跨域生态环境协作治理中的集体行动:以祁连山区域生态治理为例
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摘要
在生态环境治理中,环保政策在纵向政府层层执行中的怠惰拖延以及政府部门、地方政府对横向环境协作的忽视冷漠导致了跨域生态环境协作的困境。作为我国生态文明体制改革的一个典型样本,祁连山生态环境的嬗变就深刻地体现了这一困境。作为枢纽和信息交汇处,纵向"中继者"组织——中央环保督察组和生态环境部地方派出执法监督机构,以及横向"中继者"组织——跨域生态环境协作治理组织,可以推进中央政府、地方政府、跨域协作组织、企业、非营利组织、学者、民众等行动主体的协作治理。在生态治理过程中,各个行动主体在理性的"搭便车者"和无私的奉献者之间面临着两难选择。在这个意义上,抑制行动主体的自利性并强化其为公共利益服务的利他性是实现协作治理的关键。同时,地方政府可以通过研究型事业单位和政府的派出机构与民众、学者等行动主体就环境治理问题进行协作,形成跨域治理的"空间利益共同体"。
The implementation of environmental policies and the collaborative governance of ecological environment were always neglected hierarchically and horizontally respectively. The problem of ecological environment of Qilian Mountain reflects the dilemma of collaborative environmental governance.It is also the sample of the reform of the ecological civilization system in China. The vertical junction eg."relais" —the Agency of Inspection of Environmental Protection of Central Government and the Local Institution of Inspection of Environmental Protection of Ministry of Environmental Protection, and the horizontal "relais"— the organization of cross-border ecological collaboration governance could improve the collaborative governance among central government, local government, cross-border collaborative organization, enterprises, non-profit organization, scholars and the public. In the process of ecological environmental governance, all actors are faced with the dilemma of rational "free-rider" and the altruistic behavior. To promote the ecological collaboration, this article suggests that it should be strengthened the behavior of public interest of actors so as to constrain the self-interest behavior of actors. At the same time,local governments might collaborate with the scholars and the public through research public institutions and local government agencies to construct the "alliance of space interests".
The implementation of environmental policies and the collaborative governance of ecological environment were always neglected hierarchically and horizontally respectively. The problem of ecological environment of Qilian Mountain reflects the dilemma of collaborative environmental governance.It is also the sample of the reform of the ecological civilization system in China. The vertical junction eg."relais" —the Agency of Inspection of Environmental Protection of Central Government and the Local Institution of Inspection of Environmental Protection of Ministry of Environmental Protection, and the horizontal "relais"— the organization of cross-border ecological collaboration governance could improve the collaborative governance among central government, local government, cross-border collaborative organization, enterprises, non-profit organization, scholars and the public. In the process of ecological environmental governance, all actors are faced with the dilemma of rational "free-rider" and the altruistic behavior. To promote the ecological collaboration, this article suggests that it should be strengthened the behavior of public interest of actors so as to constrain the self-interest behavior of actors. At the same time,local governments might collaborate with the scholars and the public through research public institutions and local government agencies to construct the "alliance of space interests".
引文
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[26]CAI Y.State and agent in China:disciplining government officials[M].Stanford:Stanford University Press,2014.
[27]蔡永顺.代理人困境与国家治理:兼评“风险论”[J].社会,2017(3):67-83.
(1)中继理论是19世纪末的丹麦数学家爱尔兰(Erlang)提出的。中继是指两点间的一条传输信道,这两点通常是交换中心。中继线是承载多条逻辑链路的一条物理连接。随着科技发展,中继的概念被应用于无线通信中,在其他领域也有应用。协作理论中借用“中继”的概念,是为了描述促使行动主体之间更好地沟通与合作而构建的协作组织的作用。
[2]LIEBERTHAL K.China’s governing system and its impact on environmental policy implementation[M].China Environment Series,Washington,DC:Woodrow Wilson,1997.
[3]荣敬本,崔之元,何增科,等.从压力型体制向民主合作体制的转变:县乡两级政治体制改革[M].北京:中央编译出版社,1998:28.
[4]周黎安.转型中的地方政府:官员激励与治理[M].上海:格致出版社,2008:191-198.
[5]杜雯翠,张平淡.县级市生态环境治理的两维向度:增长压力与财政压力[J].改革,2017(8):131-140.
[6]王猛.府际关系纵向分权与环境管理向度[J].改革,2015(8):103-112.
[7]STERN R E.From dispute to decision:suing polluters in China[J].China Quarterly,2011,206:294-312.
[8]杨龙.府际关系调整在国家治理体系中的作用[J].南开学报(哲学社会科学版),2015(6):37-48.
[9]江大树.迈向地方治理---议题、理论与实务[M].台北:元照出版公司,2006:26.
[10]朱喜群.生态治理的多元协同:太湖流域个案[J].改革,2017(2):96-107.
[11]BECK U.Risk society:towards a new modernity[M].London:SAGE publication,1992.
[12]OSTROM V,BISH R L,OSTROM E.Local government in the United States[M].San Francisco:ICS Press,1988:72-80.
[13]PROVAN K,KENIS P.Modes of network governance:structure,management,and effectiveness[J].Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,2008,18(2):229-252.
[14]杨立华,张柳.大气污染多元协同治理的比较研究:典型国家的跨案例分析[J].行政论坛,2016(5):24-30.
[15]叶林.空气污染治国际比较研究[M].北京:中央编译出版社,2014.
[16]马捷,锁利铭,陈斌.从合作区到区域合作网络:结构路径与演进---来自“9+2”合作区191项府际协议的网络分析[J].中国软科学,2014(12):79-92.
[17]DOBSON A.Environmental citizenship:towards sustainable development[J].Sustainable Development,2007,(15):276-285.
[18]赵鼎新.西方社会运动与革命理论发展之述评---站在中国的角度思考[J].社会学研究,2005(1):168-209.
[19]埃哈尔·费埃德伯格.权力与规则:组织行动的动力[M].张月,等,译.上海:格致出版社,2017.
[20]米歇尔·克罗齐耶,埃哈尔·费埃德伯格.行动者与系统:集体行动的政治学[M].张月,等,译.上海:格致出版社,2017:2、3、108、108-109.
[21]吴玉萍.矿山关闭退出是治本之策,对地方是伤筋动骨之举[N].中国环境报,2017-05-03.
[22]中办国办就甘肃祁连山国家级自然保护区生态环境问题发出通报[N].人民日报,2017-07-21(1).
[23]崔晶.区域地方政府跨界公共事务整体性治理模式研究:以京津冀都市圈为例[J].政治学研究,2012(2):91-97.
[24]任卫东,谭飞,董峻,等.绿色的呼唤:探访祁连山生态的最新报告[EB/OL].(2017-04-17)[2018-05-25].http://news.xinhuanet.com/2017-04/27/c_1120886761.htm.
[25]王海芹,高世楫.生态环境监测网络建设的总体框架及其取向[J].改革,2017(5):15-34.
[26]CAI Y.State and agent in China:disciplining government officials[M].Stanford:Stanford University Press,2014.
[27]蔡永顺.代理人困境与国家治理:兼评“风险论”[J].社会,2017(3):67-83.
(1)中继理论是19世纪末的丹麦数学家爱尔兰(Erlang)提出的。中继是指两点间的一条传输信道,这两点通常是交换中心。中继线是承载多条逻辑链路的一条物理连接。随着科技发展,中继的概念被应用于无线通信中,在其他领域也有应用。协作理论中借用“中继”的概念,是为了描述促使行动主体之间更好地沟通与合作而构建的协作组织的作用。