摘要
近年来,针对以往政府投资项目管理模式存在的种种弊病,全国各地均已开始推行“代建制”项目管理模式的试运行,并取得显著成效。
代建制项目管理模式的推行关键在于:在信息不对称的情况下,如何用代建合同对代建单位进行激励与约束以避免代建制中的道德风险与逆向选择等问题。因此,代建合同是政府投资工程管理的核心,是信息不对称情况下的激励手段,是提高政府投资效益的关键。
本文首先归纳总结了代建制现有的合同激励措施,然后围绕政府部门与代建人的委托代理关系进行了代建制下委托代理模型的分析,总结出代建合同各方的诉求,然后结合委托代理关系的解析分析了目前代建制合同激励条款的局限性。其后探讨了代建管理费取费现状以及合理确定代建管理费的必要性,指出代建管理费用大体上由直接费、间接费、利润和税金、不可以预见费等五部分组成,参考有关资料设计出比较可行的代建管理费取费标准,并对现行代建管理计费形式提出建设性意见;基于目前代建合同中普遍忽视工期激励条款的现实,提出了以“联合基数法”思想对代建项目工期进行激励条款的设计,引入了奖励系数和高报惩罚系数,避免“逆向选择”的风险”的产生,同时能够合理地分担风险。上述思想同样适用于投资控制、质量控制等。最后结合代建制的特点,按风险分担的原则,对相关合同条款的设计进行说明。
In recent years, focusing on those existing drawbacks in the management model of the past government invested projects, all parts of the country have already pushed ahead with the trial run of the project management model of the government invested construction project t, namely“Agent Construction”, which has achieved remarkable effects.
The keys of the Agent Construction project management model are: Under the information asymmetry, how to motivate and restrict the contracted party by the Agent Construction contract while avoiding the risks of moral hazard, adverse selection etc. Therefore, the Agent Construction Contract is the core of government invested construction project, is the motivator under the information asymmetry, is the key of improving the effectiveness of the government invested construction project.
This article summarized the current incentive measures of the Agent Construction contract. Then it analyzed the principal-agent model between the government and the agent, summarized the claims of each party, finally analyzed the current limitations of the incentives terms of Agent Construction contract by the explanations of the principal-agent relationship.
And then, it studied the current status of the fee of the Agent Construction and the necessity of setting up the reasonable fee of the Agent Construction. The fee of the Agent Construction mainly includes five parts of direct cost, indirect cost, profits and taxes, and unforeseeable cost. With the reference, the standard of the fee of Agent Construction was set and constructive advices were offered; Based on the current popular“Construction Period Incentives”, the“Combined radix”concept was invented into the incentives mechanism with the bonus and penalty factors, which can avoid the risk of moral hazard and can reasonably pool the risks. The above concept can also apply to the control of investment, quality control etc. In the end, combining the characteristics of the Agent Construction, it depicts the related design of the contract terms under the riskpooling principal.
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