricultural insurance. Secondly, in empirical study, we evaluate the policy effect of crop insurance program to stabilize farmers'income and identify the information asymmetry risks including moral hazard and adverse selection based on the first-hand data collected by questionnaires under the current system of crop insurance or livestock insurance in Inner Mongolia from China. The empirical results can provide more robust or more reliable decision basis for policy makers and policy implementer to access the effectiveness of agricultural insurance on farmers' income and estimate its operating risks.
引文
① 数据来源：中国农村金融服务报告(2012)。
① 黄英君.机制设计与发展创新——破解中国农业保险困局[M].北京：商务印书馆,2011：7.
② 具体的研究内容可见本论文的第六章和第八章。
① 发达国家的农业保险实践也间接说明政府财政必须介入到农业保险运作当中,如美国、加拿大、西班牙、法国、日本、韩国等国家。
② Hazell(1981)认为：“农业保险带来的产出增加,不仅有利于生产者(农户),也有利于消费者。如果需求曲线是缺乏弹性的,农场主的平均收入可能会降低,而农业保险带来的收益将被消费者完全占有。”
③ Mishra(1996)认为Siamwallla和Valdes=s(1986)的研究缺陷为：第一,Siamwallla和Valdes的研究只有在保费小于或者等于农场主的风险管理费用时才成立,但在农业保险实践中,由于其高昂的运营成本,保费通常是大于农场主的风险管理费用的；第二,Siamwallla和Valdes假设需求曲线不发生变化,供给曲线向右下方移动会使得被保险商品价格降低,这一假设在现实中也过于简单；第三,Siamwallla和Valdes的研究仅考虑消费者获得的外部利益是不妥的；最后,Siamwallla和Valdes在研究中令农场主的风险管理费用与其保险费用一致的假设也还有待于商榷。
① 资料来源：张跃华.需求、福利与制度选择：中国农业保险的理论与实证研究[M].中国农业出版社,2007：
① 2012年的调查问卷可见：赵元凤等著.内蒙古自治区2012年农业保险保费补贴绩效评价[M].北京：中国农业科学技术出版社.2013：183-191.
① 目前,国内学者对农业保险中道德风险问题的研究主要集中在新疆玛纳斯河流域和浙江省,这两个地方的农业保险运作均与全国多数地方存在明显区别(钟甫宁等,2007；张跃华,2009和2013；林光华等,2013)。
① 庹国柱.保险学(第六版)[M].北京：首都经济贸易大学出版社.2011：11.
① 马克思恩格斯全集第九卷[M].中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林著作编译局编译.北京：人民出版社.1961：347.
② 马克思恩格斯全集第二十六卷[M].中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林著作编译局编译.北京：人民出版社,1961：28-29.
③ (英)帕·克·雷.农业保险——适用于发展中国家的理论、实际和应用[M].王友译.长沙：湖南人民出版社,1989：2.
④ 庹国柱.李军.农业保险[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：10.
① 庹国柱.李军.农业保险[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2005：24-25.
① 庹国柱.尽早出台政策性农业保险法[J]银行家,2007,(09)：112-114.
① (英)亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(下卷)[M].郭大力等译.北京：商务印书馆,2004：101.
② (英)马歇尔.经济学原理(下卷)[M].陈良璧译.北京：商务印书馆,1981：85.
③ (美)富兰克·H·奈特.风险、不确定性与和利润[M].安佳译.北京：商务印书馆.2010.
① (挪威)卡尔·H·博尔其.保险经济学[M].庹国柱等译.北京：商务印书馆.1999：41.
① 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社.2004：002-003.
① 1996年,中国人民保险公司更名为中国人民保险(集团)公司；2003年7月,中国人民保险公司重组改制并发起设立中国人保财险公司。
② “五多”具体是指任务多、会议集训多、公文报告表册多、组织多、积极分子兼职多；可见《中共中央关于解放区乡工作中“五多”问题的指示》。
① 庹国柱,王国军.中国农业保险与农村社会保障制度研究[M].北京：首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002：46.
① 费友海.中国农业保险制度演化研究[M].成都：西南财经大学出版社.2012：52.
① Kraft Darley.影响农场决策的一切险农作物保险的微观经济问题[A].庹国柱,李军,皮立波.国外农业保险：实践、研究和法规[C].西安：陕西人民出版社.1996：9-10.
② 数据来源：内蒙古巴彦淖尔市政府信息网,http://www.bynr.gov.cn/snfw/sndt/201207/t20120718_48427.html。
③ 数据来源：内蒙古自治区农牧业厅种植业管理处,农业保险数据库。
① 资料来源http://insurance.jrj.com.cn/focus/Icgc035/。
① 在《农业保险条例》中,第十四条规定“保险机构应当在与被保险人达成赔偿协议后10日内,将应赔偿的保险金支付给被保险人。农业保险合同对赔偿保险金的期限有约定的,保险机构应当按照约定履行赔偿保险金 义务”；第十五条规定“保险机构应当按照农业保险合同约定,根据核定的保险标的的损失程度足额支付应赔偿的保险金。任何单位和个人不得非法干预保险机构履行赔偿保险金的义务,不得限制被保险人取得保险金的权利。农业生产经营组织、村民委员会等单位组织农民投保的,理赔清单应当由被保险人签字确认,保险机构应当将理赔结果予以公示”。
③ 庹国柱.王芳华.中国农业保险发展报告2012[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2013：161.
① 庹国柱.中国农业保险发展报告(2013)[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2013：171-174。
① 资料来源http://news.jcrb.com/Biglaw/CaseFile/Criminal/201302/t20130228_1054656.html。
① 资料来源：http://www.nmgaudit.gov.cn/sjzx/sjdt/mssjdt/xam/33651.shtml。
② 资料来源：民主与法制网,http://www.mzyfz.com.。
① 资料来源http://www.nmg.xinhuanet.com/xwzx/shgj/2013-07/23/c_116647065.htm。
① 张芳洁,刘凯凯.柏士林.政策性农业保险中投保农户道德风险的博弈分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版).2013,(04)：83.
② 全国保险业标准化技术委员会.保险术语[S].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2007：106.
① 方福前.公共选择理论——政治的经济学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000：2.
① 美国农业部,风险管理局。http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/crop.cfm。
① 数据来源：《2013中国奶业年鉴》。
① 关于奶牛养殖规模的划分,本文参照《全国农产品成本收益资料汇编》(由国家发展和改革委员会价格司编著)中的饲养业品种规模分类标准,其中的奶牛饲养规模分类标准为：散户,Q≤10；小规模,10500；其中,0为奶牛养殖头数。
* 本章主要内容入选“农业.保险.：新起点与大发展”暨《农业保险条例》研讨会(中国农业大学·经济管理学院),感谢与会专家对本章的建设性意见。
② U. S. General Accountability Office(GAO)。
① 王志刚,黄圣男.钱成济.纯收入、保费补贴与逆向选择对农户参与作物保险决策的影响研究——基于黑龙江和辽宁两省的问卷调查[J].中国软科学,2013(6)：33.
② 数据来源：《2012内蒙古统计年鉴》。
③ 数据来源：《2012内蒙古统计年鉴》。
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① 黄英君.机制设计与发展创新——破解中国农业保险困局[M].北京：商务印书馆,2011：7.
② 具体的研究内容可见本论文的第六章和第八章。
① 发达国家的农业保险实践也间接说明政府财政必须介入到农业保险运作当中,如美国、加拿大、西班牙、法国、日本、韩国等国家。
② Hazell(1981)认为：“农业保险带来的产出增加,不仅有利于生产者(农户),也有利于消费者。如果需求曲线是缺乏弹性的,农场主的平均收入可能会降低,而农业保险带来的收益将被消费者完全占有。”
③ Mishra(1996)认为Siamwallla和Valdes=s(1986)的研究缺陷为：第一,Siamwallla和Valdes的研究只有在保费小于或者等于农场主的风险管理费用时才成立,但在农业保险实践中,由于其高昂的运营成本,保费通常是大于农场主的风险管理费用的；第二,Siamwallla和Valdes假设需求曲线不发生变化,供给曲线向右下方移动会使得被保险商品价格降低,这一假设在现实中也过于简单；第三,Siamwallla和Valdes的研究仅考虑消费者获得的外部利益是不妥的；最后,Siamwallla和Valdes在研究中令农场主的风险管理费用与其保险费用一致的假设也还有待于商榷。
① 资料来源：张跃华.需求、福利与制度选择：中国农业保险的理论与实证研究[M].中国农业出版社,2007：
① 2012年的调查问卷可见：赵元凤等著.内蒙古自治区2012年农业保险保费补贴绩效评价[M].北京：中国农业科学技术出版社.2013：183-191.
① 目前,国内学者对农业保险中道德风险问题的研究主要集中在新疆玛纳斯河流域和浙江省,这两个地方的农业保险运作均与全国多数地方存在明显区别(钟甫宁等,2007；张跃华,2009和2013；林光华等,2013)。
① 庹国柱.保险学(第六版)[M].北京：首都经济贸易大学出版社.2011：11.
① 马克思恩格斯全集第九卷[M].中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林著作编译局编译.北京：人民出版社.1961：347.
② 马克思恩格斯全集第二十六卷[M].中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林著作编译局编译.北京：人民出版社,1961：28-29.
③ (英)帕·克·雷.农业保险——适用于发展中国家的理论、实际和应用[M].王友译.长沙：湖南人民出版社,1989：2.
④ 庹国柱.李军.农业保险[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：10.
① 庹国柱.李军.农业保险[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2005：24-25.
① 庹国柱.尽早出台政策性农业保险法[J]银行家,2007,(09)：112-114.
① (英)亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究(下卷)[M].郭大力等译.北京：商务印书馆,2004：101.
② (英)马歇尔.经济学原理(下卷)[M].陈良璧译.北京：商务印书馆,1981：85.
③ (美)富兰克·H·奈特.风险、不确定性与和利润[M].安佳译.北京：商务印书馆.2010.
① (挪威)卡尔·H·博尔其.保险经济学[M].庹国柱等译.北京：商务印书馆.1999：41.
① 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社.2004：002-003.
① 1996年,中国人民保险公司更名为中国人民保险(集团)公司；2003年7月,中国人民保险公司重组改制并发起设立中国人保财险公司。
② “五多”具体是指任务多、会议集训多、公文报告表册多、组织多、积极分子兼职多；可见《中共中央关于解放区乡工作中“五多”问题的指示》。
① 庹国柱,王国军.中国农业保险与农村社会保障制度研究[M].北京：首都经济贸易大学出版社,2002：46.
① 费友海.中国农业保险制度演化研究[M].成都：西南财经大学出版社.2012：52.
① Kraft Darley.影响农场决策的一切险农作物保险的微观经济问题[A].庹国柱,李军,皮立波.国外农业保险：实践、研究和法规[C].西安：陕西人民出版社.1996：9-10.
② 数据来源：内蒙古巴彦淖尔市政府信息网,http://www.bynr.gov.cn/snfw/sndt/201207/t20120718_48427.html。
③ 数据来源：内蒙古自治区农牧业厅种植业管理处,农业保险数据库。
① 资料来源http://insurance.jrj.com.cn/focus/Icgc035/。
① 在《农业保险条例》中,第十四条规定“保险机构应当在与被保险人达成赔偿协议后10日内,将应赔偿的保险金支付给被保险人。农业保险合同对赔偿保险金的期限有约定的,保险机构应当按照约定履行赔偿保险金 义务”；第十五条规定“保险机构应当按照农业保险合同约定,根据核定的保险标的的损失程度足额支付应赔偿的保险金。任何单位和个人不得非法干预保险机构履行赔偿保险金的义务,不得限制被保险人取得保险金的权利。农业生产经营组织、村民委员会等单位组织农民投保的,理赔清单应当由被保险人签字确认,保险机构应当将理赔结果予以公示”。
③ 庹国柱.王芳华.中国农业保险发展报告2012[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2013：161.
① 庹国柱.中国农业保险发展报告(2013)[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2013：171-174。
① 资料来源http://news.jcrb.com/Biglaw/CaseFile/Criminal/201302/t20130228_1054656.html。
① 资料来源：http://www.nmgaudit.gov.cn/sjzx/sjdt/mssjdt/xam/33651.shtml。
② 资料来源：民主与法制网,http://www.mzyfz.com.。
① 资料来源http://www.nmg.xinhuanet.com/xwzx/shgj/2013-07/23/c_116647065.htm。
① 张芳洁,刘凯凯.柏士林.政策性农业保险中投保农户道德风险的博弈分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版).2013,(04)：83.
② 全国保险业标准化技术委员会.保险术语[S].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2007：106.
① 方福前.公共选择理论——政治的经济学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000：2.
① 美国农业部,风险管理局。http://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/crop.cfm。
① 数据来源：《2013中国奶业年鉴》。
① 关于奶牛养殖规模的划分,本文参照《全国农产品成本收益资料汇编》(由国家发展和改革委员会价格司编著)中的饲养业品种规模分类标准,其中的奶牛饲养规模分类标准为：散户,Q≤10；小规模,10
* 本章主要内容入选“农业.保险.：新起点与大发展”暨《农业保险条例》研讨会(中国农业大学·经济管理学院),感谢与会专家对本章的建设性意见。
② U. S. General Accountability Office(GAO)。
① 王志刚,黄圣男.钱成济.纯收入、保费补贴与逆向选择对农户参与作物保险决策的影响研究——基于黑龙江和辽宁两省的问卷调查[J].中国软科学,2013(6)：33.
② 数据来源：《2012内蒙古统计年鉴》。
③ 数据来源：《2012内蒙古统计年鉴》。
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