基于实验经济学的水权市场有效性研究
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摘要
在中国水权市场建立的探索时期,市场竞争机制作用发挥不充分,运用市场机制配置水资源程度仍偏低,而国内学界对于水权市场运行效率及其影响因素的研究却尤为匮乏。考虑到当前收集、使用实际运行数据分析水权市场有效性存在难度的事实,以及水权市场环境条件和相关人行为具有复杂性的现实状况,本文应用实验经济学方法建立虚拟水权交易市场,比较不同交易制度下水权市场效率,以及水权成交数量和成交价格的差异,并考察交易成本、市场势力因素及其交互组合对水权市场运行效果的影响。研究结果表明:①无论水权市场交易成本存在与否、水权初始分配为竞争还是垄断,双向拍卖、分散交易、明码标价三种交易制度下的水权交易均存在一定的社会福利损失;双向拍卖制度下的水权市场效率相对最优,成交价格、交易数量最接近于完全竞争市场的理论均衡值,而明码标价制度下的水权市场表现最不理想。②较之无交易成本的水权市场,考虑交易成本因素后三种交易制度下的水权市场效率均有下降;成交价格更趋向于竞争市场的理论均衡价格,尤以分散交易制度下的价格变动为最显著;与双向拍卖、分散交易制度形成对比的是,在明码标价制度下,交易成本的存在加剧了交易量对均衡成交数量的负向偏离。③较之仅考虑交易成本的水权市场,结合市场势力因素后,三种交易制度下水权市场效率明显降低,且双向拍卖制度下的效率变动为最小;由于市场势力的影响,三种交易制度下的平均价格偏离、平均交易数量偏离表现出显著增大的特征。基于实验结果,本文侧重于政府在水权市场建设中的作用,从加强水权市场制度建设、创新水权初始分配决策机制、重视水权交易配套设施建设等方面提出政策建议,以推进中国水权市场的健康、有效运行。
During the exploratory period pertaining to the establishment of water rights market in China,the role of the market competition mechanism was not fully employed. Furthermore,ever since,the degree to which the allocation of water resources is accomplished by using market mechanisms is still low. Congruently,domestic academic studies regarding the operating efficiency of the water rights market and its influencing factors are particularly scarce. Considering that it is difficult to collect actual operational data and analyze it in relation to the effectiveness of the water rights market and that the environmental conditions for the water rights market and related human behavior are complex topics,this paper applied experimental economics to establish a virtual water rights trading market that compares efficiency,trading volume,and price,for different trading institutions. It also investigated the influence of transaction costs and market power and their interaction in water rights markets. The results showed: ①A social welfare loss existed in water rights markets under three trading institutions: double auction,decentralized trading,and posted offer. Efficiency of a water rights market in a double auction was optimal,and trading prices and volumes were close to the theoretical equilibrium value of a perfectly competitive market. The market performance was worst when using the posted-offer method. ② Compared to a water rights market without transaction costs,the market efficiency and transaction costs under these three trading institutions declined when transaction costs were considered. Trading prices approximated the theoretical equilibrium price of a competitive market,and price variations were the most significant with decentralized trading. In contrast to a double auction and decentralized trading,transaction costs under a posted-offer method intensified the negative deviation of trading volume to the theoretical equilibrium. ③Compared to a water rights market that only considers transaction costs,the market efficiency under these three trading institutions was significantly reduced when market power was also considered. Because of market power,deviations to average prices and trading volumes under the three trading institutions increased significantly. Based on the experimental results,the government's role in building a water rights market becomes the focal point. To promote healthy and effective operation of water rights in China,this paper put forward policy recommendations such as strengthening the construction of water rights market system,innovatively taking initial allocation of water rights and attaching importance to the construction of supporting facilities for water rights trading.
During the exploratory period pertaining to the establishment of water rights market in China,the role of the market competition mechanism was not fully employed. Furthermore,ever since,the degree to which the allocation of water resources is accomplished by using market mechanisms is still low. Congruently,domestic academic studies regarding the operating efficiency of the water rights market and its influencing factors are particularly scarce. Considering that it is difficult to collect actual operational data and analyze it in relation to the effectiveness of the water rights market and that the environmental conditions for the water rights market and related human behavior are complex topics,this paper applied experimental economics to establish a virtual water rights trading market that compares efficiency,trading volume,and price,for different trading institutions. It also investigated the influence of transaction costs and market power and their interaction in water rights markets. The results showed: ①A social welfare loss existed in water rights markets under three trading institutions: double auction,decentralized trading,and posted offer. Efficiency of a water rights market in a double auction was optimal,and trading prices and volumes were close to the theoretical equilibrium value of a perfectly competitive market. The market performance was worst when using the posted-offer method. ② Compared to a water rights market without transaction costs,the market efficiency and transaction costs under these three trading institutions declined when transaction costs were considered. Trading prices approximated the theoretical equilibrium price of a competitive market,and price variations were the most significant with decentralized trading. In contrast to a double auction and decentralized trading,transaction costs under a posted-offer method intensified the negative deviation of trading volume to the theoretical equilibrium. ③Compared to a water rights market that only considers transaction costs,the market efficiency under these three trading institutions was significantly reduced when market power was also considered. Because of market power,deviations to average prices and trading volumes under the three trading institutions increased significantly. Based on the experimental results,the government's role in building a water rights market becomes the focal point. To promote healthy and effective operation of water rights in China,this paper put forward policy recommendations such as strengthening the construction of water rights market system,innovatively taking initial allocation of water rights and attaching importance to the construction of supporting facilities for water rights trading.
引文
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[20]刘世庆，巨栋，林睿．跨流域水权交易实践与水权制度创新——化解黄河上游缺水问题的新思路[J]．宁夏社会科学，2016(6):99-103.
[21]刘钢，王慧敏，徐立中．内蒙古黄河流域水权交易制度建设实践[J]．中国水利，2018(19):39-42.
[22]史煜娟．西北民族地区水权交易制度构建研究——以临夏回族自治州为例[J]．西北师大学报(社会科学版)，2019(2):140-144.
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[31]NARAYANNAN R,BELADI H,HANSEN R D,et al. Feasibility of seasonal water pricing considering metering costs[J]. Water resources research,1987,23(6):1091-1099.
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[33]CAREY J,SUNDING D L,ZILBERMAN D. Transaction costs and trading behavior in an immature water market[J]. Environment and development economics,2002,7(4):733-750.
[34]WANG Y. A simulation of water markets with transaction costs[J].Agricultural water management,2012,103:54-61.
[35]ERFANI T,BINIONS O,HAROU J J. Simulating water markets with transaction costs[J]. Water resources research,2014,50(6):4726.
[36]GARRICK D,WHITTEN S M,COGGAN A. Understanding the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy:a transaction costs analysis framework[J]. Ecological economics,2013,88(7):195-205.
[37]BEKCHANOV M,BHADURI A,RINGLER C. Potential gains from water rights trading in the Aral Sea Basin[J]. Agricultural water management,2015,152:41-56.
[38]尹云松，孟枫平，糜仲春．流域水资源数量与质量分配双重冲突的博弈分析[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2004(1):136-140.
[39]王亚华．自然资源产权的制度科层理论及其应用[J]．公共管理评论，2006(2):128-136.
[40]HARBERGER A C. Monopoly and resource allocation[J].American economic review,1954,5(2):77-92.
[41]KAMERSCHEN D R. An estimation of the‘welfare losses’from monopoly in the American economy[J]. Economic inquiry,1966,4(3):221-236.
[42]刘志彪，姜付秀，卢二坡．资本结构与产品市场竞争强度[J]．经济研究，2003(7):60-67.
[43]GODBY R. Market power in laboratory emission permit markets[J]. Environmental&resource economics,2002,23(3):279-318.
[44]CHERNENKO N. Market power issues in the reformed Russian electricity supply industry[J]. Energy economics,2015,50:315-323.
[45]MONTERO J P. Market power in pollution permit markets[J].Energy journal,2009,30(Special lssue#2):115-142.
[46]王道臻，李寿德．排污权市场中厂商势力对产品市场结构的影响[J]．系统管理学报，2011,20(4):510-512.
[47]ASGARI M H,MONSEF H. Market power analysis for the lranian electricity market[J]. Energy policy,2010,38(10):5582-5599.
[48]张占东，张铭慎．市场势力、煤电矛盾与潜在福利损失——来自上市公司的经验证据[J]．产业经济研究，2011(1):21-30.
[49]徐骏，曹学泸．我国电力市场中市场势力的形成及其监管问题研究[J]．价格理论与实践，2016(10):82-85.
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[2]沈满洪．论水权交易与交易成本[J]．人民黄河，2004(7):19-22.
[3]吴凤平，程明贝．二级水权交易市场定价方法研究——基于合作博弈视角的分析[J]．价格理论与实践，2018(5):43-46.
[4]田贵良，贾萌．水权价格影响因素实证研究——基于国家平台交易的经验证据[J]．资源与产业，2019(1):33-39.
[5]王慧敏，王慧，仇蕾，等．水期权及其定价模型——以南水北调东线为例[J]．系统工程，2008(7):45-51.
[6]唐润，王慧敏，王海燕．水权交易市场中的讨价还价问题研究[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2010(10):137-141.
[7]潘闻闻，吴凤平．水银行制度下水权交易综合定价研究[J]．干旱区资源与环境，2012(8):25-30.
[8]田贵良，顾少卫，韦丁，等．农业水价综合改革对水权交易价格形成的影响研究[J]．价格理论与实践，2017(2):66-69.
[9]吴凤平，于倩雯，沈俊源，等．基于市场导向的水权交易价格形成机制理论框架研究[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2018,28(7):17-25.
[10]刘钢，杨柳，石玉波，等．准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价机制实证研究[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2017,27(4):151-159.
[11]吴丹，王亚华．双控行动下流域初始水权分配的多层递阶决策模型[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2017,27(11):215-224.
[12]彭新育，罗凌峰．基于外部性作用的取水权交易匹配模型[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2017,27(S1):74-79.
[13]沈满洪．水权交易与政府创新——以东阳义乌水权交易案为例[J]．管理世界，2005(6):45-56.
[14]唐润，王慧敏，王海燕．政府规制下的水权拍卖问题研究[J]．资源科学，2011(10):1883-1888.
[15]田贵良，张甜甜．我国水权交易机制设计研究[J]．价格理论与实践，2015(8):35-37.
[16]潘海英，叶晓丹．水权市场建设的政府作为:一个总体框架[J]．改革，2018(1):95-105.
[17]田贵良，丁月梅．水资源权属管理改革形势下水权确权登记制度研究[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2016,26(11):90-97.
[18]沈满洪，陈军，张蕾．水资源经济制度研究文献综述[J]．浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)，2017(3):72-84.
[19]黄本胜，芦妍婷，洪昌红，等．广东省水权交易制度建设及试点若干问题探讨[J]．水利发展研究，2014(10):82-86.
[20]刘世庆，巨栋，林睿．跨流域水权交易实践与水权制度创新——化解黄河上游缺水问题的新思路[J]．宁夏社会科学，2016(6):99-103.
[21]刘钢，王慧敏，徐立中．内蒙古黄河流域水权交易制度建设实践[J]．中国水利，2018(19):39-42.
[22]史煜娟．西北民族地区水权交易制度构建研究——以临夏回族自治州为例[J]．西北师大学报(社会科学版)，2019(2):140-144.
[23]VAUX H J,HOWITT R E. Managing water scarcity:an evaluation of interregional transfers[J]. Water resources research,1984,20(7):785-792.
[24]HOWE C W, SCHURMEIER D R,SHAW W D. Innovative approaches to water allocation:the potential for water markets[J].Water resources research,1986,22(4):439-445.
[25]VICTOR B,MARTIN W E. Allocating a‘scarce’resource,water in the west:more market-like incentives can extend supply,but constraints demand equitable policies[J]. American journal of economics and sociology,1989,48(3):259-271.
[26]BOOKER J F,YOUNG R A. Modeling intrastate and interstate markets for Colorado River water resources[J]. Journal of environmental economics&management,1994,26(1):66-87.
[27]HEARNE R R,EASTER K W. The economic and financial gains from water markets in Chile[J]. Agricultural economics,1997,15(96):187-199.
[28]GRAFTON R Q,HORNE J. Water markets in the Murray-Darling Basin[J]. Agricultural Water Management,2014,145:61-71.
[29]BAUER C J. Bringing water markets down to earth:the political economy of water rights in Chile, 1976-95[J]. World development,1997,25(5):639-656.
[30]BILLINGS R B,AGTHE D E. Price elasticities for water:a case of increasing block rates[J]. Land economics,1980,56(1):73-84.
[31]NARAYANNAN R,BELADI H,HANSEN R D,et al. Feasibility of seasonal water pricing considering metering costs[J]. Water resources research,1987,23(6):1091-1099.
[32]TAKAYAMA T,JUDGE G G. Spatial and temporal price and allocation models[M]. Amsterdam&London:North-Holland Publishing Company,1971.
[33]CAREY J,SUNDING D L,ZILBERMAN D. Transaction costs and trading behavior in an immature water market[J]. Environment and development economics,2002,7(4):733-750.
[34]WANG Y. A simulation of water markets with transaction costs[J].Agricultural water management,2012,103:54-61.
[35]ERFANI T,BINIONS O,HAROU J J. Simulating water markets with transaction costs[J]. Water resources research,2014,50(6):4726.
[36]GARRICK D,WHITTEN S M,COGGAN A. Understanding the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy:a transaction costs analysis framework[J]. Ecological economics,2013,88(7):195-205.
[37]BEKCHANOV M,BHADURI A,RINGLER C. Potential gains from water rights trading in the Aral Sea Basin[J]. Agricultural water management,2015,152:41-56.
[38]尹云松，孟枫平，糜仲春．流域水资源数量与质量分配双重冲突的博弈分析[J]．数量经济技术经济研究，2004(1):136-140.
[39]王亚华．自然资源产权的制度科层理论及其应用[J]．公共管理评论，2006(2):128-136.
[40]HARBERGER A C. Monopoly and resource allocation[J].American economic review,1954,5(2):77-92.
[41]KAMERSCHEN D R. An estimation of the‘welfare losses’from monopoly in the American economy[J]. Economic inquiry,1966,4(3):221-236.
[42]刘志彪，姜付秀，卢二坡．资本结构与产品市场竞争强度[J]．经济研究，2003(7):60-67.
[43]GODBY R. Market power in laboratory emission permit markets[J]. Environmental&resource economics,2002,23(3):279-318.
[44]CHERNENKO N. Market power issues in the reformed Russian electricity supply industry[J]. Energy economics,2015,50:315-323.
[45]MONTERO J P. Market power in pollution permit markets[J].Energy journal,2009,30(Special lssue#2):115-142.
[46]王道臻，李寿德．排污权市场中厂商势力对产品市场结构的影响[J]．系统管理学报，2011,20(4):510-512.
[47]ASGARI M H,MONSEF H. Market power analysis for the lranian electricity market[J]. Energy policy,2010,38(10):5582-5599.
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