企业集团契约化管理指标体系及评价方法研究
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摘要
契约是在双方意愿一致的情况下以书面或口头的形式形成的一种有法律、法规等相互制约的关联关系。目前国内外关于企业契约理论尚有部分研究论述,但真正将该理论用于企业内部的实践研究可谓是凤毛麟角。当前,国内外市场竞争环境变化较大,传统国有企业受到一定冲击,如何提高运营效率,保证国有资产不流失、保值、增值已成为目前国内大型企业集团面临的首要问题之一。由于我国长期处于计划经济时期,企业的管控模式方面多为传统粗放式的运营模式,影响了生产效率,随着我国“十一五”规划的提出,经济、社会、环境的和谐、可持续发展已成为中国经济发展宗旨,企业应及时调整经营理念,追求经济效益最大化的同时,自觉承担社会责任。本文将契约化管理运用到集团内部国有资产经营领域,对于大型企业集团提高经营效率、减少管理压力等起着十分重要的作用,具有较强的理论和实践意义。
企业集团作为多企业联合体,涉及多行业、多领域。当今,一些大型企业集团存在思想观念落后、企业办社会包袱沉重、投资主体单一化和国有资产流失严重等问题。这些现象给企业集团的发展带了较大的压力。本文以企业契约理论为切入点,从理论和量化方法两个方面研究企业集团契约化管理。本文的重点是构建一套契约化管理指标体系,选用科学、合理的评价方法,综合评价契约化管理实施过程中的企业绩效,充分调动企业员工积极性,提高企业运营效率,保证国有资产不流失、保值、增值。
同时,本文选取某大型企业集团下属经营单位为实践研究对象,构建模型综合评价契约化管理实施成果,建立简单预警模型。本文研究以实际项目为背景,对企业经营情况现状进行了实地调研,所得出的结论具有针对性,在实践中有一定的可操作性。
The indenture is a mutual check relationship that is signed on the condition of reaching agreement between two sides with written or oral form affected by law or regulations. At present, there is little research on enterprises' center management, although there are more studies on the theory of indenture at home and abroad. Currently, there being more changes in the domestic and international markets' competitive environment, the traditional state-owned enterprises are suffered a certain impact. How to improve operational efficiency, guarantee the state-owned assets without loss and preserve and increase the value-added has become the one of the most important issues that the domestic large-scale enterprise groups facing. Duel to our country's long-term planned economy period, there are more traditional business model in the control model of enterprises, which influence the production efficiency. As China's "the 11th Five-Year" plan proposed, the harmony, sustainable and development in economic, social and environmental has become China's economic development purposes. Enterprises should adjust business concepts promptly that seeking to maximize economic benefits as well as shoulder social responsibility. The theory of indenture management will be applied to the internal management of state-owned assets management areas in this paper. The theory plays an important role in increasing efficiency and reducing management pressure for the large-scale enterprise groups, which is also has strong theoretical and practical significance as well.
As a syndicate, the enterprise group involves many industries in multiple fields. Today, there are some serious problems in state-owned enterprises, such as outdated concept, the heavy burden on social welfare of the corporation, single investment main body and the loss of state assets. All of these problems give a greater pressure on the enterprise groups' development. Based on the theory of enterprise indenture, the writer will study the indenture management of enterprise group from theoretic and quantitative method in this paper. The focus of this paper is to build up a set of indenture management indexes system, and select scientific and proper evaluation methods, in order to evaluating the enterprisese' performance during the process of indenture management reform. It will make for mobilizing employees' enthusiasm and advancing working efficiency and guaranteeing that the state-owned assets keeping intrinsic value without losing.
Meantime, writer will select some underling corporations of a certain large enterprise group as the study objects in this paper, establishing the model to evaluate the enterperises' performance and forecasting operation trend. Based on the background of a real item, writer did some research on enterprises' operation status and receive some pertinent conclusions. Therefore, this study has practical significance.
企业集团作为多企业联合体,涉及多行业、多领域。当今,一些大型企业集团存在思想观念落后、企业办社会包袱沉重、投资主体单一化和国有资产流失严重等问题。这些现象给企业集团的发展带了较大的压力。本文以企业契约理论为切入点,从理论和量化方法两个方面研究企业集团契约化管理。本文的重点是构建一套契约化管理指标体系,选用科学、合理的评价方法,综合评价契约化管理实施过程中的企业绩效,充分调动企业员工积极性,提高企业运营效率,保证国有资产不流失、保值、增值。
同时,本文选取某大型企业集团下属经营单位为实践研究对象,构建模型综合评价契约化管理实施成果,建立简单预警模型。本文研究以实际项目为背景,对企业经营情况现状进行了实地调研,所得出的结论具有针对性,在实践中有一定的可操作性。
The indenture is a mutual check relationship that is signed on the condition of reaching agreement between two sides with written or oral form affected by law or regulations. At present, there is little research on enterprises' center management, although there are more studies on the theory of indenture at home and abroad. Currently, there being more changes in the domestic and international markets' competitive environment, the traditional state-owned enterprises are suffered a certain impact. How to improve operational efficiency, guarantee the state-owned assets without loss and preserve and increase the value-added has become the one of the most important issues that the domestic large-scale enterprise groups facing. Duel to our country's long-term planned economy period, there are more traditional business model in the control model of enterprises, which influence the production efficiency. As China's "the 11th Five-Year" plan proposed, the harmony, sustainable and development in economic, social and environmental has become China's economic development purposes. Enterprises should adjust business concepts promptly that seeking to maximize economic benefits as well as shoulder social responsibility. The theory of indenture management will be applied to the internal management of state-owned assets management areas in this paper. The theory plays an important role in increasing efficiency and reducing management pressure for the large-scale enterprise groups, which is also has strong theoretical and practical significance as well.
As a syndicate, the enterprise group involves many industries in multiple fields. Today, there are some serious problems in state-owned enterprises, such as outdated concept, the heavy burden on social welfare of the corporation, single investment main body and the loss of state assets. All of these problems give a greater pressure on the enterprise groups' development. Based on the theory of enterprise indenture, the writer will study the indenture management of enterprise group from theoretic and quantitative method in this paper. The focus of this paper is to build up a set of indenture management indexes system, and select scientific and proper evaluation methods, in order to evaluating the enterprisese' performance during the process of indenture management reform. It will make for mobilizing employees' enthusiasm and advancing working efficiency and guaranteeing that the state-owned assets keeping intrinsic value without losing.
Meantime, writer will select some underling corporations of a certain large enterprise group as the study objects in this paper, establishing the model to evaluate the enterperises' performance and forecasting operation trend. Based on the background of a real item, writer did some research on enterprises' operation status and receive some pertinent conclusions. Therefore, this study has practical significance.
引文
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2.威廉姆森.治理机制[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社.2001,201-210
3.科斯.企业的性质[M],载于陈郁.企业、市场和法律[M].上海:上海三联书店,1990,17-30
4.Cheung,S.N.S.The contractual nature of the firm.Journal of Law and Economics,26(1),1-21.1983
5.阿尔钦,德姆塞森.生产、信息成本和经济组织[M].盛洪.现代制度经济学(上卷)[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2003,1-6
6.吴乐意.企业契约理论及其发展--国有企业市场化的契约分析[D],广州:华南师范大学,2002
7.华艳琴.基于契约关系的民营企业治理机制研究[D],南京:河海大学,2006
8.Bengt Holmstrom.Moral Hazard in Teams,Bell Journal of Economics,13.pp.324-340,1982
9.张维迎.所有者、治理结构与委托--代理关系[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999,1-20
10.罗建刚.委托代理:国有资产管理体制创新[M].北京:北京财政经济出版社,2004,10-17
11.史金平.中国国有企业委托--代理制度的理论研究[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2005,13-15
12.杨瑞龙.不完全契约理论:一个综述[J],经济研究,2006,(2),32-33
13.林金忠.中小企业也能实现规模经济[J],经济学家,2001,(2),41-42
14.周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J],经济研究,1997,(6),36-38
15.易宪容.现代合约经济学导论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1998,13-16
16.王仕军.论西方企业契约理论的局限性[J],经济学研究,2006,(1),33-35
17.张民安.公司契约理论研究[J],现代法学,2003,(2),21-22
18.王俊.契约化--电信企业创新的新亮点[J],当代通信,2005,(12),62
19.孙加祺.论企业改制中产权和契约的关联与差异[J],经济界,2006,(5),53-56
20.王精华.国有建筑企业集团契约化管理初探[J],企业管理,2006,(6),29-32
21.罗日镁.我国国有企业委托--代理问题及解决途径[J],企业管理,2005,(8),171-172
22.翁丽玲.委托代理视角下的国有企业产权改革与管理层收购[D],成都:西南交通大学,2005
23.张英婕,陈德棉.国有企业委托代理关系分析及建议[J],商业研究,2005,(5),135-136
24.李丹岩.委托--代理模式下的公司治理结构探讨[D],西安:西北大学,2001
25.隋子林.国有资产管理模式的比较研究与借鉴[D],北京:中国农业大学,2005
26.张丽华.提高国有企业经济效益的有效途径--实行资产经营责任制[J],经济分析,1999,(3),57-59
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