摘要
企业经营者经营能力的重要性早已成为共识。一个企业控制的资源总体上可分为两大部分:物质资本和人力资本,其中对企业的生存发展具有重要意义的是人力资本当中的经营者的经营管理决策能力。
随着经济全球化的加剧,国有企业面临的市场竞争越来越激烈,这种竞争环境使得国企经营者的经营管理决策能力比以往任何时候都更为重要。但是,国企经营者具备较高的经营能力并不等于就一定愿意或一定能够发挥其经营管理能力。在国有经济的改革中,旧有体制被打破的同时,新的体制还不完善,致使国企经营者的行为出现了新的问题,国企经营者缺乏提高其所在企业经营绩效的内、外部激励与约束,从而没有动力和压力去提高国有企业的经营绩效。从改革初期的经营者行为的短期化,到目前企业中“内部人”控制问题,机会主义问题等,特别是过去多以财务指标来衡量经营者的业绩,业绩评价不能真正反映经营者的经营业绩,从而使有些经营者可以在经营行为上不选择努力,而是一些机会主义行为,如偷懒、做假账等行为来粉饰经营业绩,从而获得较高的评价,为其升任更高级别的职务铺路。
种种现实说明,从业绩评价的视角,来研究国企经营者的行为,并最终找到合适的路径,从而规范国企经营者的行为,已经成为十分重要的课题。
基于上述思考,本论文遵循“提出问题—分析问题—解决问题”的思路,根据国企经营者的特有的行为规律,分为八个章节来寻找问题的答案:
第一章明确的界定了国企经营者行为的内涵外延以及研究的意义,进而提出问题;第二章分别对国内外关于国企经营者业绩评价和经营者行为的研究成果进行综述,然后对国内外从业绩评价角度研究国企经营者行为的成果进行了梳理。
在第三章对于国有企业经营者的行为进行了一般性的分析,由于国有企业的特殊性,国企经营者的个人目标与国有企业的社会和价值目标既有一致性又有差异性,通过对一致性和差异性的分析,找到了国企经营者的行为一般规律,特别是把经营者的经营行为分为生产性努力和分配性努力行为两种来进行分析,并且建立了博弈模型,进而找到不完全信息下的最优努力选择。
第四章研究了国企经营者业绩评价体系的构建思路,提出了在国有企业传统“德、能、勤、绩、廉”的考核评价模式中引入平衡计分卡来设计业绩指标体系,设计出了具有通用性的有中国特色的国有企业经营者的综合计分卡,通过考核和评议两种评价方式,并且采用层次分析法进行系统评价分析。由于这一章的研究目的是为了研究构建业绩评价体系的思路,需要保持业绩评价体系的通用性和代表性,所以提供了一种理论上的框架与操作思路。
本文的第五章进行了业绩评价与经营者行为激励约束的博弈分析,并且建立了两个博弈模型,从不同角度对业绩评价与经营者行为激励与约束机制之间的互动关系做出博弈分析,并运用博弈模型得出相关结论来指导对经营者行为的认识,从而为业绩评价实践活动和经营者激励约束提供理论依据。第一个模型分析了静态经营者行为激励约束。第二个模型建立了基于企业线性业绩模型和线性激励模型基础上的国企经营者行为激励与约束机制分析模型,通过对经营者与国资委之间的动态博弈分析,分析了经营者的行为变量、业绩分享系数、股东监督力度之间的关系,为如何有效约束经营者的负面行为,并使得业绩评价与经营者行为激励约束更好地挂钩提供了理论依据。
在本文第六章和第七章,进一步从业绩评价的角度对于国企经营者的行为激励与约束进行了深入的分析和研究。在第六章中,首先对经营者的行为激励的机理进行了分析,并且从业绩评价的角度对国企经营者的行为进行了考察,对于经营者的显性和隐性激励,从现状和问题分析,并分别提出了解决对策,同时在第六章中的显性激励部分进行了实证分析。在第七章中,首先分析了业绩评价与国企经营者约束的关系,其次对经营者的约束机理进行了分析,最后提出了完善从业绩评价角度构建经营者约束机制的对策。
在本文第八章分析了国企经营者的选拔任用和淘汰退出的现状和存在的问题,提出从业绩评价的角度,在完善经理人市场的前提下,构建经营者的选任和退出机制的对策。
It has already become a consensus that the capability of enterprise managers is very important. The resources of an enterprise can be divided into two parts as a whole, material capital and human resource capital, among which, managers' decision-making capability in enterprise operation and management, which belongs to human resource capital, is of crucial importance for an enterprise's existence and development.
As economic globalization accelerates, SOEs are facing a severer market competition, and this competitive environment requires a high decision-making capability in enterprise operation and management of the SOE managers, which is much more important than any time before. But SOE managers' possession of good operation capability doesn't necessarily mean they would like or they can exert their operation and management ability. In the reform of state-owned economies, the old system is broken down, and new system isn't perfect, which cause new problems in the behaviors of SOE managers. SOE managers lack the incentive and restraint of improving their enterprises' performance both from inside and outside, as a result, there is no motivation or pressure to improve the enterprise's operation performance. From the short-term inclination of managers' behavior at the beginning of the reform, to the "insider's control" problem, opportunism, etc. in the present enterprises, especially in the past, an enterprise's performance is evaluated largely by financial indices, the performance evaluation can't truly reflect the performance of enterprise managers. This caused some managers failing to choose hard work, but opportunism, such as laziness, fake account, etc. to glorify their performance and obtain a high appraisal and lay the foundation for their promotion to a higher position.
All kinds of facts indicate that to study the behaviors of SOE managers from the perspective of performance evaluation, and eventually find an appropriate way to regulate the behavior of SOE managers, have already become a very important subject.
Based on the above thinking, this article adheres to the thought of putting forward problems---analyzing the problem---resolving the problem, looking for the answers to the problems with 9 chapters according to the specific behavioral features of SOE managers.
Chapter 1 clearly defines the connotation and extension and study the significance of SOE managers' behaviors, further on, it comes forward the problems. Chapter 2 summarizes separately the research achievements of SOE managers' performance evaluation and their behaviors at home and abroad. Afterwards, it gives a sum-up of the study achievement of SOE managers' behaviors from the perspective of performance evaluation at home and abroad.
Chapter 3 gives a general analysis of SOE managers' behaviors. Because of the specialty of SOEs, there are both consistence and discrepancies between SOE managers' personal goals and SOEs' social and value goals. Through the analysis of consistency and discrepancy, the general laws of SOE enterprises' behaviors were found (behavioral chain), especially, it divides SOE managers' behaviors into productive efforts and distributional efforts and analyzes them respectively. In addition, it sets up the game model, and finds the optimized choice under complete and incomplete information.
Chapter 4 studies the constitution thinking of SOE managers' performance evaluation system, brings forward to introduce balanced scoring card to design performance index system in addition to the traditional SOE evaluation model of "virtue, ability, diligence, performance, probity". It designs an universal and China-featured SOE managers' balanced scoring card, which can make systematic evaluation and analysis adopting hierarchical analytical method, through the two evaluation ways of examination and assessment. As the purpose of this chapter is to study the thought of constituting the performance evaluation system, it is necessary to maintain the universality and representativeness of the performance evaluation system, therefore it provides a kind of theoretic structure and operating route.Chapter 5 gives a game model analysis of performance evaluation and managers' behavioral incentive and restraint, and sets up 3 game models, making game model analysis of the interacting relationship between performance evaluation and incentive and restraint mechanism of managers' behaviors from a variety of perspectives, and draws the relative conclusion using game models so as to guide the understanding of managers' behaviors, which provides a theoretic basis for performance evaluation practices and managers incentive and restraint. The first model analyzes the relationship of static manager performance evaluation and manager incentive and restraint. The second sets up the analysis model of SOE managers' behavior incentive and restraint based on enterprise linear performance model and linear incentive model.
Through dynamic game model analysis of SOE managers and State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, it analyzes the relationship of managers' behavioral variable, performance sharing coefficient and shareholder supervision strength, providing a theoretic basis for efficiently restraining the negative behaviors of managers, and better combining performance evaluation and manager behavioral incentive and together.
Chapter 6 and 7 give a deeper analysis and research of SOE managers' behavioral incentive and restraint from the perspective of performance evaluation. In chapter 6, it first analyzes the mechanism of managers' behavior incentive, and reviews SOE managers' behaviors from the perspective of performance evaluation. With regard to managers' characteristic and recessive incentive, it gives an analysis of the current status and problems, and puts forward corresponding resolving measures. Meanwhile, it gives a positive analysis of characteristic incentive in chapter 6. In chapter 7, it first analyzes the relationship of performance evaluation and SOE managers' restraint. Afterwards, it analyzes the mechanism of managers' behavioral restraint. And at last, it puts forwards the measures of improving the constitution of manager's restraining mechanism from the perspective of performance evaluation.
Chapter 8 analyzes the current status and existing problems of the selection, appointment, elimination and receding of SOE managers. From the perspective of performance evaluation, it puts forward the measures of constituting the mechanism of selection and receding of managers on the premise of the improvement of manager market.
引文
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