中国地方公共物品供给差异性分析
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摘要
一些数据表明,造成我国现阶段区域发展差距和城乡差距的一个重要原因是公共物品供给的不平衡。在“基本公共物品均等化”的公共财政目标要求下,如何客观公正并深刻的看待我国公共物品供给中出现的差异性问题,深入分析其产生的原因,认真研究解决办法,对于促进经济发展、缩小地区差距、实现城乡统筹无疑具有重要的理论价值与现实意义。
公共物品的基本特征是消费的非竞争性和受益的非排他性。在特定地理和空间区域内表现为有限非竞争性和非排他性的公共物品,称之为地方公共物品。地方公共物品供给对地方经济社会发展具有重要作用,地方公共物品均衡性供给也是影响地区、城乡均衡发展的重要因素。因此,本文以地方公共物品为研究对象,首先对我国地方公共物品的供给现状进行全面而深刻的描述性分析,然后从财政管理体制和非财政管理体制两大方面,探究了造成地方公共物品供给差异性的原因,继而运用实证分析,找出公共物品的供给与经济发展之间的关系,最后给出适当的政策建议。
在对地方公共物品的供给现状进行描述性分析的部分,与以往的文献不同,本文不仅采用了定性的描述,更是采用大量的统计数据作为佐证,使现阶段地方公共物品的供给状况一目了然。通过分析发现,我国地方公共物品总体上有效供给不足,在民生性、公益性、基础性等方面的公共物品提供均不到位;并且城乡间、地区间的供给结构不平衡,这种情况极大的加剧了地区经济发展的差距。限于现有的统计资料,本文以公共教育、公共医疗和基础设施三种主要的地方公共物品为例,指出供给中存在的问题:公共教育总体投入水平较低,且教育支出各组成部分比例不合理,教育资源在东、中、西部地区之间以及省内地区间分配不均等;公共卫生支出的力度不足;卫生资源在城乡之间、地区之间分配差距大,资源配置失衡;基础设施平均发展水平低,供需结构和布局不合理,东中西部差距显著,农村基础设施供给落后等。
本文继而从财政管理体制和非财政管理体制两大视角分析供给不足和不均衡的原因。首先对事权层层解剖,表明在政府与市场之间应按照市场优先原则,在政府与政府之间应按照地方优先原则界定事权。而我国分税制财政体制由于事权划分不完善,造成政府与市场间“越位”、“缺位”并存,各级政府间事权错位下移,事权财权不对称,转移支付效率低下,种种情况结合起来,导致基层财政普遍困难,对供给地方公共物品往往力不从心。从非财政管理体制角度,以政治经济地位的不平等为特征,分三种情况刻画了发展中国家公共物品供给的特点,指出政治和经济地位的不平等,是公共物品的供给水平低下和不平等的深层原因。通过赋予穷人平等的政治权利和经济地位可以提高公共物品供给质量,降低贫困率,并提高经济中的总收入和增长率。
为了验证公共物品供给对经济增长产生的影响,本文利用1997-2007年间31个省份(除去港、澳、台)的面板数据,采用公共教育、公共卫生和基础设施作为解释变量,被解释变量经济发展水平采用国内生产总值数据,考察了两者之间的关系。研究表明,公共物品供给的不同水平对GDP具有明显的促进作用,而且不同的公共物品的贡献率在各省之间存在较大差异,东部地区的效果最明显,西部地区居中,而中部地区的影响最小。文章从基本公共服务均等化的目标给出了适当的解释。
最后,在总结全文的基础上,提出解决地方公共物品供给问题的几点政策建议,包括深化政治体制改革,推进协调发展战略的实施;积极推进政府经济职能转变和财政转型;进一步完善分税制,按照公共财政和市场经济要求规范政府职能;按财权与事权匹配原则划分收入;将事权的划分纳入法制化轨道;完善省以下财政管理体制,增强基层政府提供公共物品的能力;完善转移支付制度,促进地区间基本公共物品均等化和构建政府支出绩效评价体系。
Some data showing that, nowadays one of the important reasons causing the gap between regional development and urban-rural areas is the imbalance of the supplies of public goods. Under the requirements of public financial objective of“equalization of basic public services”, how to look into the problems existing in our public goods supplies objectively and fairly, to further analyze the causes, have undoubtedly theoretical and realistic significance towards promoting economic development, narrowing the gap between regions and realizing urban-rural coordination.
The basic characteristics of public goods are non-competitiveness of consumption and non-exclusiveness of benefit, most of them represent limited non-competitive and non-exclusive goods in specialized geographic and spatial areas, which we call local public goods. The supply of local public goods plays an important role to local economic and social development; local public goods supply balance is also an important factor in affecting the balanced development of urban and rural areas. Therefore, this article takes local public goods as subjects, first conducts a comprehensive and profound descriptive analysis on the status of the supply of local public goods, then from the two aspects of financial management system and non-financial management system, explores the reasons for the imbalance of the supply of local public goods, and under empirical analysis, identifies the relationship between local public goods supply and economic development, finally suggests some appropriate policy recommendations.
Different from previous literature, in the descriptive analysis of local public goods supply, this article not only adopts qualitative description, but also adopts a large number of statistical data used as evidence, which we can have a clear glance of the current local supply of public goods status. Through the analysis it is found that, in general our local public goods lack of effective supply, people's livelihood, and public welfare and the basis of the provision of public goods are not in place; and imbalance in the supply structure between urban and rural areas, which greatly exacerbated the gap between regional economic developments. Limited to the existing statistical data, this article selects three typical local public goods of public education, public health and infrastructure as examples, and gives specific analysis of its supply problems. In public education, the fiscal expenditure on education accounted for the proportion of fiscal expenditure is fairly low, and the expenditure structure is not reasonable, educational resources in the eastern, central and western regions as well as the areas within the province are uneven; public health expenditure is weak; A large gap of health resources in the distribution between urban and rural areas, the allocation of resources is imbalance; the average level of infrastructure development is low, and demand structure and the layout is unreasonable, a significant gap between eastern, central and western areas, rural infrastructure supply lagged behind, etc.
Then from the financial management system and non-financial management system points of view, this article continues to explore the causes of supply inadequacy and imbalance, first layers of anatomy to say that in between the government and the market should be in accordance with market priority principles, in between governments should be defined in accordance with the principle of giving priority to local authorities. Our country’s fiscal system and tax system as a result of incomplete division of powers, resulting in between the government and the market "offside", "lack of" co-exist, between all levels of government down the wrong power, power asymmetry property, the lower the efficiency of transfer payments, Combination of these circumstances, leading to widespread financial difficulties in the grass-roots level, often are unable for the supply of local public goods. From the perspective of non-financial management system, the unequal status of political and economic as characteristics portrayed three situations of the characteristics of the supply of public goods in developing countries, pointing out that the status of political and economic inequality, the deep-seated cause of low level and imbalance supply of public goods. The poor by giving equal political rights and economic status of the supply of public goods can increase quality, reduce the poverty rate, and improve the economy and the growth rate of total revenue.
In order to verify the impact of supply of public goods on the economic growth, this article makes use of 31-year period 1997-2007 the provinces (excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) of the panel data, public education, public health and infrastructure as explanatory variables, explained variables level of economic development are GDP data to study the relationship between the two. Studies have shown that the supply of public goods at different levels of GDP have significant role in promoting and different contribution rate of public goods in the provinces there is a big difference between the eastern region, the most obvious effect, the middle western region, and the impact of the central region minimum. Article from the equalization of basic public services the objective of appropriate explanations are given.
Finally, on the basis of summing up the whole paper, puts forward several political suggestions for the solution of imbalance in the local public goods supply, that is, to deepen reform of the political system, promote the coordinated development of the implementation of the strategy; public finances in accordance with the requirements of the market economy and regulate the functions of the government; by the property and the principle of division of power to match income; to the division of power into the orbit of the rule of law; a well-established financial management system below the provincial level, and enhance grass-roots government's ability to provide public goods; perfect transfer payments and promote inter-regional equalization of basic public goods and building performance evaluation system of financial expenditure.
公共物品的基本特征是消费的非竞争性和受益的非排他性。在特定地理和空间区域内表现为有限非竞争性和非排他性的公共物品,称之为地方公共物品。地方公共物品供给对地方经济社会发展具有重要作用,地方公共物品均衡性供给也是影响地区、城乡均衡发展的重要因素。因此,本文以地方公共物品为研究对象,首先对我国地方公共物品的供给现状进行全面而深刻的描述性分析,然后从财政管理体制和非财政管理体制两大方面,探究了造成地方公共物品供给差异性的原因,继而运用实证分析,找出公共物品的供给与经济发展之间的关系,最后给出适当的政策建议。
在对地方公共物品的供给现状进行描述性分析的部分,与以往的文献不同,本文不仅采用了定性的描述,更是采用大量的统计数据作为佐证,使现阶段地方公共物品的供给状况一目了然。通过分析发现,我国地方公共物品总体上有效供给不足,在民生性、公益性、基础性等方面的公共物品提供均不到位;并且城乡间、地区间的供给结构不平衡,这种情况极大的加剧了地区经济发展的差距。限于现有的统计资料,本文以公共教育、公共医疗和基础设施三种主要的地方公共物品为例,指出供给中存在的问题:公共教育总体投入水平较低,且教育支出各组成部分比例不合理,教育资源在东、中、西部地区之间以及省内地区间分配不均等;公共卫生支出的力度不足;卫生资源在城乡之间、地区之间分配差距大,资源配置失衡;基础设施平均发展水平低,供需结构和布局不合理,东中西部差距显著,农村基础设施供给落后等。
本文继而从财政管理体制和非财政管理体制两大视角分析供给不足和不均衡的原因。首先对事权层层解剖,表明在政府与市场之间应按照市场优先原则,在政府与政府之间应按照地方优先原则界定事权。而我国分税制财政体制由于事权划分不完善,造成政府与市场间“越位”、“缺位”并存,各级政府间事权错位下移,事权财权不对称,转移支付效率低下,种种情况结合起来,导致基层财政普遍困难,对供给地方公共物品往往力不从心。从非财政管理体制角度,以政治经济地位的不平等为特征,分三种情况刻画了发展中国家公共物品供给的特点,指出政治和经济地位的不平等,是公共物品的供给水平低下和不平等的深层原因。通过赋予穷人平等的政治权利和经济地位可以提高公共物品供给质量,降低贫困率,并提高经济中的总收入和增长率。
为了验证公共物品供给对经济增长产生的影响,本文利用1997-2007年间31个省份(除去港、澳、台)的面板数据,采用公共教育、公共卫生和基础设施作为解释变量,被解释变量经济发展水平采用国内生产总值数据,考察了两者之间的关系。研究表明,公共物品供给的不同水平对GDP具有明显的促进作用,而且不同的公共物品的贡献率在各省之间存在较大差异,东部地区的效果最明显,西部地区居中,而中部地区的影响最小。文章从基本公共服务均等化的目标给出了适当的解释。
最后,在总结全文的基础上,提出解决地方公共物品供给问题的几点政策建议,包括深化政治体制改革,推进协调发展战略的实施;积极推进政府经济职能转变和财政转型;进一步完善分税制,按照公共财政和市场经济要求规范政府职能;按财权与事权匹配原则划分收入;将事权的划分纳入法制化轨道;完善省以下财政管理体制,增强基层政府提供公共物品的能力;完善转移支付制度,促进地区间基本公共物品均等化和构建政府支出绩效评价体系。
Some data showing that, nowadays one of the important reasons causing the gap between regional development and urban-rural areas is the imbalance of the supplies of public goods. Under the requirements of public financial objective of“equalization of basic public services”, how to look into the problems existing in our public goods supplies objectively and fairly, to further analyze the causes, have undoubtedly theoretical and realistic significance towards promoting economic development, narrowing the gap between regions and realizing urban-rural coordination.
The basic characteristics of public goods are non-competitiveness of consumption and non-exclusiveness of benefit, most of them represent limited non-competitive and non-exclusive goods in specialized geographic and spatial areas, which we call local public goods. The supply of local public goods plays an important role to local economic and social development; local public goods supply balance is also an important factor in affecting the balanced development of urban and rural areas. Therefore, this article takes local public goods as subjects, first conducts a comprehensive and profound descriptive analysis on the status of the supply of local public goods, then from the two aspects of financial management system and non-financial management system, explores the reasons for the imbalance of the supply of local public goods, and under empirical analysis, identifies the relationship between local public goods supply and economic development, finally suggests some appropriate policy recommendations.
Different from previous literature, in the descriptive analysis of local public goods supply, this article not only adopts qualitative description, but also adopts a large number of statistical data used as evidence, which we can have a clear glance of the current local supply of public goods status. Through the analysis it is found that, in general our local public goods lack of effective supply, people's livelihood, and public welfare and the basis of the provision of public goods are not in place; and imbalance in the supply structure between urban and rural areas, which greatly exacerbated the gap between regional economic developments. Limited to the existing statistical data, this article selects three typical local public goods of public education, public health and infrastructure as examples, and gives specific analysis of its supply problems. In public education, the fiscal expenditure on education accounted for the proportion of fiscal expenditure is fairly low, and the expenditure structure is not reasonable, educational resources in the eastern, central and western regions as well as the areas within the province are uneven; public health expenditure is weak; A large gap of health resources in the distribution between urban and rural areas, the allocation of resources is imbalance; the average level of infrastructure development is low, and demand structure and the layout is unreasonable, a significant gap between eastern, central and western areas, rural infrastructure supply lagged behind, etc.
Then from the financial management system and non-financial management system points of view, this article continues to explore the causes of supply inadequacy and imbalance, first layers of anatomy to say that in between the government and the market should be in accordance with market priority principles, in between governments should be defined in accordance with the principle of giving priority to local authorities. Our country’s fiscal system and tax system as a result of incomplete division of powers, resulting in between the government and the market "offside", "lack of" co-exist, between all levels of government down the wrong power, power asymmetry property, the lower the efficiency of transfer payments, Combination of these circumstances, leading to widespread financial difficulties in the grass-roots level, often are unable for the supply of local public goods. From the perspective of non-financial management system, the unequal status of political and economic as characteristics portrayed three situations of the characteristics of the supply of public goods in developing countries, pointing out that the status of political and economic inequality, the deep-seated cause of low level and imbalance supply of public goods. The poor by giving equal political rights and economic status of the supply of public goods can increase quality, reduce the poverty rate, and improve the economy and the growth rate of total revenue.
In order to verify the impact of supply of public goods on the economic growth, this article makes use of 31-year period 1997-2007 the provinces (excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) of the panel data, public education, public health and infrastructure as explanatory variables, explained variables level of economic development are GDP data to study the relationship between the two. Studies have shown that the supply of public goods at different levels of GDP have significant role in promoting and different contribution rate of public goods in the provinces there is a big difference between the eastern region, the most obvious effect, the middle western region, and the impact of the central region minimum. Article from the equalization of basic public services the objective of appropriate explanations are given.
Finally, on the basis of summing up the whole paper, puts forward several political suggestions for the solution of imbalance in the local public goods supply, that is, to deepen reform of the political system, promote the coordinated development of the implementation of the strategy; public finances in accordance with the requirements of the market economy and regulate the functions of the government; by the property and the principle of division of power to match income; to the division of power into the orbit of the rule of law; a well-established financial management system below the provincial level, and enhance grass-roots government's ability to provide public goods; perfect transfer payments and promote inter-regional equalization of basic public goods and building performance evaluation system of financial expenditure.
引文
①王军.中外专家谈地方财政建设[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2006:91-92.
②中国社会科学院财政与贸易经济研究所.中国财政政策报告2004/2005—科学发展观:引领中国财政政策新思路[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.12:51-52
①马海涛和李剑.我国财政对义务教育支出的现状及原因分析[J].财政研究,2004.5
②尚长风.农村公共品缺位研究[J].经济学家, 2004(6):6
①樊胜根等.中国农村公共投资在农村经济增长和反贫困中的作用[J].华南农业大学学报,2001:1
②.钱克明.加入WTO与我国农业政策调整和制度创新[J].农业经济问题,2002:1
③迟福林等.加快推进基本公共服务均等化[J].经济研究参考,2008:3
①孙智明.免费义务教育实施路径研究[D].硕士学位论文.湖南师范大学,2006,3
①上海财经大学公共政策研究中心.中国财政发展报告—构建和谐社会的财政政策研究[R].上海财经大学出版社,2008
①冯兴元,李晓佳.公共卫生事权应该怎样划分[J].中国改革,2005:10
①王任飞、王进杰.我国基础设施发展现状评析.经济研究参考,2006:2.
①王任飞、王进杰.我国基础设施发展现状评析.经济研究参考,2006:2.
①冯兴元.我国各级政府公共服务事权划分的研究.经济研究参考.2005,26:2
①冯兴元.我国各级政府公共服务事权划分的研究.经济研究参考.2005,26:2
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