摘要
从博弈论的视角,探讨中央政府与地方政府间、地方政府间、地方政府与企业间、企业和公众间在生态环境保护和经济发展中基于利益最大化的博弈分析,力图找到各博弈主体生态环境保护与区域经济发展这两者之间协调共生的平衡点,促进两者从相克到相生的转变,整个生态环境和社会经济的可持续发展。
From the perspective of game theory,this paper probes into the game analysis based on the maximization of interests between central government and local government,between local governments,between local government and enterprises,and between enterprises and the public in the ecological environment protection and economic development,and tries to find out the balance point of the coordinated coexistence between the ecological environment protection and the regional economic development so as to accelerate the transformation from mutual restraint to mutual promotion,and the sustainable development of the whole ecological environment and social economy.
引文
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