摘要
知识产权表现为一种法定垄断状态,而且在一定条件下这种法定垄断权可能转化成反垄断法所关注的经济垄断。在对外许可时,知识产权人有可能通过知识产权所带来的优势,在知识产权许可协议的谈判过程中从事限制竞争的行为,有必要对此进行反垄断法规制。由于知识产权制度和反垄断法共享创新、效率、竞争等目标价值,所以,对知识产权许可行为的反垄断法规制亦以上述基本范畴为衡量标准。同时,反垄断法作为以公共利益为出发点调整市场经济秩序的法律部门,保护消费者福利是其正义性的体现。由此,对知识产权许可行为的反垄断法规制应遵循如下原则:(1)许可行为对竞争有阻碍,但可以实现显著的创新效率从而提高社会整体福利,而且这些行为是实现这些效率所必不可少的,在各种可能的选择中,对消费者福利产生的损害最少,在这些前提下,该许可行为应被允许;(2)如果某种行为对创新效率的效果是中性或不确定的,则以其对消费者福利的影响来判断是否允许;(3)无论如何,该行为不能导致永久性、全面性的消除竞争。以上原则对于新经济产业同样适用。
中国目前技术上属于技术后发国,要实现经济、技术上的后发优势,提高自己的综合国力,除了自主创新,技术引进是必由之路。从这一点来说,知识产权许可往往意味着我国企业作为技术引进方,发达国家的知识产权人作为许可人,就某个技术进行授权使用、销售等达成协议。同时,发达国家越来越重视知识产权对于巩固和提高其在国际上经济地位的作用,大的跨国公司也将知识产权战略作为扩张和发展的手段。基于以上理论分析,参考和借鉴其他国家和地区的成功经验,结合我国目前的现状,我国当前对知识产权许可反垄断法规制应以维护市场的开放、公平竞争为首要目标,通过对竞争环境的保护,促进我国自主创新战略的实施,保护国家利益,提升国家经济实力和竞争力。
在反垄断法语境下,知识产权人在知识产权许可协议中从事限制竞争的行为,可分为滥用优势地位和限制竞争协议两大类:前者包括搭售、拒绝许可、价格歧视、效力质疑等,对于该类知识产权许可中的限制条款,一般都体现为拥有优势地位的行为人通过知识产权的独占性,来排斥相关行业的竞争,或是损害被许可人的创新积极性,维持自己的垄断地位;后者包括回授、产量限制、价格限制、排他许可和地域限制、使用领域限制等,这类行为往往体现为双方通过协议在一定程度上减少竞争,因此,必须从许可协议双方是否是竞争者的角度进行分类,并分别予以不同的反垄断法规制。此外,技术联营和标准化组织也可能对竞争产生危害,技术联营与技术标准中既涉及滥用支配地位行为,也包括限制竞争协议行为,而且在新经济产业中,尤为凸显了技术标准的支配地位,反垄断法对此须严格关注。当前,美国、欧盟、日本等对知识产权许可的反垄断法规制程度趋向宽松,持有利于知识产权人的立场,这是符合这些国家和地区自身利益的一种变化,但我国在以上具体问题上应结合国情作出略微从紧的的规制。
Behaved as an legal monopoly, under certain circumstance intellectual property rights might transform into economic monopoly that antimonopoly law would regulate. In external license, the intellectual property rights holders might restrict the competition in the negotiation of intellectual property rights license protocol by the advantage of intellectual property rights.IP system and antimonopoly law sharing the same goal of innovation, efficiency and competition, therefore the antimonopoly regulation of IP license contracts should regard those concepts as criterion. Furthermore, being an legal branch of protecting public interest, the antimonopoly regulation to IP license contracts should comply the model as following:(1)Doing harm to competition, the licenses can realize the innovation efficiency and improve the whole welfare of society. In the mean while,the license is absolutely necessary to realize the efficiency and does the least damage to consumer welfare. Under these premises, the license should be permitted.(2)If certain license is neutral or dubious to innovation efficiency, the antimonopoly judgement of it should based on consumer welfare.(3)In no case, the license should banish competition permanently and entirely. The above model can also apply to new economy.
The technical level of China is lower than that of the developed countries. At present, in order to improve our comprehensive strength, we need to get license from the IP holders in developed countries besides independent innovation. From this point of view, the Chinese enterprises are the licencees and the IP holders in developed countries are the licensers. At the same time, the developed countries pay more and more attention to the function of IP in consolidating and advancing their super position in technology and economy. The big multinational companies use IP strategy as means to enlargment and development as well. Grounding on the above theory model, referencing of successful experiences of else countries and areas, combining the actuality of China, the openness of market and equal competition should be the most important goal in our current antimonopoly regulation. Our economic and competitive strength should be advanced through competitive environment protection, independent innovation strategic promotion and national interest protection.
In term of antimonopoly law , it can be divided into two categories of which the former is the abuse of preponderant position including articles on tying, price discrimination and challenging the validity of IP, For licensing of intellectual property rights in such restrictive clauses, generally have a dominant position as reflected in the behavior of people through the exclusive intellectual property rights, to exclude competition in the industry, or damage to the licensee's innovative initiative to maintain its monopoly status ;the latter is monopoly agreement (i. e. Cartel) including grant back, restriction on output, price, terrain and usage field. Such behavior is often reflected in the agreement between the two sides to a certain extent, reduce competition and, therefore, must begin with the license agreement the two sides is whether to classify the perspective of competitors, respectively, and anti-monopoly law be different regulations. In addition, IP pools and integration of IP to technical standards can also bring new restrictive problems of competition, it is not only related to abuses of dominant positions, including restrictions on competition agreement, but in the new economy industries, particularly highlighted the dominance of technical standards, strict anti-monopoly law to be concerned about this.so antimonopoly law must regulate all of these behaves. currently, America, Europe Union (EU) and Japan have relax the regulation of IP license and hold the standpoint in favor of the licensers according with the benefits of those counties and districts,but China must carry out the tighter regulation considering the situation of a country.
引文
①较有代表性的文章有:汪丁丁的《知识产权,垄断利润,反暴利法案》,方兴东的《起来——挑战微软霸权》,王小东的《盗版有理》等。
①较有影响的如盛杰民、叶卫平,反垄断法价值理论的重构,现代法学,2005年第1期;胡甲庆,反垄断法的经济逻辑,厦门大学出版社,2007年版等。
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