摘要
我国快速城镇化进程导致了大量的农地被征为非农用地,而征地过程伴随土地权益的调整引发了大量的土地冲突事件和失地农民。由于征地冲突缓解或化解的机制尚未建立,随着我国未来继续推进加速城镇化战略,征地矛盾冲突必将越演越烈。因此,有必要探索有效解决土地冲突的系统的理论支持和制度化手段。
本文在综合借鉴国内外已有研究成果的基础上,把国外对土地冲突研究的思路和方法进行适当的改进,使之符合我国的国情。在对相关概念和理论等基本问题进行阐述之后,本文展开研究的框架是:征地冲突的诱因征地冲突的动力征地冲突的博弈过程征地冲突的调适机制总结。
1、征地冲突的诱因。诱因的存在使得征地冲突的发生具有潜在可能。征地冲突诱因是多方面的,从宏观社会到中观政府组织再到微观冲突主体的整体诱因来源来看,诱因包括:法律制度诱因、社会环境诱因、政府组织诱因和行为主体诱因等。土地冲突的发生并不是由于单个诱因在起作用,而是多诱因综合起作用。
2、征地冲突的动力。冲突动力激发了征地冲突的发生,而征地冲突动力是基于土地相对冲突主体的效用不一致而产生的。对地方官员而言,征地为官员带来两类效用:第一类主要是从货币收益带来的有形效用;第二类则主要是从政府官员政绩的提升带来的无形效用。两类效用与征地规模大小成正相关关系,这两类效用越大,征地冲突的动力就越大。对被征地的农民而言,其抗争的动力源于其失地之后所面临的风险状况。处于不同风险状况的农民,其抗争风险的动力是不同的。农民的抗争动力源于:①抗争行为获得的补偿收益相对于自身的效用状况;②失地农民抗争在不确定条件下的期望补偿数额的大小;③失地农民抗争所面临环境的不确定性;④失地农民的主观投机性。根据政府征地的效用函数与征地补偿对失地农民的效用函数成反向变化,冲突一方以对方的负效用为效用,征地冲突动力的大小取决于双方反向变化的差距。根据冲突动力变化规律,本文引入了Kaldor-Hicks补偿检验模型指导征地政策的制订和实施。检验模型表明:征地决策的Pareto效率趋向要缩小农民与政府官员之间的冲突动力,以提高农民的服从度,降低征地冲突的强度。
3、征地冲突参与主体博弈过程。博弈局中人设为政府官员与被征地农民,展开型威胁博弈模型模拟了冲突参与主体展开讨价还价的博弈过程,求得纳什均衡解表明:①冲突各方的土地效用收益随土地冲突升级而降低,相应土地社会总效用收益减少,造成土地资源的浪费;②冲突一方获取土地面积份额随自身的冲突成本与收益的比值的增大而增加,随另一方的冲突成本与收益的比值的增大而减少,在土地收益相对稳定情况下,支付冲突成本能力越强的一方,其获取土地权益份额越多。在博弈过程中,博弈双方为达到要价目标而采取的进攻型威胁策略和防御性威胁策略是建立在双方互动中形成的对对方的判断的基础之上的。由于失地农民和政府官员是有差别的非对称有限理性博弈群体,双方的冲突处于非对称信息的动态博弈的状态中。这样,有限理性博弈方通过多次互相的了解和策略调整,一方面,政府官员采取的策略是对农民的控制与安抚,另一方面,农民采取的策略是对政府官员的抗争与妥协。控制与抗争的策略构成了政府官员与农民冲突的一面,而安抚与妥协的策略反映了政府官员与农民和谐的一面,而各方采取哪种策略的时机可借助鹰鸽博弈模型及其复制动态分析,结果表明:各方采取的策略最终收敛于进化稳定策略,而进化稳定策略形成取决于土地对各自的效用价值和冲突成本的比较值的变化。
4、征地冲突的调适机制。征地矛盾冲突的缓解或化解有待构建冲突的调适机制,必须使法律、环境和个体效用等各方面相互适应。征地冲突调适的策略选择有多种方式,但最根本的保障是制度调适。具体调适机制包括:法律制度调适、社会环境调适、政府组织调适和博弈方式调适。
5、总结。论文结尾部分指出了本研究获得的主要结论、创新点和有待进一步研究的问题。
Lots of land is converted from agricultural use to non-agricultural use by expropriation in the process of the fueling urbanization in contemporary China. Because of rural land expropriation, the adjustment of land rights and interests led to land conflict incidents and landless farmers. But the solution or harmonious mechanism for land conflict has not been built up, and if China continues adopting urbanization strategy in the future, rural land conflict would replay more and more heatedly. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the theoretical and systemic measures to effectively resolve rural land conflict.
Based on outcomes of the existing research on land conflict abroad and home, the thinking and methodology of the foreign research is renewed to apply for China’s factual land conflict situation in the paper. After the related conceptions and theories are introduced, the frame of the paper is set up like this: the first section is to anatomize causes inducing conflict in the process of land expropriation, the second is to explore the dynamics of land conflict, the third is to analyze and simulate game process of land conflict, the fourth is to construct harmonious mechanism of land conflict, and the last is to make clear conclusion and discussion.
1. The causes inducing land conflict. Induced causes make land conflict happen possible in the process of land expropriation. The induced causes generally come from law and institution, social environment, governmental organization and actors.
2. The dynamics of land conflict. The conflicting dynamics, which arises out of the inconsistent utility of the same land for conflicting participants, explodes land conflict. As for local governmental official, they dynamically expropriate rural land in the interest of the two types of their utility: the first is the appreciable financial income, and the second is the un-computable promotion because of political achievement. At the same time, the two change positively with the quantity of the expropriated land. If the two is higher, the conflicting dynamics is more powerful. But then, as for the expropriated farmers, they dynamically strive for the risk after their contacting land is expropriated. Because groups of landless farmers stay in the diverse boats, their contest dynamics differs. Landless farmers’conflicting dynamics come from the following:①the utility as which they reckon the compensation they strive for according to their risk situation;②the expected compensation that they strive for under uncertainty;③the uncertainty that they have to strive in;④the speculation that they contest by. To sum up, the utility function that governmental official expropriate land for counterchanges with the function as which they reckon the compensation they strive for. Namely, the conflicting dynamics relies on the two parties’utility function change. According to the conflicting dynamics change law, land expropriation policy is drawn up and implemented by the guide of Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Model. The model shows that Pareto improvement of land expropriation decision and policy decreases the conflicting dynamics between governmental officials and farmers in order to promote farmers’obedience and debase land conflict intensity.
3. The game process of conflicting participants. Governmental officials and expropriated farmers are regarded as game players, and their bargaining process is simulated by extensive threat game model. Nash equilibrium solution in the model reveals:①each party’s land utility value and general social land utility diminishes as land conflict become more intense, which results in land waste;②the land utility share that one player get increases as the proportion of his conflict cost to benefit becomes large, and decreases as the proportion of counter-player’s cost to benefit becomes large. Under the relative constant of general land benefit, if one party has more potential capacity to pay conflicting cost, he obtains more share of land benefit. In the bargaining course, both parties adopt aggressive strategies or defensive strategies to obtain their expected share on basis of their own judgement to counterparty’s response. On account of this subjective asymmetrical information dynamical game, as asymmetrical boundedly rational players, governmental officials and landless farmers cognize each other and adjust their respective strategies by repeated interaction. On one hand, officials apply their strategies to control or appease landless farmers, on the other hand, landless farmers adopt their strategies to oppose or compromise with officials. Controlling and opposing strategies stimulate officials and farmers to conflict, and appeasing and compromising strategies make them to peace. However, when both types of strategies are applied need to be chosen by dint of the analysis of hawk-dove game model and replicator dynamics. The result in the model shows that the adopted strategies converge on the evolutional stable strategies. Furthermore, the evolutional stable strategies depend on the ratio of land utility value to conflicting cost.
4. The harmonious mechanism of land conflict. The harmonious mechanism has to be constructed to decrease or harmonize land conflict only if the law and institution, social environment, governmental organization and parties’utility adapt each another. There is a great deal of the optional tactics of harmonizing land conflict including law and institution improvement, social environment transformation, governmental organization reform and game character adjustment, but law and institution improvement is the fundament of harmonious mechanism.
5. Sum-up. The last section of the paper clarifies the conclusion, innovation and further issues.
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