中小企业融资行为与商业银行制度和业务创新
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摘要
中小企业是各国经济体中非常重要的一部分，它对GDP的贡献率、科技向现实生产力的转换、就业的增加、国际贸易的促进等方面都发挥着不可替代的作用。同时，从当今企业规模发展来看，许多大型企业考虑到内部运营成本过高等问题，均已出现化整为零，化大为小的经营趋势，即形成以核心企业为轴心，专门开发某项技术和经营某种产品的无数中小企业为产业链群的新格局。从有关统计数据来看，中小企业已成为各国经济发展的生力军，而且各国政府都在采取相应政策和措施积极扶植中小企业的发展。
然而，困扰各国中小企业发展的一个普遍难题就是融资问题，包括西方发达国家在内，都在竭力创造条件去解决，但是，效果都不甚理想，对于中国这样一个发展中国家，融资难的矛盾尤为突出。作者在大量参阅国外相关文献及经验的基础上，洋为中用，力争提出符合中国国情的解决中小企业融资难问题的思路和举措，并同商业银行的制度和业务创新结合起来一并分析，先理论，后实践，先模型设计，后实证分析。主要研究内容概括为如下几方面：
第一部分是绪论，主要阐述选题背景、动因及研究思路，介绍选择此论题的理论价值和实践意义，而且重点指出本文的创新观点和方法。
第二部分主要是对研究中小企业融资和商业银行创新方面的国内外相关理论文献和数理模型予以综述，包括经典融资理论和现代融资理论。并运用数学方法加以描述，是本论文的理论基础部分。
第三部分主要是阐述中小企业融资的特点，对其融资的困境进行深层次的分析，既有国外方面的分析，也有国内自身的特点，着重从企业生命周期，信息不对称等角度予以展开，并专门去分析中国中小企业融资难的多种原因，为下一步解决这一问题提供铺垫。
第四部分重点讲中小企业融资中的商业银行信贷行为，由于存在信息不对称和委托代理成本，再加上利率管制，我国商业银行对中小企业的信贷供给是弱效的，而且存在严重的信贷配给，主要以商业银行角度剖析形成中小企业融资困难的成因。
第五部分是本文的重点，也是创新的地方，提出解决中小企业融资的制度基础——银企共生机制，即从银企关系的分析入手，将解决中小企业融资的根本途径归结到重塑新型的银企关系，运用生物学中的共生理论，嫁接到分析银行与企业之间的融资关系中，寻找最佳的组合模式，并对国外一些成功的经验进行“中国化”改造，创造性地提出适合中国国情的银企新模式。
第六部分着重进行实证分析，即对论文提出的创新思路进行实证检验，围绕商业银行的制度和业务创新，设计出可行性的融资方案，结合国内最新动态予以实践，得出公允的结论。
The study on the small & middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) financing and banking innovation is an international frontier research. The dilemma of SMEs enterprises financing has given rise to high attention from all of the governments. Especially in China. The puzzle between enterprises and banks is very serious. For one hand, The commercial banks own a great quantity of liabilities but dare not grant loans due to several reasons; on the other, The SMEs can’t get adequate capital support from banks or other financial organizations. As a matter of fact, The lack of SMEs and banks’ financial bridge constrains the capital efficiency. However, The SMEs plays an important role in economic society, who can give an impetus to GDP, increase employment, enhance exports, and enrich property structures.
In comparison to China, The foreign countries meat the same difficulty problem. They all exert themselves to the utmost to solve the puzzle.
This dissertation devotes major efforts to systematically study the SMEs’ financing dilemma and the commercial banks behavior, and try to fill in the gap between them by devising new SMEs and banks’ relationship, in a bid to resolve the problem. The main research contents can be summarized as the following several respects:
Chapter one “preface”, In this chapter, the author explain the presentation of this article, research background and motive, put forward the writing methods and innovation points.
Chapter two “related literatures and mathematical model introduction”, the author first expounds the basic definition of SMEs financing, including classic and modern financing theories such as MM theorem and its expansion, recent trends are elaborated .
Chapter three “The SMEs finance peculiars from international experience and predicament analysis”, in the chapter, the author adopts the comparative approach to set forth the causes of the SMEs’ financing dilemma, by contrast, The author makes a systematic exposition about China’s difficult position .Firstly, The SMEs’ bad credit ratings constrain its finance ability; second, Asymmetrical information brings about adverse selection and moral hazard, which restricts the commercial bank’s loan enlargement; thirdly, from social angel, The government can’t build perfect finance-support platform and service-system.
Chapter four “ The commercial bank’ behavior in SMEs financing”, Due to principal-agent cost and interest rate control. The gap between enterprises and banks creates credit rationings and low-efficacy market. The author proposes concrete resolving schemes in view of China’s special characteristics in unfavorable finance conditions.
Chapter five “The institution innovation of resovling SME’s finance problem－Symbiosis between SMEs and bank”, in this chapter, the author analyses the relationship between them with general and mathematic models. What’s more, Apply biological conception to economic fields, in order to devise inspiration from the frontier science and find feasible ways to work out the solution..
Chapter six “resolving plans and substantial evidence analysis”, In this chapter, the author put forward suggestions and feasible institutional & operational innovation, construct finance-support system, According to the above, the author catches hold of full and accurate materials at home and abroad to verify his schemes. The heart of this dissertation lies in this chapter.
然而，困扰各国中小企业发展的一个普遍难题就是融资问题，包括西方发达国家在内，都在竭力创造条件去解决，但是，效果都不甚理想，对于中国这样一个发展中国家，融资难的矛盾尤为突出。作者在大量参阅国外相关文献及经验的基础上，洋为中用，力争提出符合中国国情的解决中小企业融资难问题的思路和举措，并同商业银行的制度和业务创新结合起来一并分析，先理论，后实践，先模型设计，后实证分析。主要研究内容概括为如下几方面：
第一部分是绪论，主要阐述选题背景、动因及研究思路，介绍选择此论题的理论价值和实践意义，而且重点指出本文的创新观点和方法。
第二部分主要是对研究中小企业融资和商业银行创新方面的国内外相关理论文献和数理模型予以综述，包括经典融资理论和现代融资理论。并运用数学方法加以描述，是本论文的理论基础部分。
第三部分主要是阐述中小企业融资的特点，对其融资的困境进行深层次的分析，既有国外方面的分析，也有国内自身的特点，着重从企业生命周期，信息不对称等角度予以展开，并专门去分析中国中小企业融资难的多种原因，为下一步解决这一问题提供铺垫。
第四部分重点讲中小企业融资中的商业银行信贷行为，由于存在信息不对称和委托代理成本，再加上利率管制，我国商业银行对中小企业的信贷供给是弱效的，而且存在严重的信贷配给，主要以商业银行角度剖析形成中小企业融资困难的成因。
第五部分是本文的重点，也是创新的地方，提出解决中小企业融资的制度基础——银企共生机制，即从银企关系的分析入手，将解决中小企业融资的根本途径归结到重塑新型的银企关系，运用生物学中的共生理论，嫁接到分析银行与企业之间的融资关系中，寻找最佳的组合模式，并对国外一些成功的经验进行“中国化”改造，创造性地提出适合中国国情的银企新模式。
第六部分着重进行实证分析，即对论文提出的创新思路进行实证检验，围绕商业银行的制度和业务创新，设计出可行性的融资方案，结合国内最新动态予以实践，得出公允的结论。
The study on the small & middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) financing and banking innovation is an international frontier research. The dilemma of SMEs enterprises financing has given rise to high attention from all of the governments. Especially in China. The puzzle between enterprises and banks is very serious. For one hand, The commercial banks own a great quantity of liabilities but dare not grant loans due to several reasons; on the other, The SMEs can’t get adequate capital support from banks or other financial organizations. As a matter of fact, The lack of SMEs and banks’ financial bridge constrains the capital efficiency. However, The SMEs plays an important role in economic society, who can give an impetus to GDP, increase employment, enhance exports, and enrich property structures.
In comparison to China, The foreign countries meat the same difficulty problem. They all exert themselves to the utmost to solve the puzzle.
This dissertation devotes major efforts to systematically study the SMEs’ financing dilemma and the commercial banks behavior, and try to fill in the gap between them by devising new SMEs and banks’ relationship, in a bid to resolve the problem. The main research contents can be summarized as the following several respects:
Chapter one “preface”, In this chapter, the author explain the presentation of this article, research background and motive, put forward the writing methods and innovation points.
Chapter two “related literatures and mathematical model introduction”, the author first expounds the basic definition of SMEs financing, including classic and modern financing theories such as MM theorem and its expansion, recent trends are elaborated .
Chapter three “The SMEs finance peculiars from international experience and predicament analysis”, in the chapter, the author adopts the comparative approach to set forth the causes of the SMEs’ financing dilemma, by contrast, The author makes a systematic exposition about China’s difficult position .Firstly, The SMEs’ bad credit ratings constrain its finance ability; second, Asymmetrical information brings about adverse selection and moral hazard, which restricts the commercial bank’s loan enlargement; thirdly, from social angel, The government can’t build perfect finance-support platform and service-system.
Chapter four “ The commercial bank’ behavior in SMEs financing”, Due to principal-agent cost and interest rate control. The gap between enterprises and banks creates credit rationings and low-efficacy market. The author proposes concrete resolving schemes in view of China’s special characteristics in unfavorable finance conditions.
Chapter five “The institution innovation of resovling SME’s finance problem－Symbiosis between SMEs and bank”, in this chapter, the author analyses the relationship between them with general and mathematic models. What’s more, Apply biological conception to economic fields, in order to devise inspiration from the frontier science and find feasible ways to work out the solution..
Chapter six “resolving plans and substantial evidence analysis”, In this chapter, the author put forward suggestions and feasible institutional & operational innovation, construct finance-support system, According to the above, the author catches hold of full and accurate materials at home and abroad to verify his schemes. The heart of this dissertation lies in this chapter.
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171. 王春峰：《金融市场风险管理》，天津大学出版社，2001。
172. 姜青舫、陈方正：《风险度量原理》，上海，同济大学出版社，2000。
173. [英]约翰·霍利韦尔：《金融风险管理手册》，中文版，上海，上海译文出版社，2000。
174. [美]菲利普·乔瑞：《VaR：风险价值》，中文版，北京，中信出版社，2000。
175. [美]詹姆斯·格里森：《财务风险管理》，中文版，北京，中华工商联合出版社，2000。
176. 赵晓菊：《银行风险管理——理论与实践》，上海，上海财经大学出版社，1999。
177. 施兵超、杨文泽：《金融风险管理》，上海，上海财经大学出版社，1999。
178. 杨力：《商业银行风险管理》，上海，上海财经大学出版社，1998。
179. 姚刚：《21世纪中国证券市场风险与防范》，广州，广东经济出版社，2000。
180. 李晓西：《21世纪中国银行业风险与防范》，广州，广东经济出版社，1999。
181. 鲁毅：《商业银行防范化解金融风险安全研究》，深圳，海天出版社，1997。
182. 肖成华：《新世纪个人资信评估》，北京，中华工商联合出版社，2001。
183. 王芳、张宗梁：《银行业风险与防范》，北京，经济科学出版社，1998。
184. 骆玉鼎：《信用经济中的金融控制》，上海，上海财经大学出版社，2000。
185. 谢康、肖静华：《网络银行》，长春，长春出版社，2000。
186. 薛峰：《银行信用风险分析》，北京，中国经济出版社，1995。
187. 吴晶妹：《资信评估》，北京，中国审计出版社，2000。
188. 汪叔夜等：《直面WTO：中国的金融证券业及基础原材料产业》，北京，经济管理出版社，2000。
189. [美]阿斯沃斯·达莫德兰（Aswath Damodaran）：《投资估价——评估任何资产价值的工具和技术》，中文版，北京，清华大学出版社，1999。
190. [美]S·M·劳斯基：《随机过程》，北京，中国计划出版社，1997。
191. 王明华：《发达国家扶持中小企业发展的金融举措及启示》，《金融参考》2000
年第5期。
192. 吴敬链、柳红：《台湾怎样扶植中小企业》，中国经济出版社1999年9月出版。
193. 吕国胜：《中小企业研究》，上海财经大学出版社1998年5月出版。
194. 仇高擎：《可持续性：我国中小企业信用后果保基金高效运作的核心问题》，《上海金融》1999年第8期。
195. 许运凯 吴向阳：《日本中小企业信用担保体系的特点及启示》，《上海金融》2000年第6期。
196. 《浅论我国中小企业的发展趋势》，《财经问题研究》2000年11月。
197. 陈乃醒：《构筑中小企业金融支持体系的若干建议》，《经济问题》1999年第5期；《中小企业的经营与发展》，经营管理出版社1999年3月出版。
198. 中国社会科学院中小企业研究中心课题组：《西方七国促进中小企业发展的政策措施》，《经济蓝页》报告版，第75期。
199. 肖汉平：《论创业投资与中小企业成长》，《经济理论与经济管理》1999年第5期。
200. 马长水、黄丽陆：《中小企业信贷有待扩展》，《经济日报》1999年4月7日。
201. 郭朝先：《借鉴国外经验构筑我国中小企业支持体系》，《经济问题》1999年第3期。
202. 狄娜：《中小企业改革与发展的政策设想》，《经济管理》2000年第4期。
203. 罗国勋等：《二十一世纪：中国中小企业的发展》，北京社会科学文献出版社1999年1月出版。
204. 傅建华等：《上海中小企业发展战略研究》，上海财经大学出版社1998年7月出版。
205. 吴敬琏：《发展中小企业：需要我们做些什么》，《经济日报》1999年4月
12日。
206. 张炜：《进一步推进中小企业的改革和发发展》，《中国经济时报》1999年7月30日；《小企业贷款环境改善了》，《中国经济时报》1999年5月17日。
207. 《关于建立我国中小企业融资体系的思考》，《改革与战略》1999年第4期。
208. 《中小企业融资》，经济管理出版社，2000年出版，第36页。
209. 《非国有中小企业发展中的金融支持》，《金融与保险》2000年第七期。
210. 赵晓雷：《上海科技型中小企业融资问题研究》，《上海经济研究》1999年第2期。
211. 《中小企业成为我国经济重要层面》，《中国改革报》1999年4月6日。
212. 国家经贸委中小企业司《对美国中小企业融资与社区发展情况的考察》。
213. 陈明璋主编：《台湾个小企业发展论文集》，台北：联经出版事业公司1994年。
214. 台湾中小企业协会：《1997年台湾中小企业协会年报》1998年。
215. 李国鼎：“创设中小企业信用保证基金之经过及其对中小企业发展之贡献”，
《信保通讯》213、214、215期，1997年5、6、7月。
216. 中小企业信保基金：《1997年中小企业信用保证基金年报》1998年。
217. 《经济学动态》、《金融研究》、《天津大学学报》、《南开经济研究》等期刊
1999—2002年合订本；
科研、论文及获奖情况
一、学术论文
1．任志华，王俊寿，国外资产证券化的启发与我国的制度安排，《天津大学学
报》，2002年第4期第346页。
2．任志华，王小林，个体户手中的票子哪里去了，《中国经济体制改革》，1989
年第8期第48页。
3．任志华，防止外汇风险十二法，《经济管理》，1996年第1期第47页。
4．任志华，产品市场寿命周期理论在银行发放技术改造贷款中的应用，《经济问题》，1994年第1期第40页。
5．任志华，缓解资金短缺对策中的十个关系，《改革》，1989年第5期第98页。
6．任志华，从国际股市的“连锁反应”看我国股票市场的管理，《中国金融》，1992年第9期，第38页。
7．任志华，谈谈股票、债券和储蓄，《中国工商》1993年第4期，第18页。
8．任志华，加快我国对外开放步伐应实现十个转变，《经济工作通讯》，1994年第10期，第18页。
9．任志华，略谈影响股票价格的十大因素，《金融管理科学》，1992年第6期，
第23页。
10．任志华，对现行粮食信贷管理体制的思考，《中国商业企业管理》，1992年第1期，第40页。
11．任志华，建立中国式的《股票法》之管见，《国际金融导刊》，1993年第1期，第40页。
12．任志华，我国开办信用卡业务的现状与对策，《经济工作通讯》，1993年第7期第10页。
13．任志华，警惕：“连带责任”同样是一种法律责任，《中国工商》，1992年第10期，第42页。
14．任志华，我国股份制经济应向最后防线突破，《福建论坛》，1993年第2期，第20页。
15．任志华，我国企业借贷行为研究，《中国城市金融》，1995年第9期，第24页。
16．任志华，从国内外银行制度比较看我国商业银行的改革方向，《中国城市金融》，1995年第1期，第17页。
二、著作
1．万成林，任志华，《市场行情分析》，天津大学出版社，1996年12月第一版。
2．任志华，储秀峰，《走向市场——证券、资金、企业、银行、法律等热点问题研究》，天津大学出版社，1993年3月第一版。
3．万成林，任志华等《当代市场营销管理丛书》，共计10本，2003年9月即可由天津大学出版社出版发行。
三、学术会议论文
1．银行管理与调整信贷结构，中国展望出版社，任志华，在我国建立非通货膨胀型缓解资金短缺的探讨，1996年10月。
2．金融理论与实践，财经问题研究编辑部，张焕通，任志华，摆脱超负荷经营、实现良性循环，1991年10月。
3．政治经济论文选编，河北人民出版社，任志华，当前国营企业补充自有流
动资金存在的问题与改革刍议，1996年10月。
4．金融体制改革与商业银行经营，中国经济出版社，任志华，优化金融资产质量的构想，1995年10月。
四、科研项目成果鉴定
1．任志华，从国际股市的“连锁反应”看我国股票市场的管理，荣获河北省第三届（1991~1993年）金融科学优秀成果奖，1994年8月5日颁发荣誉证书。
2．任志华，我国企业借贷行为研究，荣获天津市金融科研优秀成果三等奖，1998年4月24日颁发证书。
3．任志华，遵循操作规程、维护资金安全，荣获中国经济科学“十二届
三中全会以来经济学文章”三等到奖，1993年5月颁发证书。
4．任志华，试论社会主义初级阶段金融调控机制的转换，荣获城市金融优
秀论文三等奖，1991年10月颁发证书。
5．任志华，信用工具本身没有姓社与姓资之分，荣获张家口市首届社会科学优秀成果二等奖，1994年7月颁发证书。
6．任志华，浅议强化银行在企业承包经营中的作用，荣获河北省优秀科研成果奖，1991年6月颁发证书。
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214. 台湾中小企业协会：《1997年台湾中小企业协会年报》1998年。
215. 李国鼎：“创设中小企业信用保证基金之经过及其对中小企业发展之贡献”，
《信保通讯》213、214、215期，1997年5、6、7月。
216. 中小企业信保基金：《1997年中小企业信用保证基金年报》1998年。
217. 《经济学动态》、《金融研究》、《天津大学学报》、《南开经济研究》等期刊
1999—2002年合订本；
科研、论文及获奖情况
一、学术论文
1．任志华，王俊寿，国外资产证券化的启发与我国的制度安排，《天津大学学
报》，2002年第4期第346页。
2．任志华，王小林，个体户手中的票子哪里去了，《中国经济体制改革》，1989
年第8期第48页。
3．任志华，防止外汇风险十二法，《经济管理》，1996年第1期第47页。
4．任志华，产品市场寿命周期理论在银行发放技术改造贷款中的应用，《经济问题》，1994年第1期第40页。
5．任志华，缓解资金短缺对策中的十个关系，《改革》，1989年第5期第98页。
6．任志华，从国际股市的“连锁反应”看我国股票市场的管理，《中国金融》，1992年第9期，第38页。
7．任志华，谈谈股票、债券和储蓄，《中国工商》1993年第4期，第18页。
8．任志华，加快我国对外开放步伐应实现十个转变，《经济工作通讯》，1994年第10期，第18页。
9．任志华，略谈影响股票价格的十大因素，《金融管理科学》，1992年第6期，
第23页。
10．任志华，对现行粮食信贷管理体制的思考，《中国商业企业管理》，1992年第1期，第40页。
11．任志华，建立中国式的《股票法》之管见，《国际金融导刊》，1993年第1期，第40页。
12．任志华，我国开办信用卡业务的现状与对策，《经济工作通讯》，1993年第7期第10页。
13．任志华，警惕：“连带责任”同样是一种法律责任，《中国工商》，1992年第10期，第42页。
14．任志华，我国股份制经济应向最后防线突破，《福建论坛》，1993年第2期，第20页。
15．任志华，我国企业借贷行为研究，《中国城市金融》，1995年第9期，第24页。
16．任志华，从国内外银行制度比较看我国商业银行的改革方向，《中国城市金融》，1995年第1期，第17页。
二、著作
1．万成林，任志华，《市场行情分析》，天津大学出版社，1996年12月第一版。
2．任志华，储秀峰，《走向市场——证券、资金、企业、银行、法律等热点问题研究》，天津大学出版社，1993年3月第一版。
3．万成林，任志华等《当代市场营销管理丛书》，共计10本，2003年9月即可由天津大学出版社出版发行。
三、学术会议论文
1．银行管理与调整信贷结构，中国展望出版社，任志华，在我国建立非通货膨胀型缓解资金短缺的探讨，1996年10月。
2．金融理论与实践，财经问题研究编辑部，张焕通，任志华，摆脱超负荷经营、实现良性循环，1991年10月。
3．政治经济论文选编，河北人民出版社，任志华，当前国营企业补充自有流
动资金存在的问题与改革刍议，1996年10月。
4．金融体制改革与商业银行经营，中国经济出版社，任志华，优化金融资产质量的构想，1995年10月。
四、科研项目成果鉴定
1．任志华，从国际股市的“连锁反应”看我国股票市场的管理，荣获河北省第三届（1991~1993年）金融科学优秀成果奖，1994年8月5日颁发荣誉证书。
2．任志华，我国企业借贷行为研究，荣获天津市金融科研优秀成果三等奖，1998年4月24日颁发证书。
3．任志华，遵循操作规程、维护资金安全，荣获中国经济科学“十二届
三中全会以来经济学文章”三等到奖，1993年5月颁发证书。
4．任志华，试论社会主义初级阶段金融调控机制的转换，荣获城市金融优
秀论文三等奖，1991年10月颁发证书。
5．任志华，信用工具本身没有姓社与姓资之分，荣获张家口市首届社会科学优秀成果二等奖，1994年7月颁发证书。
6．任志华，浅议强化银行在企业承包经营中的作用，荣获河北省优秀科研成果奖，1991年6月颁发证书。
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