重点生态区位商品林生态补偿利益相关者演化博弈研究
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摘要
根据演化博弈理论,构建动态演化博弈模型,探讨重点生态区位商品林生态补偿过程中各利益主体在有限理性条件下的利益驱动、决策行为和依据以及主体间交互作用下的演化稳定策略,分析在不同情境下影响林农和地方政府演化博弈均衡的因素。研究结果表明:两大博弈主体的策略选择和策略演化方向依赖于初始状态及其演化路径,并与博弈矩阵的参数有关;地方政府的行为决策直接影响生态补偿项目的可持续性;作为项目的直接实施主体,林农的积极性与响应度直接影响生态补偿项目的实施效果。因此,应该建立健全生态补偿,完善生态环境保护激励机制,构建政府主导、林农参与的环境保护工作机制。
⑴ Background——As a forestry policy,the formulation and implementation of ecological compensation for commercial forests in key ecological locations involves the different interest demands of multiple interest groups,together with the multifunctional characteristics of forest resources themselves,which leads to the complexity and diversity of forestry policies in the process of formulation and implementation.Faced with the commercial forests that have been distributed to households,how governments at all levels solve the problem of "governments get green and forest farmers get profit" has been concerned by many scholars.⑵ Methods——Based on the stakeholder theory and game theory,this paper constructs a game model for dynamic evolution to explore the interest-driven,decision-making behavior and basis of stakeholders under the condition of bounded rationality,as well as the evolutionary stabilization strategy under the interaction of stakeholders.⑶ Results——It can be concluded that:first,only when the benefits of forest farmers' participation in commercial forest protection are greater than the short-term benefits under unprotected circumstances can forest farmers have the incentive to protect commercial forest resources.Reasonable ecological compensation standards or expanding the benefits of forest farmers' engagement in other production are the core to ensure that forest farmers change their traditional livelihood and participate in commercial forest protection;second,local governments have a high degree of influence and appeal in ecological compensation.When they implement the policies of ecological compensation for commercial forests with a probability greater than(C_1-U_1+U_2)÷W,the decision-making of forest farmers' behaviors will evolve accordingly,that is,they gradually converge to the protection from not participating in the protection of commercial forests,and then to a desired stable state;Third,the punishment of local governments for deforestation will also affect the behavior choice of forest farmers.⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——The behavior choice of forest farmers is affected by the trade-off between the actual net income obtained by participating in the protection of commercial forests and the net income not participating in the protection.The game results of the decision-making parties and the benefits and costs of the forest farmers' implementation of the protection strategy,the probability of local government implementing policies,the cost of implementing policies,and the penalties imposed on forest farmers are closely related.Therefore,the following suggestions are put forward:first,based on the value of ecosystem service system,establish scientific ecological compensation standards and diversified ecological compensation mechanisms.Second,Establish multi-level ecological environmental protection incentives.Third,we should establish a government-led environmental protection mechanism with the participation of forest farmers.
⑴ Background——As a forestry policy,the formulation and implementation of ecological compensation for commercial forests in key ecological locations involves the different interest demands of multiple interest groups,together with the multifunctional characteristics of forest resources themselves,which leads to the complexity and diversity of forestry policies in the process of formulation and implementation.Faced with the commercial forests that have been distributed to households,how governments at all levels solve the problem of "governments get green and forest farmers get profit" has been concerned by many scholars.⑵ Methods——Based on the stakeholder theory and game theory,this paper constructs a game model for dynamic evolution to explore the interest-driven,decision-making behavior and basis of stakeholders under the condition of bounded rationality,as well as the evolutionary stabilization strategy under the interaction of stakeholders.⑶ Results——It can be concluded that:first,only when the benefits of forest farmers' participation in commercial forest protection are greater than the short-term benefits under unprotected circumstances can forest farmers have the incentive to protect commercial forest resources.Reasonable ecological compensation standards or expanding the benefits of forest farmers' engagement in other production are the core to ensure that forest farmers change their traditional livelihood and participate in commercial forest protection;second,local governments have a high degree of influence and appeal in ecological compensation.When they implement the policies of ecological compensation for commercial forests with a probability greater than(C_1-U_1+U_2)÷W,the decision-making of forest farmers' behaviors will evolve accordingly,that is,they gradually converge to the protection from not participating in the protection of commercial forests,and then to a desired stable state;Third,the punishment of local governments for deforestation will also affect the behavior choice of forest farmers.⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——The behavior choice of forest farmers is affected by the trade-off between the actual net income obtained by participating in the protection of commercial forests and the net income not participating in the protection.The game results of the decision-making parties and the benefits and costs of the forest farmers' implementation of the protection strategy,the probability of local government implementing policies,the cost of implementing policies,and the penalties imposed on forest farmers are closely related.Therefore,the following suggestions are put forward:first,based on the value of ecosystem service system,establish scientific ecological compensation standards and diversified ecological compensation mechanisms.Second,Establish multi-level ecological environmental protection incentives.Third,we should establish a government-led environmental protection mechanism with the participation of forest farmers.
引文
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[15]李芬,甄霖,黄河清,等.土地利用功能变化与利益相关者受偿意愿及经济补偿研究“以鄱阳湖生态脆弱区为例”[J].资源科学,2009,31(4):580-589.
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[20]邵景安,邵全琴,芦清水,等.农牧民参与政府主导生态建设工程的初始行为响应“以江西山江湖和青海三江源为例”[J].自然资源学报,2012,27(7):1075-1088.
[21]龙开胜,王雨蓉,赵亚莉,等.长三角地区生态补偿利益相关者及其行为响应[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(8):43-49.
[22]王晓亮,杨裕钦,曾春媛.生态环境利益相关者的界定与分类:基于环境外部性视角[J].环境科学导刊,2013,32(3):11-15.
[23]李炜,田国双.生态补偿机制的博弈分析:基于主体功能区视角[J].学习与探索,2012(6):106-108.
[24]焦若静,牛海鹏.新常态下如何实现环境保护的纳什均衡[J].中国环境管理,2016,8(1):68-72.
[25]高超.演化博弈模型及其应用[D].太原:山西大学,2008:3-9.
[26]陈玉洁,仲伟周.基于演化博弈的僵尸企业退出机制[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2019,21(2):59-66.
[27]KOONTZ T M.We finished the plan,so now what?Impacts of collaborative stakeholder participation on land use policy[J].Policy Studies Journal,2005,33(3):459-481.
[28]郑晶,林慧琦.重点生态区位商品林赎买中的林农认知及其影响因素“基于福建的案例调查”[J].林业科学,2018,54(9):114-124.
[29]罗宝华,张彩虹.荒漠生态补偿利益主体行为的演化博弈分析[J].广东农业科学,2014(19):174-178,187.
[30]胡小飞,傅春.自然保护区生态补偿利益主体的演化博弈分析[J].理论月刊,2013(9):135-138.
[31]胡振华,刘景月,钟美瑞,等.基于演化博弈的跨界流域生态补偿利益均衡分析“以漓江流域为例”[J].经济地理,2016,36(6):42-49.
[32]王晓莉,徐娜,王浩,等.地方政府推广市场化生态补偿式扶贫的理论作用与实践确认[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(8):105-116.
[2]涂年旺.永安市重点生态区位林赎买和管理的实践与探索[J].华东森林经理,2015,29(3):25-27.
[3]张桂荣.重点生态区位商品林政府赎买试点探讨[J].福建林业,2015(6):39-41,45.
[4]吴守蓉,冀光楠.我国重大生态保护工程政策工具选择研究“以天保工程区集体公益林为例”[J].中国行政管理,2014(1):93-97.
[5]詹国明,周财荣,李日鸿,等.生态公益林可持续经营理念的创新探讨[J].安徽林业科技,2013,39(1):59-62.
[6]马晓伟.永平县生态公益林补偿实施中存在的问题及对策[J].林业调查规划,2012,37(5):60-63.
[7]俞静漪.自然保护区集体林权制度改革问题探讨[J].浙江林业科技,2009,29(2):73-76.
[8]邱晓鸿.黄岐半岛重点生态区位商品林政府赎买探讨[J].低碳世界,2015(22):306-307.
[9]林慧琦,王文意,郑晶.重点生态区位商品林赎买的投融资模式研究“以福建省为例”[J].中国林业经济,2018(3):1-5,16.
[10]林琰,陈治淇,陈钦,等.福建省重点生态区位商品林赎买研究[J].中国林业经济,2017(2):11-17.
[11]张江海,胡熠.福建省重点生态区位商品林赎买长效机制构建研究[J].福建论坛(人文社会科学版),2019(3):194-200.
[12]洪燕真,戴永务.福建省重点生态区位商品林赎买改革优化策略研究[J].林业经济,2019,41(1):92-97.
[13]刘金龙,傅一敏,赵佳程.地方林业政策的形成与执行过程解析“以福建Y市重点区位商品林赎买为例”[J].贵州社会科学,2018(4):140-146.
[14]李宁,王磊,张建清.基于博弈理论的流域生态补偿利益相关方决策行为研究[J].统计与决策,2017(23):54-59.
[15]李芬,甄霖,黄河清,等.土地利用功能变化与利益相关者受偿意愿及经济补偿研究“以鄱阳湖生态脆弱区为例”[J].资源科学,2009,31(4):580-589.
[16]陈传明.自然保护区生态补偿的利益相关者研究“以福建天宝岩国家级自然保护区为例”[J].资源开发与市场,2013,29(6):610-614.
[17]郑海霞,张陆彪,张耀军.金华江流域生态服务补偿的利益相关者分析[J].安徽农业科学,2009,37(25):12111-12115.
[18]王晓亮,杨裕钦,曾春媛.生态环境利益相关者的界定与分类“基于环境外部性视角”[J].环境科学导刊,2013,32(3):11-15.
[19]柯水发,赵铁珍.退耕还林工程利益相关者行为动态博弈分析[J].林业经济问题,2008,28(1):47-50,60.
[20]邵景安,邵全琴,芦清水,等.农牧民参与政府主导生态建设工程的初始行为响应“以江西山江湖和青海三江源为例”[J].自然资源学报,2012,27(7):1075-1088.
[21]龙开胜,王雨蓉,赵亚莉,等.长三角地区生态补偿利益相关者及其行为响应[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(8):43-49.
[22]王晓亮,杨裕钦,曾春媛.生态环境利益相关者的界定与分类:基于环境外部性视角[J].环境科学导刊,2013,32(3):11-15.
[23]李炜,田国双.生态补偿机制的博弈分析:基于主体功能区视角[J].学习与探索,2012(6):106-108.
[24]焦若静,牛海鹏.新常态下如何实现环境保护的纳什均衡[J].中国环境管理,2016,8(1):68-72.
[25]高超.演化博弈模型及其应用[D].太原:山西大学,2008:3-9.
[26]陈玉洁,仲伟周.基于演化博弈的僵尸企业退出机制[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2019,21(2):59-66.
[27]KOONTZ T M.We finished the plan,so now what?Impacts of collaborative stakeholder participation on land use policy[J].Policy Studies Journal,2005,33(3):459-481.
[28]郑晶,林慧琦.重点生态区位商品林赎买中的林农认知及其影响因素“基于福建的案例调查”[J].林业科学,2018,54(9):114-124.
[29]罗宝华,张彩虹.荒漠生态补偿利益主体行为的演化博弈分析[J].广东农业科学,2014(19):174-178,187.
[30]胡小飞,傅春.自然保护区生态补偿利益主体的演化博弈分析[J].理论月刊,2013(9):135-138.
[31]胡振华,刘景月,钟美瑞,等.基于演化博弈的跨界流域生态补偿利益均衡分析“以漓江流域为例”[J].经济地理,2016,36(6):42-49.
[32]王晓莉,徐娜,王浩,等.地方政府推广市场化生态补偿式扶贫的理论作用与实践确认[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018,28(8):105-116.