摘要
拍卖本质而言是一个集体决定资源价格及其分配的过程,是构建公开、公平、高效的交易市场的有力工具。拍卖也是不完全信息博弈最重要的应用领域之一。随着经济的发展及以第三方物流为代表的现代物流产业的产生,形成了对应的物流交易市场。在这一市场中,物流服务需求方和供给方之间是委托-代理关系。这一市场前提下,物流服务的供给方具有需求方所不具有的信息优势。从而使传统的交易方式(标价、议价)与拍卖交易方式相比较,不能在较广范围内以如此便捷和低成本的方式了解到物流服务的真正市场价值,并形成交易价格。同时,政府为了对物流产业进行有效的引导和规划,也会通过拍卖出售特许经营权等方式来对稀缺的物流资源(如铁路、港口)进行管理,以实现社会福利最大化。本文的研究目的就是在上述市场环境下,设计合理的拍卖交易规则来实现物流服务的有效交易和物流资源的高效配置,以及对物流资源拍卖出售中的合谋等相关问题进行分析。
物流供给商由于自身管理能力、技术能力、运营能力等素质的不同,具有供给成本及服务质量的差别。拍卖机制就可以在物流服务供应商进行竞标的前提下,区别出不同企业具有的不同内涵的供给能力,从而实现物流资源的高效配置。当物流供需信息传播和汇聚的市场范围越为广泛,物流资源实现高效配置的可能性就越大。由于信息技术的快速发展,为信息的传播和汇聚提供了有力的工具。构建基于互联网技术的物流信息中心和拍卖交易中心,使得通过设计更多样化的拍卖机制来实现多种市场结构下的物流有效交易变得越加可行。物流拍卖交易具有成本节约,供给和需求的快速匹配,为商业企业扩大潜在的市场范围,提高信息流和增强供应链的整合等优势。而基于信息技术构建的拍卖交易系统又有参与个体多、交易时间短、进入退出费用低等特点。本文试图借助信息技术构建的拍卖交易平台,通过将拍卖理论的最新成果运用到我国的物流交易市场中,以通过更为高效的物流交易来实现资源的优化配置。本文得到的主要结论如下：
第一,本文分析了我国从计划经济向市场经济的改革,传统的生产资料流通企业向现代物流企业转变的过程。这种转变以专业化的第三方物流的崛起和持续高速发展为代表,最终决定了当前和以后的物流市场格局。在这一过程中形成的包括集体所有制、私营企业和股份制的物流企业,成为这一市场中的交易主体。正是这些独立的交易主体的出现、成长和自身特点使得拍卖交易的应用有着可行的基础。在这一市场基础上,本文通过分析了物流需求方和物流供给方的交易关系,指出他们之间存在信息不对称问题,且在这种信息结构下,拍卖是最为简单易行的交易方式之一。并进一步探讨了,基于现代互联网技术,构建汇聚整个区域市场的物流供需信息的拍卖交易平台可实现的重要功能。
第二,文章对物流多属性交易、双边交易和组合交易这几种市场结构下的拍卖问题进行了研究。其一,许多产品物流价值对多个质量指标的实现程度非常敏感,多属性拍卖突破了传统拍卖形式仅仅考虑交易价格这一唯一属性的局限性。本文将多属性拍卖理论引入到对物流采购标准具有多属性要求的物流交易中,针对很多企业对价格外的物流质量要求,设计以综合评分最优为目标的拍卖模型,同时分析了竟标者的成本函数和拍卖者的效用函数,以及他们各自的最优竟标策略和评分函数选择。其二,在物流市场交易中,对同样的物流服务常常同时有多个供给方和多个需求方,如货运业务现货市场的双边交易。双边拍卖就突破传统拍卖市场结构中的“一对多”的市场格局,对“多对多”的市场格局的交易进行了分析。本文讨论了自动配置交易量并生成交易价格的物流双边拍卖交易机制,并且文中证明了该规则是满足激励相容约束和参与理性约束的。其三,物流供给商和物流采购商由于自身经营或是成本的考虑,对原材料端到消费者端的整个物理链上的多项物流环节在很多时候有组合进行交易的需求。本文讨论了使得这一组合需求得以实现的物流组合拍卖交易机制,并证明了该机制是满足激励相容约束和参与理性约束的。同时,讨论了当把链上一个合作看作一个组合约束时,组合拍卖机制对激励供应链上组合优化的作用。
第三,当前各经济区域都呈现物流区域中心化趋势,当市场不确定较大时,区域物流中心固定资产的投资也会不足,政府机构如何通过区域整体来把握专用固定资产的投资量,将有利于解决专用物流供给与需求之间的矛盾。本文设计了一个能使政府机构以较为稳定的价格获得某一固定物流能力储备的物流供给,并能保持对物流专用固定资产投资效率和运营效率实现双重持续激励的招投标(密封拍卖)机制。通过仿真分析,新的拍卖招投标机制有利于招标方更好规避供需严重不平衡而产生的较大市场波动。并且,由于同时可降低物流供给方的专用固定资产投资风险,所以有利于从区域整体更有效优化资源投资,从而一定程度上降低招标方的获取成本。这个方法通过招标方进行区域内全局调度,且物流供给方竞争较为充分竞争,有利于构建公开、高效的区域物流市场,和实现区域社会福利最大化。
第四,在物流产业中,港口、铁路等资源属于稀缺的公共资源,为了提高这些物流资源的利用效率和有效管理,越来越多的通过拍卖方式来实现这些资源的社会价值。另一方面,物流企业在对这些资源进行竞标过程中,也有动力去通过合谋来减少竞争,从而得到更多的交易剩余。现阶段我国很多类型的物流领域中的垄断性还非常明显,有限的企业数量为企业间合谋以从这些资源的出售方(政府机构)处获得更多的交易剩余提供了可能。本文分析了在这些物流市场条件下企业进行合谋的可能机制,该机制满足激励相容约束,同时也讨论了满足参与理性约束的条件。同时分析了我国多种物流类型市场具有垄断性质的现实,并对物流市场在估价均匀分布情况下的合谋进行了算例分析。针对该市场结构下的合谋可能,政府为防止合谋,应进一步开放市场准入,引入更多的新进入企业,增强行业竞争,从而将具有垄断力的物流企业合谋收益压缩在一个有限的范围,乃至消除合谋。
Essentially, the auction is a process of deciding the price and allocation of resources, and a powerful tool to build an open, fair and efficient trading market. Auction is also one of the most important applications of the incomplete information game. With the development of economic and the emergence of modern logistics represented by the third-party logistics industry, there forms a corresponding logistics market. In this market, the demand and supply of logistics services is a principal-agent relationship. Under the premise of this market, the providers of logistics services have information superiority compared with the demand side. So that the traditional transaction methods (price, bargaining), compared not with auction trading, can not understand the true market value of logistics service in such a wide range by such convenient and low-cost way, and form the transaction prices finally. Meanwhile, to realize the social welfare maximization, Government will manage the scarce logistics resources by selling franchise by auction, and so on. Purpose of this paper is, in this market environment, design the auction trading rules to achieve the effective logistics services trade, and the efficient allocation of logistics resources.
Due to the differences of their management ability, technical ability, and operational capacity, Suppliers of logistics have different of supply costs and service quality. Based on the competitive bidding of Logistics service providers, the auction mechanism can distinguish different enterprises with different connotations in the supply capacity, to achieve efficient allocation of logistics resources. When the supply and demand information of logistics spread more extensive, the allocation of logistics resources will be achieved more effectively. The rapid development of information technology provides a powerful tool for information dissemination and aggregation. Based on Internet technology, logistics information center and auctions trading center make the logistics transactions become increasingly feasible in a variety of logistics market structure through designing more diversified auction mechanisms. Logistics auction has many advantages, such as transaction cost savings, fast matching of supply and demand, and expand the scope of potential markets, improve information flow and enhance the advantages of supply chain integration, and so on. The auction trading system based on information technology has many features, such as the more participate individual, the transaction time is short, and low cost of entry and exit. This paper attempts to use the latest achievements of auction to the logistics market in China, then through more efficient logistics transactions to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. The main conclusions are as follows.
First, this paper analyzes the economy reforms from a planned economy to market, and the change process that the traditional means of production and distribution companies link to modern logistics enterprises. The shift is representative of by the rise and sustainable high-speed development of specialized third-party logistics, and, final, decide of the current and future logistics market structure. In the process, several types of logistics enterprises including the formation of collective ownership, private enterprises and joint-stock of the logistics enterprises become the Principal transactions in this market. Just due to the emergence, growing, and its features of these counterparties make auction transactions have a viable basis for application. Based on this market conditions, this paper, through analyzes the relationship between of demand-side and supply-side of logistics, points out that there is information asymmetry between them, and auctions is one of the most simple transactions way in this Information structure. And this paper further explore, based on the modern Internet-based technologies, the important function of the auction trading platform witch together the supply and demand information of logistics throughout the regional market.
Second, in this article, several types of auction issues were studied in different market structure, including multi-attribute transactions, bilateral transactions and combination transactions. First, the logistics value of many products is very sensitive to the realization degree of a number of quality indicators, Such as cold chain logistics, and the traditional auction format witch only consider the transaction price has limitations. This article introduce multi-attribute auction theory to logistics procurement with multiple attributes requested transaction, and, for the logistics quality requirements of many companies outside of the price, design of an integrated score auction model. Analysis of their optimal strategy and score function selection based on the cost function and utility function of the bidder. Second, in the logistics trading market, for the same logistics services, there often has many suppliers and many demanders at the same time. For example, the warehousing and distribution services, freight business of the spot market in a regional market just are the market structure of bilateral trade. Double auction break with the localization of the traditional auction with "one to many" market structure, analyzes the "many to many" market structure, then allows the buyers and sellers being an equality relationship of supply and demand. This article discusses the logistics double auction trading mechanism witch automatic configuring trading volume and generating price. And the paper proves the rule meet the incentive compatibility constraint and rational participation constraint. Third, due to their own business or cost considerations, logistics suppliers and logistics buyers in many cases have the demand of combination trading for a number of logistics projects from the raw materials ended to the consumer side of the physical chain. This article discusses the combination of logistics auction trading mechanism witch making of this combination of demand to be able to achieve. At the same time, this mechanism takes into account the multi-attribute constraints, and proves that the mechanism meet the incentive compatibility constraints and rationality participation constraint. Meanwhile, this article discussed, when take the cooperative binding as a combination constraint, the role of combinatorial auction in inspiritting enterprise to maximize its own benefit, and then maximize the social welfare.
Third, in the current, economic regions are showing the regional logistics center trend. When the market uncertainty is high, the fixed assets investment of regional logistics center will be less. How to grasp the fixed assets investment volume from the whole region will help solve contradiction between supply and demand of specific logistics. This article design a new bidding mechanism to solve these two issues and maximize the entire region social welfare, and the new method has the merits of both the stable of supply and competitive inspirit. Through simulation, the new bidding mechanism can help better avoid a serious imbalance between supply and demand generated by high market volatility. And, at the same time, because it can reduce the risk of a dedicated investment in fixed assets, so some extent reduce the acquisition cost of the tender side. This method schedule from the global region, and logistics supply-side is more fully competitive, the help build an open and efficient regional logistics market, and the achievement of regional social welfare maximization.
Fourth, in the logistics industry, the port, railways and other resources are scarce public resources, and in order to improve efficiency in the use and management of these logistics resources, government more and more use auction to achieve the social value of these resources. On the other hand, the logistics enterprises in a competitive bidding process for these resources, also have an incentive to reduce competition by collusion to get more trade surplus. At this stage, monopoly is also very clear in many types of logistics industries in China's. Limited number of enterprises let collusion being possible. This article analyzes some possible mechanisms in this market conditions, and shows by the example. And this paper think, the Government, in order to prevent collusion, should further open market access to bring more of new enterprise into the market. Through rise competition, the collusions of logistics enterprises can be compress in a limited range, even eliminate collusion.
引文
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