会计信息可比性影响高管薪酬契约的有效性吗?
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摘要
基于2005-2016年我国A股上市公司数据,本文从薪酬业绩敏感性出发,研究了会计信息可比性对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。研究发现:会计信息可比性的提高增加了高管薪酬业绩敏感性,而这种影响在国有企业中较弱。表明会计信息可比性的提高有助于增加高管薪酬契约的有效性,但国有企业面临的行政干预制约了这种作用。进一步分析则表明,会计信息可比性对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响在信息不对称程度更严重的情况下较大。此外,会计信息可比性的提高降低了高管超额薪酬水平。本文的研究对于全面认识会计信息可比性的契约作用、提升高管薪酬契约有效性具有重要的参考价值。
Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2016,this study examines the impact of accounting information comparability on executive pay-performance sensitivity.We find that the improvement of accounting information comparability increases executive pay-performance sensitivity,which is weaker in state-owned enterprises(SOEs).These results show that the improvement of comparability enhances the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts,but the government intervention faced by SOEs limits the effect.In the further analysis,we show that comparability of accounting information has a greater impact on executive pay-performance sensitivity in the case of more serious information asymmetry.Meanwhile,we find that the improvement of comparability has reduced excess executive compensation.Our paper provides new insights into the contractual role of accounting information comparability and sheds light on how to improve the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts.
Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2016,this study examines the impact of accounting information comparability on executive pay-performance sensitivity.We find that the improvement of accounting information comparability increases executive pay-performance sensitivity,which is weaker in state-owned enterprises(SOEs).These results show that the improvement of comparability enhances the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts,but the government intervention faced by SOEs limits the effect.In the further analysis,we show that comparability of accounting information has a greater impact on executive pay-performance sensitivity in the case of more serious information asymmetry.Meanwhile,we find that the improvement of comparability has reduced excess executive compensation.Our paper provides new insights into the contractual role of accounting information comparability and sheds light on how to improve the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts.
引文
[1]陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010(11):56-64.
[2]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[3]刘慧龙.控制链长度与公司高管薪酬契约[J].管理世界,2017(3):95-112.
[4]WATTS R,ZIMMERMAN J.Positive accounting theory[J].Englewood Cliffs,N.J Prentice Hall,1986.
[5]NATARAJAN R.Stewardship value of earnings components:Additional evidence on the determinants of executive compensation[J].The Accounting Review,1996:1-22.
[6]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009(11):68-81.
[7]罗正英,詹乾隆,段姝.内部控制质量与企业高管薪酬契约[J].中国软科学,2016(2):169-178.
[8]BUSHMAN R M,SMITH A J.Financial accounting information and corporate governance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,32(1/3):237-333.
[9]GIBBS M,MERCHANT K A,STEDE W A V,et al.Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):409-436.
[10]罗宏,黄敏,周大伟,等.政府补助、超额薪酬与薪酬辩护[J].会计研究,2014(1):42-48.
[11]BARTH M E,LANDSMAN W R,LANG M,et al.Are IFRS-based and US GAAP-based accounting amounts comparable?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,54(1):68-93.
[12]BAE K H,TAN H,WELKER M.International GAAPdifferences:The impact on foreign analysts[J].The Accounting Review,2008,83(3):593-628.
[13]刘骏.关于FASB与IASB联合趋同会计信息质量特征的探讨[J].江西财经大学学报,2010(6):38-42.
[14]袁知柱,吴粒.会计信息可比性研究评述及未来展望[J].会计研究,2012(9):248-248.
[15]DE FRANCO G,KOTHARI S P,VERDI R S.The benefits of financial statement comparability[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2011,49(4):895-931.
[16]陈胜蓝,卢锐.股权分置改革、盈余管理与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].金融研究,2012(10):180-190.
[17]JENSEN M C,MURPHY K J.Performance pay and topmanagement incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[18]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[19]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8):110-122.
[20]姜付秀,朱冰,王运通.国有企业的经理激励契约更不看重绩效吗?[J].管理世界,2014(9):143-159.
[21]周兵,钟延勇,徐辉,等.企业战略、管理者预期与成本粘性:基于中国上市公司经验证据[J].会计研究,2016(7):58-65.
[22]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[23]刘斌,刘星,李世新,等.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3):35-39.
[24]KIM O,VERRECCHIA R E.The relation among disclosure,returns,and trading volume information[J].The Accounting Review,2001,76(4):633-654.
[25]BEBCHUK L A,FRIED J M,WALKER D I.Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[R].National Bureau of Economic Research,2002.
[26]CRYSTAL G S.Why CEO compensation is so high[J].California Management Review,1991,34(1):9.
[27]刘璇,吕长江.谁签订的薪酬契约?签约方身份与会计信息的契约作用:来自中国地方国有上市公司的证据[J].会计研究,2017(1):75-81.
[28]ARMSTRONG C S,GUAY W R,WEBER J P.The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010,50(2):179-234.
[29]SOHN B C.The effect of accounting comparability on the accrual-based and real earnings management[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2016,35(5):513-539.
[30]GOW I,TAYLOR D,VERRECCHIA R.On the complementary relation between earnings and private information[R].Working Paper,2012.
[31]谢德仁,林乐,陈运森.薪酬委员会独立性与更高的经理人报酬-业绩敏感度:基于薪酬辩护假说的分析和检验[J].管理世界,2012(1):121-140.
[32]姚颐,刘志远,冯程.央企负责人、货币性薪酬与公司业绩[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(6):123-135.
[33]CHEN J,EZZAMEL M,CAI Z.Managerial power theory,tournament theory,and executive pay in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(4):1176-1199.
[34]BARTH M E.财务报告的全球可比性:是什么、为什么、如何做以及何时实现[J].会计研究,2013(5):3-10.
[35]KIMBROUGH M D,WANG I Y.Are seemingly selfserving attributions in earnings press releases plausible?Empirical evidence[J].The Accounting Review,2013,89(2):635-667.
[36]陈玥,江轩宇.会计信息可比性能够降低审计收费吗?:基于信息环境与代理问题的双重分析[J].审计研究,2017(2):89-97.
[37]罗进辉.媒体报道与高管薪酬契约有效性[J].金融研究,2018(3):190-206.
[38]胥朝阳,刘睿智.提高会计信息可比性能抑制盈余管理吗?[J].会计研究,2014(7):50-57.
[39]CHENG C,AGNES S,ZHANG H.Effects of smoothing and comparability on value-relevance of earnings[R].Working Paper,2011.
[40]ROYCHOWDHURY S.Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.
[41]刘启亮,何威风,罗乐.IFRS的强制采用、新法律实施与应计及真实盈余管理[J].中国会计与财务研究,2011(1):57-121.
[42]姜付秀,石贝贝,马云飙.信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束[J].经济研究,2016(6):83-97.
(1)Pearson相关系数表明各研究变量之间不存在严重的多重共线性,限于篇幅未列示。
(1)计算真实盈余管理涉及的变量数据存在缺失,导致此处的样本量同前文有差异。
(1)COMPACCT=COMPACCT10时,研究结论保持一致,限于篇幅没有报告。
(1)COMPACCT=COMPACCT10时,研究结论保持一致,限于篇幅没有报告。
(1)限于篇幅未详细列示,下同。
[2]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[3]刘慧龙.控制链长度与公司高管薪酬契约[J].管理世界,2017(3):95-112.
[4]WATTS R,ZIMMERMAN J.Positive accounting theory[J].Englewood Cliffs,N.J Prentice Hall,1986.
[5]NATARAJAN R.Stewardship value of earnings components:Additional evidence on the determinants of executive compensation[J].The Accounting Review,1996:1-22.
[6]辛清泉,谭伟强.市场化改革、企业业绩与国有企业经理薪酬[J].经济研究,2009(11):68-81.
[7]罗正英,詹乾隆,段姝.内部控制质量与企业高管薪酬契约[J].中国软科学,2016(2):169-178.
[8]BUSHMAN R M,SMITH A J.Financial accounting information and corporate governance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,32(1/3):237-333.
[9]GIBBS M,MERCHANT K A,STEDE W A V,et al.Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):409-436.
[10]罗宏,黄敏,周大伟,等.政府补助、超额薪酬与薪酬辩护[J].会计研究,2014(1):42-48.
[11]BARTH M E,LANDSMAN W R,LANG M,et al.Are IFRS-based and US GAAP-based accounting amounts comparable?[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2012,54(1):68-93.
[12]BAE K H,TAN H,WELKER M.International GAAPdifferences:The impact on foreign analysts[J].The Accounting Review,2008,83(3):593-628.
[13]刘骏.关于FASB与IASB联合趋同会计信息质量特征的探讨[J].江西财经大学学报,2010(6):38-42.
[14]袁知柱,吴粒.会计信息可比性研究评述及未来展望[J].会计研究,2012(9):248-248.
[15]DE FRANCO G,KOTHARI S P,VERDI R S.The benefits of financial statement comparability[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2011,49(4):895-931.
[16]陈胜蓝,卢锐.股权分置改革、盈余管理与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].金融研究,2012(10):180-190.
[17]JENSEN M C,MURPHY K J.Performance pay and topmanagement incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[18]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[19]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007(8):110-122.
[20]姜付秀,朱冰,王运通.国有企业的经理激励契约更不看重绩效吗?[J].管理世界,2014(9):143-159.
[21]周兵,钟延勇,徐辉,等.企业战略、管理者预期与成本粘性:基于中国上市公司经验证据[J].会计研究,2016(7):58-65.
[22]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[23]刘斌,刘星,李世新,等.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3):35-39.
[24]KIM O,VERRECCHIA R E.The relation among disclosure,returns,and trading volume information[J].The Accounting Review,2001,76(4):633-654.
[25]BEBCHUK L A,FRIED J M,WALKER D I.Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[R].National Bureau of Economic Research,2002.
[26]CRYSTAL G S.Why CEO compensation is so high[J].California Management Review,1991,34(1):9.
[27]刘璇,吕长江.谁签订的薪酬契约?签约方身份与会计信息的契约作用:来自中国地方国有上市公司的证据[J].会计研究,2017(1):75-81.
[28]ARMSTRONG C S,GUAY W R,WEBER J P.The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2010,50(2):179-234.
[29]SOHN B C.The effect of accounting comparability on the accrual-based and real earnings management[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2016,35(5):513-539.
[30]GOW I,TAYLOR D,VERRECCHIA R.On the complementary relation between earnings and private information[R].Working Paper,2012.
[31]谢德仁,林乐,陈运森.薪酬委员会独立性与更高的经理人报酬-业绩敏感度:基于薪酬辩护假说的分析和检验[J].管理世界,2012(1):121-140.
[32]姚颐,刘志远,冯程.央企负责人、货币性薪酬与公司业绩[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(6):123-135.
[33]CHEN J,EZZAMEL M,CAI Z.Managerial power theory,tournament theory,and executive pay in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(4):1176-1199.
[34]BARTH M E.财务报告的全球可比性:是什么、为什么、如何做以及何时实现[J].会计研究,2013(5):3-10.
[35]KIMBROUGH M D,WANG I Y.Are seemingly selfserving attributions in earnings press releases plausible?Empirical evidence[J].The Accounting Review,2013,89(2):635-667.
[36]陈玥,江轩宇.会计信息可比性能够降低审计收费吗?:基于信息环境与代理问题的双重分析[J].审计研究,2017(2):89-97.
[37]罗进辉.媒体报道与高管薪酬契约有效性[J].金融研究,2018(3):190-206.
[38]胥朝阳,刘睿智.提高会计信息可比性能抑制盈余管理吗?[J].会计研究,2014(7):50-57.
[39]CHENG C,AGNES S,ZHANG H.Effects of smoothing and comparability on value-relevance of earnings[R].Working Paper,2011.
[40]ROYCHOWDHURY S.Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.
[41]刘启亮,何威风,罗乐.IFRS的强制采用、新法律实施与应计及真实盈余管理[J].中国会计与财务研究,2011(1):57-121.
[42]姜付秀,石贝贝,马云飙.信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束[J].经济研究,2016(6):83-97.
(1)Pearson相关系数表明各研究变量之间不存在严重的多重共线性,限于篇幅未列示。
(1)计算真实盈余管理涉及的变量数据存在缺失,导致此处的样本量同前文有差异。
(1)COMPACCT=COMPACCT10时,研究结论保持一致,限于篇幅没有报告。
(1)COMPACCT=COMPACCT10时,研究结论保持一致,限于篇幅没有报告。
(1)限于篇幅未详细列示,下同。
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