摘要
三十余年的改革开放浪潮，为我国民营中小企业提供了良好的发展锲机，使其在经济、社会中的重要地位日益凸显。但是我国的民营中小企业长期受到资源分配体制性主从次序的影响，在社会资源获取方面尤其是信贷资源获取方面，仍然存在一些自身难以突破的制度性瓶颈约束。然而，近年来民营企业家通过参政议政来构建政治关联，获取社会稀缺资源的现象已屡见不鲜。民营企业竞相构建政治关联的行为引起了学术界的高度关注。作为理论界一个新兴的研究领域，现有的研究关注的重点问题普遍是“政治关联对企业有何影响”，且研究对象多为民营大型企业。对于我国为数众多的民营中小企业而言，政治关联动机有何特殊性？政治关联与其面临的融资约束有何关系？我国现有的制度背景对民营中小企业政治关联的构建及政治关联效应的发挥又有何影响？学术界对于这些问题还鲜有研究。
为了探索理论上的未知与疑惑，本文在已有文献的基础上展开研究。全文共8章，除第1章绪论外，第2-4章在企业信贷融资理论、政府管制理论、寻租理论的基础上，深入剖析企业政治关联的构建动机，全面分析我国民营中小企业信贷融资约束的形成机理，并重点挖掘其寻求政治关联这一非正式保护机制的内在根源。第5-7章利用深圳交易所321家中小企业板上市公司2007-2012年的面板数据，检验民营中小企业政治关联对信贷融资的影响，并将转轨时期我国民营中小企业信贷融资面临的制度约束融入到经验分析之中，检验制度背景与政治关联在信贷融资中的替代效应。第8章基于上述的研究结论为政治关联能否成为一种可以推广的非正式保护机制寻求答案，并从政府和企业两个视角提出相应的决策建议。
通过上述研究，本文主要得出以下结论：
（1）政治关联是企业的一种非常有价值的资源，扩大经济利益是企业构建政治关联的首要动机。企业构建政治关联的动机包括寻求政治保护、提高政治地位及体现社会责任。民营中小企业在面临融资桎梏背景下构建政治关联，是为了寻求一种非正式的保护机制，帮助其冲破我国资源配置体制性主从次序的束缚，获得稀缺信贷资源的优先占有权。
（2）政治关联可以作为一种信号传递机制，使信贷市场实现斯宾塞—莫里斯分离均衡（Spence-Mirrlees Separating Equilibrium），为银企交易创造必要条件。同时，利用中小企业板上市公司面板数据的经验分析也较好的验证了理论模型，发现民营中小企业的政治关联对其信贷融资有着显著的正向影响。对信贷融资进行的政治关联异质性检验，表明有政治关联的企业面临较少的融资约束，即在发生信贷业务时对企业规模、抵押价值、盈利能力等存在较低的门槛限制，并且政治关联企业能以相对较低的信贷成本获得较多的信贷资源。政治关联作为保护机制可以帮助民营中小企业获取在信贷市场上无法或很难获取的稀缺资源，对缓解中小企业融资困境具有一定的积极作用。
（3）政治关联与制度背景在民营中小企业信贷融资中存在替代效应。基于社会信任度与市场化进程两个制度背景变量的进一步扩展检验，发现不仅制度背景对政治关联及信贷融资有着显著的影响，而且政治关联与制度背景在民营中小企业信贷融资中存在替代效应。对制度背景进行的异质性检验，发现在社会信任度较高、市场化进程较快的地区，民营中小企业面临较少的融资约束，而政治关联对信贷融资的正向促进作用并不显著。然而，在社会信任度较低、市场化进程较慢的地区则面临较多的融资约束，并且政治关联对信贷融资的正向促进作用较为显著。因此，政治关联作为一种替代性的机制对信贷融资发挥积极作用的前提条件是存在不健全的制度背景。
除此之外，本文的研究结论对民营中小企业与政府的行为决策也存在一定的启示作用。对于中小企业而言，政治关联固然存在一定的积极作用，但其并非是一种可以普遍推广的保护机制，它从客观上扭曲了企业的行为。对于政府而言，企业构建政治关联是对不健全制度背景的无奈且理性回应，只有加强信用体系建设、不断完善市场机制才能从根本上弱化企业政治关联的构建诉求，破除民营中小企业融资桎梏。
In our country, more than thirty years’ reform and opening up to formed thestrongly wave, which boosted to provide a good opportunity for small and mediumsized private enterprises’ development. Their important position in economy andsociety has become increasingly prominent. But the financing problem is a worldlydifficult problem, become the important obstacle to the small and medium-sizedenterprises’ development. Because of the master-slave order of resource allocationsystem in china, the small and medium-sized private enterprises meet someinstitutional bottleneck constraints which they cannot break through. However, inrecent years, it is often seen that the phenomenon of small and medium privateentrepreneurs through build political connections to access the scarce resources. Thebehavior of private enterprises compete against each other to construct politicalconnection is aroused great concern in the academic circlE.As a new research field inthe theoretical circle,“what are the implications of political connections forenterprises” is the key issue of the existing research and attention, and most of theresearch object is large private enterprises. However, to the large number of small andmedium-sized enterprises, What is the specialty of political association motivation?What is the relationship between political connections and the financing constraints?What is the implication of our existing institutional background for constructingpolitical connections and political connections’ effect? There has a few of researcheson these problems in academic circles.
In order to explore the unknown and doubt on the theory, this paper study on thebasis of the existing literature. The whole thesis consists of8chapters, in addition tothe first chapter of introduction, chapter2-4were based on the financing theories ofenterprises, political connection theory，the theory of political connection’ influence toenterprise, and analyzed the motivation of small and medium-sized private enterprisesabout the construction of political connections deeply, and analyzed the formationmechanism of financing constraints of small and medium-sized private enterprisescomprehensively, and explored the intrinsic root of seeking political connection whichis a informal protection mechanism. Chapter5-7were base on panel data of Shenzhen stock exchange321SME board listing Corporation in2007-2012years,and tried todiscuss the effect on political connections of private SMEs’ credit financing byempirical analysis, and the institutional constraints of private SMEs’ credit financingin the transitional period were assimilated into the empirical analysis, discussedinstitutional background how to affect political connections and financing’s effect ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises. Chapter8was seek answers for whether politicalconnection is a kind of informal protection mechanism can be generalized, and putsforward the corresponding policy recommendations from government and enterprises.
Through the above research, this paper draws the following conclusion:
(1) Political connection is a kind of valuable resources for enterprises, expandeconomic interest is the primary motivation for enterprise to construct politicalconnection. The Motives of enterprises construct political connection includes thatseek for political protection, improving the political status and social responsibility. Inthe background of meeting the finance shackles, small and medium-sized enterprisesto build political connections is want to seek an informal protection mechanism, helpthem to break the shackles the master-slave sequence of our resource allocationsystem, and get the priority for scarce credit resources.
(2) The political connection can be used as a signaling mechanism, and the creditmarket can achieve Spence-Mirrlees Separating Equilibrium, to reach the transactionin credit market. Through the panel model empirical test of the SME board listingCorporation, also found that political connection of small and medium-sizedenterprises have a significant positive effect on their credit financing. Politicallyconnected enterprises facing less financing constraints, these enterprises in creditmarket have low threshold about enterprise size, collateral value, profitability, and soon. And political connection enterprises can obtain more credit resources and payrelatively low cost. Political connection as a protection mechanism, it can help SMEsto obtain scarce resources which they were unable or difficult to obtain, has thecertain positive role to alleviate the financing difficulties of SMEs.
(3) Political connections and institutional background have replaceable effect onSMEs’ credit financing. Based on further expansion test of two institutionalbackground variables about social trust and marketing process, not only find the institutional background has a significant impact on political connections and creditfinancing, but also political connections and institutional background have replaceableeffect on SMEs’ credit financing. In the higher social trust and faster marketingprocess area, small and medium-sized enterprises face less financing constraints, butthe positive effect of political connections to credit financing is not significant.Conversely, in the lower social trust and slower marketing process area, small andmedium-sized enterprises face more financing constraints, and political connectionsplay a significant positive role in credit financing. Under the unsound institutionalbackground, political connections as an alternative mechanism play a positive role incredit financing.
In addition, the conclusion of this research has definite enlightenment for smalland medium-sized enterprises and government. For the small and medium-sizedenterprises, political connections have definite positive effect, but it is not a generalprotection mechanism, and it distorts the behavior of enterprises from the objectiveaspect. For the government, small and medium-sized private enterprises constructpolitical connections is a helpless and rational response to the unsound institutionalbackground, in order to weaken demands of political connections construction andbreak the shackles of SMEs’ financing fundamentally, only by strengthening theconstruction of credit system and improving the market mechanism constantly.
引文
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