环境分权与区域绿色发展
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摘要
绿色发展是经济转型发展的根本途径,合理的环境管理体制是实现区域绿色发展的关键。本文从环境分权出发,探索实现区域绿色发展的中央政府和地方政府环境管理权责分配关系。将环境分权纳入环境与经济整体分析框架,引入财政分权指标,探索环境分权对区域绿色发展内在作用机理,并利用省级面板数据和空间计量模型实证检验作用机制。研究发现:①区域绿色发展空间正向溢出显著,本地区绿色发展水平的提高将促进其他区域的绿色发展。②全国层面环境分权、环境行政分权和环境监测分权对区域绿色发展具有显著促进作用,环境监察分权对区域绿色发展具有一定的负面影响。③环境分权与财政分权的互动效应整体为负。在地方环保部门拥有较大环境管理权力的同时,地方财政自主权的提高将造成区域绿色发展的恶化,其影响大小又与环境管理权力的类别相关。④不同地区环境分权的经济环境效应存在差异。随着国家对环境重视程度的不断提高,中西部地区环境分权对区域绿色发展的促进作用要强于东部地区,但环境分权与财政分权结合所得的负面影响更大。因此,为实现中国绿色发展、转型升级和实现高质量发展,应在考虑地方财政权力的基础上,从区域差异与环境管理权力类别差异两方面入手,建立差异化的环境管理体制。一方面,进一步提高中西部地区环境系统人员数,以此建立完善的环境管理网络;另一方面,环境行政与监测权力应适当下放,环境监察权力应适当上移。同时,应下放环境保护责任,增加环境转移支付,在实现地方权责匹配的基础上弱化财政分权与环境分权的联动效应。
Green development is the fundamental way of economic transformation and a reasonable environmental management system is the key to achieving regional green development. This paper starts from environmental decentralization and explores the relationship of environment management and responsibilities between the central government and local governments as a way to realize regional green development. Furthermore,it integrates environmental decentralization into the environmental and economic analytical framework,introduces a fiscal decentralization indicator to explore the mechanism of environmental decentralization and regional green development,and tests this using Chinese provincial penal data and spatial econometric model. As shown by the results,firstly,the spillover effect of green development is significant,namely improving regional green development will promote green development in the neighboring regions. Secondly,at the national level,environmental,environmental administrative,and environmental monitoring decentralization have positive impacts on regional green development,while environmental inspection decentralization may aggravate the situation. Thirdly, the interaction between environmental and fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on regional green development. While the local environmental protection department has greater environmental management power,the increase in local fiscal autonomy will worsen the regional green development,and the effect is related to the category of environmental management power. Finally,the effects of environmental decentralization vary among regions. With the increase in emphasis on the environment,the improvement of regional green development caused by environmental decentralization and the negative effect caused by the interaction term is more significant in central and western regions. Therefore,given the local fiscal power,the government should establish a differentiated environment management system from the differences of regions and management power categories in order to realize China's green development. On the one hand,the number of environmental system personnel in central and western regions should increase to establish a better environment management network. On the other hand,the environmental administrative and monitoring decentralization should increase while the inspection decentralization should decrease. Apart from that,the environmental protection responsibilities should be decentralized and the environmental transfer should be increased to match the power and responsibility of local government so as to weaken the interaction effect between fiscal and environmental decentralization.
Green development is the fundamental way of economic transformation and a reasonable environmental management system is the key to achieving regional green development. This paper starts from environmental decentralization and explores the relationship of environment management and responsibilities between the central government and local governments as a way to realize regional green development. Furthermore,it integrates environmental decentralization into the environmental and economic analytical framework,introduces a fiscal decentralization indicator to explore the mechanism of environmental decentralization and regional green development,and tests this using Chinese provincial penal data and spatial econometric model. As shown by the results,firstly,the spillover effect of green development is significant,namely improving regional green development will promote green development in the neighboring regions. Secondly,at the national level,environmental,environmental administrative,and environmental monitoring decentralization have positive impacts on regional green development,while environmental inspection decentralization may aggravate the situation. Thirdly, the interaction between environmental and fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on regional green development. While the local environmental protection department has greater environmental management power,the increase in local fiscal autonomy will worsen the regional green development,and the effect is related to the category of environmental management power. Finally,the effects of environmental decentralization vary among regions. With the increase in emphasis on the environment,the improvement of regional green development caused by environmental decentralization and the negative effect caused by the interaction term is more significant in central and western regions. Therefore,given the local fiscal power,the government should establish a differentiated environment management system from the differences of regions and management power categories in order to realize China's green development. On the one hand,the number of environmental system personnel in central and western regions should increase to establish a better environment management network. On the other hand,the environmental administrative and monitoring decentralization should increase while the inspection decentralization should decrease. Apart from that,the environmental protection responsibilities should be decentralized and the environmental transfer should be increased to match the power and responsibility of local government so as to weaken the interaction effect between fiscal and environmental decentralization.
引文
[1]李正图.中国发展绿色经济新探索的总体思路[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2013,23(4):11-17.
[2]赵领娣,张磊,徐乐,等.人力资本、产业结构调整与绿色发展效率的作用机制[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(11):106-114.
[3]FENG C, WANG M, LIU G C, et al. Green development performance and its influencing factors:a global perspective[J].Journal of cleaner production,2017,144:323-333.
[4]YUAN B,XIANG Q. Environmental regulation,industrial innovation and green development of Chinese manufacturing:based on an extended CDM model[J]. Journal of cleaner production,2018,176:895-908.
[5]张华,丰超,刘贯春.中国式环境联邦主义:环境分权对碳排放的影响研究[J].财经研究,2017,43(9):33-49.
[6]LEVINSON A. Environmental regulatory competition:a status report and some new evidence[J]. National tax journal,2003,56(1):91-106.
[7]BURGESS R,HANSEN M,OLKEN B A,et al. The political economy of deforestation in the tropics[J]. Quarterly journal of economics,2012,127(4):1707-1754.
[8]陆远权,张德钢.环境分权、市场分割与碳排放[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(6):107-115.
[9]盛巧燕,周勤.环境分权、政府层级与治理绩效[J].南京社会科学,2017(4):20-26.
[10]ULPH A. Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information[J].European economic review,1998,42:583-592.
[11]DIJKSTRA B R,FREDRIKSSON P G. Regulatory environmental federalism[J]. Annual review of resource economics,2010,2(1):319-339.
[12]BOSKOVIC B. Air pollution, externalities, and decentralized environmental regulation[R]. 2015-11-20. http://dx. doi. org/10. 2139/ssrn. 2781219.
[13]龙硕,胡军.政企合谋视角下的环境污染:理论与实证研究[J].财经研究,2014,40(10):131-144.
[14]CHANG H F,SIGMAN H,TRAUB L G. Endogenous decentralization in federal environmental policies[J]. International review of law and economics,2014,37:39-50.
[15]MILLIMET D L. Assessing the empirical impact of environmental federalism[J]. Journal of regional science,2003,43(4):711-733.
[16]白俊红,聂亮.环境分权是否真的加剧了雾霾污染?[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(12):59-69.
[17]TIEBOUT C M. A pure theory of local expenditures[J]. Journal of political economy,1956,64(5):416-424.
[18]OATES W E. On the evolution of fiscal federalism:theory and institutions[J]. National tax journal,2008,61(2):313-334.
[19]GOEL R K,MAZHAR U,NELSON M A,et al. Different forms of decentralization and their impact on government performance:microlevel evidence from 113 countries[J]. Economic modelling,2017,62:171-183.
[20]李强.河长制视域下环境分权的减排效应研究[J].产业经济研究,2018(3):53-63.
[21]KONISKY D M,WOODS N D. Environmental free riding in state water pollution enforcement[J]. State politics and research quarterly,2012,12(3):227-251.
[22]GROOMS K K. Enforcing the clean water act:the effect of statelevel corruption on compliance[J]. Journal of environmental economics&management,2015,73:50-78.
[23]SJOBERG E,XU J. An empirical study of US environmental federalism:RCRA enforcement from 1998 to 2011[J]. Ecological economics,2018,147:253-263.
[24]SIGMAN H. Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies[J]. Journal of environmental economics&management,2005,50(1):82-101.
[25]FREDRIKSSON P G, WOLLSCHEID J R. Environmental decentralization and political centralization[R/OL]. Working paper,2011. http://convegni. dises. univpm. it/environmentalfederalism/Fredriksson_Wollscheid. pdf.
[26]FERRARA I,MISSIOS P,YILDIZ H M. Inter-regional competition,comparative advantage and environmental federalism[J]. The Canadian journal of economics,2014,47(3):905-952.
[27]祁毓,卢洪友,徐彦坤.中国环境分权体制改革研究:制度变迁、数量测算与效应评估[J].中国工业经济,2014(01):31-43.
[28]OYONO P R. Profiling local-level outcomes of environmental decentralizations:the case of Cameroon’s forests in the Congo Basin[J]. Journal of environment&development,2005,9(3):17-20.
[29]彭星.环境分权有利于中国工业绿色转型吗?———产业结构升级视角下的动态空间效应检验[J].产业经济研究,2016(2):21-31,110.
[30]D’AMATO A,VALENTINI E. Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system[J]. Journal of regulatory economics,2011,40(2):141-159.
[31]MILLIMET D L. Environmental federalism:a survey of the empirical literature[R]. 2013. https://www. econstor. eu/bitstream/10419/90124/1/dp7831. pdf.
[32]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(3):4-12,22.
[33]尹振东.垂直管理与属地管理:行政管理体制的选择[J].经济研究,2011,46(4):41-54.
[34]SJOBERG E. An empirical study of federal law versus local environmental enforcement[J]. Journal of environmental economics and management,2016,76:14-31.
[35]吴延兵.中国式分权下的偏向性投资[J].经济研究,2017,52(6):137-152.
[36]黄寿峰.财政分权对中国雾霾影响的研究[J].世界经济,2017,40(2):127-152.
[37]陈硕.分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给[J].经济学(季刊),2010,9(4):1427-1446.
[38]黄建欢,吕海龙,王良健.金融发展影响区域绿色发展的机理———基于生态效率和空间计量的研究[J].地理研究,2014,33(3):532-545.
[39]单豪杰.中国资本存量K的再估算:1952—2006年[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2008(10):17-31.
[2]赵领娣,张磊,徐乐,等.人力资本、产业结构调整与绿色发展效率的作用机制[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(11):106-114.
[3]FENG C, WANG M, LIU G C, et al. Green development performance and its influencing factors:a global perspective[J].Journal of cleaner production,2017,144:323-333.
[4]YUAN B,XIANG Q. Environmental regulation,industrial innovation and green development of Chinese manufacturing:based on an extended CDM model[J]. Journal of cleaner production,2018,176:895-908.
[5]张华,丰超,刘贯春.中国式环境联邦主义:环境分权对碳排放的影响研究[J].财经研究,2017,43(9):33-49.
[6]LEVINSON A. Environmental regulatory competition:a status report and some new evidence[J]. National tax journal,2003,56(1):91-106.
[7]BURGESS R,HANSEN M,OLKEN B A,et al. The political economy of deforestation in the tropics[J]. Quarterly journal of economics,2012,127(4):1707-1754.
[8]陆远权,张德钢.环境分权、市场分割与碳排放[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(6):107-115.
[9]盛巧燕,周勤.环境分权、政府层级与治理绩效[J].南京社会科学,2017(4):20-26.
[10]ULPH A. Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information[J].European economic review,1998,42:583-592.
[11]DIJKSTRA B R,FREDRIKSSON P G. Regulatory environmental federalism[J]. Annual review of resource economics,2010,2(1):319-339.
[12]BOSKOVIC B. Air pollution, externalities, and decentralized environmental regulation[R]. 2015-11-20. http://dx. doi. org/10. 2139/ssrn. 2781219.
[13]龙硕,胡军.政企合谋视角下的环境污染:理论与实证研究[J].财经研究,2014,40(10):131-144.
[14]CHANG H F,SIGMAN H,TRAUB L G. Endogenous decentralization in federal environmental policies[J]. International review of law and economics,2014,37:39-50.
[15]MILLIMET D L. Assessing the empirical impact of environmental federalism[J]. Journal of regional science,2003,43(4):711-733.
[16]白俊红,聂亮.环境分权是否真的加剧了雾霾污染?[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(12):59-69.
[17]TIEBOUT C M. A pure theory of local expenditures[J]. Journal of political economy,1956,64(5):416-424.
[18]OATES W E. On the evolution of fiscal federalism:theory and institutions[J]. National tax journal,2008,61(2):313-334.
[19]GOEL R K,MAZHAR U,NELSON M A,et al. Different forms of decentralization and their impact on government performance:microlevel evidence from 113 countries[J]. Economic modelling,2017,62:171-183.
[20]李强.河长制视域下环境分权的减排效应研究[J].产业经济研究,2018(3):53-63.
[21]KONISKY D M,WOODS N D. Environmental free riding in state water pollution enforcement[J]. State politics and research quarterly,2012,12(3):227-251.
[22]GROOMS K K. Enforcing the clean water act:the effect of statelevel corruption on compliance[J]. Journal of environmental economics&management,2015,73:50-78.
[23]SJOBERG E,XU J. An empirical study of US environmental federalism:RCRA enforcement from 1998 to 2011[J]. Ecological economics,2018,147:253-263.
[24]SIGMAN H. Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies[J]. Journal of environmental economics&management,2005,50(1):82-101.
[25]FREDRIKSSON P G, WOLLSCHEID J R. Environmental decentralization and political centralization[R/OL]. Working paper,2011. http://convegni. dises. univpm. it/environmentalfederalism/Fredriksson_Wollscheid. pdf.
[26]FERRARA I,MISSIOS P,YILDIZ H M. Inter-regional competition,comparative advantage and environmental federalism[J]. The Canadian journal of economics,2014,47(3):905-952.
[27]祁毓,卢洪友,徐彦坤.中国环境分权体制改革研究:制度变迁、数量测算与效应评估[J].中国工业经济,2014(01):31-43.
[28]OYONO P R. Profiling local-level outcomes of environmental decentralizations:the case of Cameroon’s forests in the Congo Basin[J]. Journal of environment&development,2005,9(3):17-20.
[29]彭星.环境分权有利于中国工业绿色转型吗?———产业结构升级视角下的动态空间效应检验[J].产业经济研究,2016(2):21-31,110.
[30]D’AMATO A,VALENTINI E. Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system[J]. Journal of regulatory economics,2011,40(2):141-159.
[31]MILLIMET D L. Environmental federalism:a survey of the empirical literature[R]. 2013. https://www. econstor. eu/bitstream/10419/90124/1/dp7831. pdf.
[32]傅勇,张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向:为增长而竞争的代价[J].管理世界,2007(3):4-12,22.
[33]尹振东.垂直管理与属地管理:行政管理体制的选择[J].经济研究,2011,46(4):41-54.
[34]SJOBERG E. An empirical study of federal law versus local environmental enforcement[J]. Journal of environmental economics and management,2016,76:14-31.
[35]吴延兵.中国式分权下的偏向性投资[J].经济研究,2017,52(6):137-152.
[36]黄寿峰.财政分权对中国雾霾影响的研究[J].世界经济,2017,40(2):127-152.
[37]陈硕.分税制改革、地方财政自主权与公共品供给[J].经济学(季刊),2010,9(4):1427-1446.
[38]黄建欢,吕海龙,王良健.金融发展影响区域绿色发展的机理———基于生态效率和空间计量的研究[J].地理研究,2014,33(3):532-545.
[39]单豪杰.中国资本存量K的再估算:1952—2006年[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2008(10):17-31.
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